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Abstract
The Australian full imputation reform has now been in place for a little over ten years. 
There is a very large literature analysing the effects of tax systems in other countries 
on corporate financial policy and investment decisions. Strangely, there has been 
almost no formal analysis of the effects of the Australian tax system.
The aim of this thesis is to make a step towards filling this gap. The thesis draws on 
previous literature which has analysed the effects of foreign tax systems and modifies 
it for Australian tax settings. It provides a formal model of a widely-held company 
which takes account of company and personal taxes and investigates how Australia's 
full imputation provisions and capital gains tax provisions can affect decisions for 
Australian firms aiming to maximise the wealth of their shareholders. It emphasises 
the way in which Australia's indexed capital gains tax provisions which were 
introduced the year before the full imputation reform can combine with the full 
imputation provisions to provide incentives which are not well understood.
The model is used to examine the way in which Australian tax provisions can bias 
decisions over whether investment is financed by debt, new equity, or two different 
possible methods of retained earnings. In contrast to previous studies, it is argued that 
Australian tax provisions can provide a bias against debt and in favour of new equity 
issues. The study also clarifies a number of other financial incentives created by 
Australian tax provisions and estimates magnitudes of financial policy biases.
The model is also used to derive a cost of capital expression which takes account of 
corporate and personal taxes. Costs of capital for companies and unincorporated 
enterprises would be identical in the absence of capital gains taxation. Capital gains 
taxation can drive a wedge between costs of capital for corporate and unincorporated 
enterprises. This means that the full imputation reform will not have eliminated 
biases over whether investment takes place in companies or unincorporated 
enterprises even though the Australian full imputation reform was designed to 
approximate the full integration 'ideal'. Costs of capital are examined under both 
idealised and actual capital write-off provisions in Australia.
The model is extended back to consider how financial policy biases and costs of 
capital have changed since the time of Australia's former classical company tax 
system. We find that there is some uncertainty over whether financial policy biases 
have been reduced as a consequence of the full imputation reform. If Australia's 
former classical company tax system is modelled in the way that proponents of the 
'new view of dividends' would suggest, we find that Australia's full imputation may 
have had a relatively small effect in reducing biases concerning whether investment is 
undertaken by companies or unincorporated enterprises. Indeed, in the case of 
relatively tax-preferred forms of investment, the bias against corporate investment can 
be higher than would have arisen if a classical company tax system had been retained. 
Nonetheless, the reform appears to have had important effects in reducing biases 




1.2 Australia's Capital Gains Tax and Full Imputation Reforms 4
1.3 Relationship of Thesis With Other Literature 11
1.4 Key Assumptions and Possible Criticisms 19
1.5 Reasons for the Full Imputation Reform 24
1.6 Effects of Full Imputation 28
Chapter 2: Corporate Financial Policy
2.1 Introduction 37
2.2 The Model 38
2.3 Some Preliminaries 44
2.4 Financial Policy Biases 46
2.5 Assumptions Used in Deriving Numerical Estimates 61
2.6 Numerical Estimates of Financial Policy Biases 65
2.7 Reconciliation with the Data 73
2.8 Concluding Comments 80
Appendix 2.1: Modelling the Australian Realisation-Basis Capital Gains Tax as a 
Tax on Accrual 82
Chapter 3: Optimal Investment Decisions and The Cost of Capital
3.1 Introduction 87
3.2 Costs of Capital for Widely -Held Companies and Unincorporated
Enterprises 88
3.3 Cost of Capital Under Idealised Depreciation Provisions 92
3.4 Assumptions Underlying Numerical Estimates 102
3.5 Numerical Estimates 103
3.6 Concluding Comments 113
Appendix 3.1: Optimal Investment Decisions and The Cost of Capital 115
Appendix 3.2: Comparison with Sieper's Cost of Capital Expression 124
Chapter 4: Financing and Investment Biases Since 1984/85
4.1 Introduction 132
4.2 Major Tax Parameters Since 1984/85 136
4.3 The Classical Company Tax System and Financial Policy Biases 138
4.4 Changes in Financial Policy Biases: 1984/85 to 1996/97 150
4.5 The Classical Company Tax System and the Cost of Capital 155
4.6 Changes in Costs of Capital Between 1984/85 and 1995/96 157
4.7 Summary and Concluding Comments 171
Appendix 4.1: The Cost of Capital with a Classical Company Tax System 174





In 1986/87 Australia introduced a capital gains tax. One year later Australia's 
classical company tax system was abandoned and a full imputation system of 
company taxation was introduced. There is a very large international literature which 
has examined the incentive effects of tax systems in other countries. However, there 
has been very little formal analysis of the effects of the Australian full imputation 
company tax system. The aim of this dissertation is to derive a formal model to 
examine how Australia's full imputation company tax system and capital gains tax 
provisions can affect financial policy and investment decisions for widely-held 
companies owned by Australian residents. To do this the thesis draws on the work of 
King (1974a and 1977) and modifies it to take account of Australian tax provisions.
The broad structure of the thesis is as follows. The issues that will be analysed are 
outlined in this chapter. This chapter also provides some background information 
relevant to our study. It outlines key features of the Australian capital gains and full 
imputation provisions, discusses how this study departs from previous studies and 
provides some data on changes in investment, dividends and methods of corporate 
finance in recent years.
Chapter 2 presents the formal model of a company and uses it to investigate financial 
policy biases that can arise under Australia's full imputation provisions. King's work 
examined biases arising under a variety of company tax systems including imputation 
schemes but there are important differences in the Australian full imputation 
provisions from the imputation schemes that King analysed. King's work provided 
the underpinnings for the methodology of King and Fullerton (1984) which has been 
drawn on to analyse corporate financial policy biases in a number of countries 
including Australia. However, there are features of the Australian reform which have 
not been analysed clearly in Australian studies which have used the King-Fullerton 
methodology.
With the exception of Benge (1997) which draws on an early version of material from 
this thesis, there appear to have been no attempts to set down a formal model to 
consider financial policy biases under Australian tax settings or to estimate the 
magnitudes of these biases. In chapter 2 King's work is modified to take account of 
Australia's indexed capital gains tax provisions and the two different forms of
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dividends ('franked' and 'unfranked' dividends) that firms can pay. We examine 
financial policy biases for widely-held Australian companies as a result of Australian 
tax provisions.1 This allows us to derive insights which differ in important ways from 
other studies. For example, there has been controversy over the extent to which the 
Australian reform has eliminated a tax bias favouring debt. Some other studies have 
argued that the bias has been only partially removed while some have argued that the 
bias has been completely removed. In contrast to other studies, we show that the 
indexation provisions of the capital gains tax together with full imputation can result 
in the tax bias in favour of debt being more than completely removed. We show that 
in times of inflation, new equity can be favoured relative to debt.
Other studies appear to have come to differing conclusions over whether or not 
retained earnings are tax preferred to new equity. In Australia incentives to retain 
profits depend on whether any dividends would be franked or unfranked if profits 
were distributed instead. Our study examines the conditions required for new equity 
to be tax preferred to each of these forms of retained earnings. Finally, we estimate 
the magnitude of financial policy biases under Australian tax settings.
King also examines how company and personal tax provisions can interact to affect 
investment decisions. In chapter 3 King's analysis is modified to investigate the cost 
of capital (i.e., the minimum pre-tax rate of return at which investment becomes 
profitable).
The effect of dividend taxation on corporate investment decisions is controversial. 
This thesis, in common with the 'new view of dividends' models of Auerbach (1979a 
and b) and Bradford (1981), assumes that equity investment in companies is financed
1 Throughout the thesis, the companies being referred to should be thought of as widely held. For 
closely-held companies it may be possible to reduce capital gains tax liabilities in ways which are not 
analysed. We assume that a fixed fraction of shares are sold in each period which means that if firms 
retain profits, shareholders will be subject to capital gains tax. For closely-held companies there is the 
option of retaining profits for a number of years and then paying dividends immediately before shares 
are sold. If a closely-held company has a single shareholder, this procedure could be used to eliminate 
any capital gains tax being levied on retained profits. While, in principle, widely-held companies 
could attempt to retain profits for a fixed number of years and then make a distribution to cater for a 
certain clientele of shareholders, this seems to be much less likely to be feasible and there is no 
evidence of this happening in practice. Our assumption that retention leads to taxable capital gains 
appears much more plausible for widely-held than closely-held companies.
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in the least cost way.2 Under a classical company tax system in which capital gains 
are taxed less heavily than dividends, retentions are a cheaper way of raising equity 
than new equity issues. Proponents of the new view of dividends assume that equity 
investment is financed at the margin by the retention of profits. In this case, for 
mature firms which are able to meet their equity requirements by the retention of 
profits, formal models suggest that the tax rate on dividends should affect neither 
investment nor dividend decisions. An interesting aspect of the Australian reform is 
that normally new issues will be tax preferred to the retention of frankable earnings 
(ie., the retention of profits which would be franked if paid as dividends). By 
modifying King's work for Australian tax settings, we derive a model where the tax 
treatment of dividends affects both investment and dividend decisions.
In chapter 3, cost of capital expressions are derived for both widely-held companies 
and unincorporated enterprises. In the absence of capital gains tax, costs of capital 
would be the same for these two types of firm.3 We explore how capital gains 
taxation together with the Australian full imputation system can cause costs of capital 
for these two types of firms to diverge. Costs of capital are examined under idealised 
depreciation provisions: an immediate deduction for capital expenditure (expensing), 
deductions for falls in the real value of assets (real economic depreciation) and 
deductions for falls in the nominal value of assets (nominal economic depreciation). 
Reasons for costs of capital expressions in these three simple cases are discussed.
This helps in developing an understanding of how full imputation can affect 
incentives to invest. Estimates of costs of capital are also made taking account of 
actual capital allowances available in Australia.
In chapter 4 the analysis in chapters 2 and 3 is extended backwards in time to consider 
how financial policy biases and investment biases have changed over the period since 
1984/85 which was before the full imputation and capital gains tax reforms. This 
allows us to assess the overall effects of the capital gains tax and full imputation 
reforms and of other tax changes on financial policy and investment biases. It is 
sometimes argued (see, for example, Zodrow, 1992) that if the new view of dividends 
is the correct way of modelling a classical company tax system, the case for partial
2 The 'new view of dividends is also sometimes referred to as the 'trapped equity' model of the 
corporation.
3 Costs o f capital for closely-held companies would be the same as those of unincorporated enterprises 
if distribution policy could be manipulated to avoid any capital gains tax impost.
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integration measures such as Australia's full imputation company tax system is 
substantially undermined. In chapter 4 we use a new view model to consider the 
effects of the classical company tax system. We show that even in this case the full 
imputation reform appears to have had important effects on investment biases. 
However, the main reason is not that full imputation has reduced biases influencing 
whether investment takes place in the corporate or unincorporated sectors. Instead it 
is because full imputation tends to reduce biases between different forms of 
investment a company can undertake.
An important goal of the thesis is to help open up analysis of Australian tax provisions 
and to allow insights from the international literature to be modified for Australian tax 
settings. This is a very large task and the thesis is little more than a first step in this 
direction. Some brief comments on directions for future research are provided in 
chapter 5.
1.2 Australia's Capital Gains Tax and Full Imputation Reforms
Before the set of tax changes initiated in the mid-1980s Australia had a classical 
company tax system. The company tax rate was 46 per cent and dividends could pass 
within the corporate sector free of tax as a result of the intercorporate dividend rebate. 
Tax rates levied on resident 'final shareholders' (ie., shareholders other than 
corporations able to make use of the intercorporate dividend rebate) varied between 0 
per cent and 60 per cent. Over one-third of dividends received by individual 
shareholders were by those on the top personal marginal rate of 60 per cent. 
Superannuation funds which were major shareholders were normally untaxed. Life 
insurance companies were taxed at the company tax rate of 46 per cent on their non­
superannuation business.
At that time Australia had no general capital gains tax although certain capital gains 
were taxed under specific provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act, for example, 
profits made on the sale of assets within 12 months of purchase, (s. 26AAA), on 
property acquired for the purpose of making profits by sale (s. 25 A) or on the trading 
profits of dealers in land, shares and securities (s. 25). Regulations prohibited 
companies from buying back their own shares and from purchasing shares in related 
companies.
Proposals for changing the system of company taxation had been analysed in the 
Australian Financial System Inquiry: Final Report (1981), (often referred to as the 
Campbell Report). This inquiry together with its commissioned studies had
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advocated a switch away from Australia's classical company tax system to a fully- 
integrated company tax system.
The first clear indication that the government was prepared to contemplate changing 
the company tax system was provided in the government's Draft White Paper (1985). 
The Draft White Paper proposed sweeping changes to the tax system including a 
general capital gains tax and indicated (somewhat tentatively) that the government 
was 'disposed to allow either partial (say 50 per cent) or full imputation credits on 
dividends received by resident individual shareholders, on a broadly revenue-neutral 
basis.'4 This was followed by a statement by the Treasurer on 19 September 1985 
(Keating, 1985) which announced a wideranging set of tax reforms. Importantly for 
our study they included a general capital gains tax and a switch to full imputation.
The Capital Gains Tax
The following key features of the capital gains tax which was introduced with effect 
from 1 July 1986 on assets acquired on or after 20 September 1985 are relevant for 
our study:
• as with capital gains taxes in other countries, gains are taxed on realisation (when 
assets are disposed of) rather than as the gains accrue;
• gains are taxed at ordinary rates of personal or company tax;5
• if an asset is sold which has risen in real value, tax is normally levied only on the 
real (inflation-adjusted) capital gain;6
• if an asset is sold which has fallen in nominal value, the nominal capital loss may 
be offset against real capital gains in the same year or be carried forward to be 
offset against future real capital gains;7
• if there is inflation and an asset is sold which has fallen in real value but risen in 
nominal value, there is neither a taxable gain nor a deductible loss.
4 See Draft White Paper (1985, p. 199).
5 A proviso which we do not analyse is that for gains on assets held by individuals, there is a notional 
averaging provision to limit the "bunching" of capital gains.
6 Exceptions arise if gains are realised within a year of the asset being acquired or if the asset is sold 
by a dealer in the asset. In either of these cases the nominal gain is taxable.
7 The loss cannot be offset against income other than capital gains.
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The somewhat peculiar indexation provisions reflect the government's desire to only 
tax real capital gains without moving to a tax system which was comprehensively 
indexed for inflation. For example, there were no moves to inflation index either 
depreciation provisions, deductions for trading stock or interest. If real capital losses 
were deductible, this would have provided a backdoor method of indexing 
depreciation provisions if firms buy and sell assets to realise real capital losses.
The capital gains tax rules are varied if the inflation rate becomes negative but for 
simplicity this complication will be ignored in the model presented in this thesis. The 
indexation provisions mean that there are a number of different possible cases to 
analyse when the inflation rate is positive. First, if it were known that shares would 
eventually all be sold for more than their real acquisition cost, only real gains would 
be taxable on realisation (provided the gain is not realised within 12 months or by a 
sharetrader). Second, if it were known that all shares would eventually be sold for 
less than their real but more than their nominal acquisition cost, at the margin any 
additional capital gain would be untaxed. Third, if it were known that all shares 
would ultimately be sold for less than their nominal acquisition cost, at the margin any 
nominal capital gain would be taxed (ie., reduce the nominal capital loss that can be 
set off against capital gains in that year or carried forward to be offset against such 
income in future years).8
Further complications arise for two reasons. First, even if the future profile of share 
prices were known, a capital gain could lead to a real gain for some shareholders, a 
real loss but nominal gain for others and a reduction of the nominal loss for others 
depending on when the shares were acquired. Second, in practice the future profile of 
share prices will be uncertain. For any one shareholder there will be the possibility of 
real gains or nominal gains being taxed or gains being untaxed. These further 
complications are ignored in our formal analysis where we treat the future profile of 
gains as being certain and assume that all shareholders either derive real gains, 
nominal losses or real losses but nominal gains.
The Full Imputation Scheme
In his 19 September 1985 announcement, the Treasurer also stated that a full 
imputation scheme would be introduced in the 1987/88 income year. The initial
8 As discussed in footnote 3, nominal gains would also be taxed where gains are realised within 12 
months of an asset being acquired or when gains are realised by a sharetrader.
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scheme was modified in a further statement by the Treasurer on 10 December 1986 
(Keating, 1986) which, inter alia, included a decision to adopt a franked/unfranked 
dividend approach instead of the United Kingdom's ACT approach and (as is 
discussed further below) to allow firms to pass imputation credits to shareholders by 
issuing bonus shares as well as by paying dividends. Other key features of the scheme 
introduced in 1987/88 were as follows:
• the company tax rate was raised from 46 cents in the dollar and aligned with the 
top personal marginal tax rate of 49 cents in the dollar9;
• imputation credits were made available to offset taxes on other income earned by 
resident individuals but not to give rise to cash refunds to individuals below the 
tax-free threshold, to tax-exempt bodies or to non-residents;
• imputation credits were made available only in respect of Australian tax paid by 
companies.
The franked/unfranked dividend approach works broadly as follows. Suppose that the 
company tax rate is x. On each dollar of assessable income the company pays x in the 
tax and the remainder 1 -  x increases the company's 'franking account balance' which 
allows it to pay an additional 1 -  x in franked dividends. If a company has a positive 
franking account balance, it can pay franked dividends and each dollar of franked 
dividends reduces the franking account balance by a dollar. On franked dividends, 
imputation credits can be claimed by Australian taxpaying shareholders including 
individuals, life insurance companies and superannuation funds.10
Suppose that a shareholder is a taxpaying resident taxed at rate m > 0. On each dollar 
of franked dividends the shareholder will be taxed on the grossed-up dividend of
9 This was not quite effective alignment for those on the top personal marginal tax rate because of the 
1 per cent Medicare Levy which increased the top effective personal marginal tax rate to 50 per cent.
10 Superannuation funds were nontaxpayers until 1988/89 and so were unable to claim imputation 
credits until that time. Up until 1988/89 dividends received by life insurance companies were 
effectively exempt due to the intercorporate dividend rebate and life insurance companies could not 
claim imputation credits. If a company earned $100, paid $49 in tax and distributed the remaining $51 
as dividends to shareholders which were life insurance companies, the life insurance companies would 
have paid no further tax and have received $51 in after-tax dividends. In 1988/89 life insurance 
companies became able to claim imputation credits but were denied the intercorporate dividend rebate. 
This change has no effect on the tax liabilities of life insurance companies so long as life insurance 
companies are taxed at the same statutory rate as other companies.
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1/(1 — t) but can claim an imputation credit o f x / ( l - x )  which results in a net tax 
liability of (m -  x) / (1 -  t) and an after-tax dividend of (1 -  m) / (1 -  x). This means 
that if a company earns one dollar in taxable income, pays x in tax and distributes the 
remainder as a franked dividend, its shareholder (assume a single shareholder for 
convenience) would pay a further m -  x in tax and receive 1 - m  after tax. This is in 
line with the imputation scheme's objective of ensuring that distributed corporate 
income is taxed once at a shareholder's marginal tax rate. If m > x, additional tax is 
payable when franked dividends are paid. If 0 < m < x , franked dividends lower a 
shareholder's tax liability.
Once firms have reduced their franking account balance to zero by paying franked 
dividends, any further dividends are unfranked. A shareholder pays tax of m on each 
dollar of unfranked dividends and receives 1 — m after tax. Thus, if a firm earns $1 
and fully distributes its after-tax profits to a taxpaying resident shareholder, the 
shareholder would end up with 1 - m  after tax irrespective of whether or not the 
income was taxed in the company's hands.
As imputation credits arise only when Australian tax is paid, the benefits of measures 
which reduce company tax can be clawed back in full or in part. Measures which 
reduce company tax may include intentional legislated tax preferences or unintended 
loopholes in the tax law. The benefit of a reduction in company tax can be clawed 
back in full if the reduction in company tax transforms a dividend which would have 
been franked to one which is unfranked.11’12 The benefit can also be clawed back in 
part if the reduction in company tax reduces the level of franked dividends a company 
can pay and thus results in a firm retaining more profits than would otherwise be the 
case. This is because this will add to the value of shares which may result in a capital 
gains tax liability for shareholders when shares are sold.
11 The taxation of unfranked dividends may also at times wash away the benefits of the inflation 
indexation of capital gains. Suppose there is inflation and a company owns an asset which maintains 
its real value. If the firm sells the asset, it pays no capital gains tax. However, if the company has a 
zero franking account balance and distributes the proceeds to shareholders as dividends, the dividends 
will be unfranked and taxable. This may make it desirable for individuals to own assets which 
appreciate in nominal value such as rental property directly rather than through a private company.
12 The way in which partial integration measures can claw back tax preferences when dividends are 
paid is well known (see, for example, McLure, 1979).
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Imputation credits are not refundable and so cannot be claimed by a nontaxpayer.
They also cannot be carried forward or back to offset tax in other years and so 
imputation credits in excess of those required to drive a shareholder's tax liability to 
zero or imputation credits received by shareholders who are temporarily in a tax-loss 
position are wasted. 13 Imputation credits are also not refunded to foreign shareholders 
and so foreign shareholders gain no direct benefit from the imputation scheme. 14 As a 
result of these provisions the value of franked dividends relative to unfranked 
dividends varies between shareholders. There are complex provisions aimed at 
preventing companies from streaming different forms of dividends to different groups 
of shareholders.
When full imputation was introduced, the intercorporate dividend rebate was 
preserved. As a result of this rebate, both franked and unfranked dividends received 
by Australian companies other than life insurance companies are effectively exempt. 
However, franked dividends add to the corporate shareholder's franking account 
balance allowing credit for underlying company tax to pass down a chain of 
companies.
At times firms may wish to retain profits while providing shareholders with 
imputation credits. Firms can do this by capitalising profits and issuing franked bonus 
shares which are taxed as dividends. Suppose, for example, that a company earns a 
dollar of assessable income and pays t in tax which increases its franking account
13 Suppose, for example, that an superannuation fund which is taxed at 15 cents in the dollar has $ 100 
of interest income and $64 of franked dividends. Assuming the current company tax rate of 36 per 
cent, the franked dividends correspond to $100 of grossed-up dividends. Tax on the grossed up 
income would be $30 (i.e., 15 per cent multiplied by $200) but the superannuation fund would have 
$36 of imputation credits. As the imputation credits exceed tax on the grossed up income, the 
superannuation fund would have no tax to pay. However, $6 of the imputation credits would be 
wasted.
14 At the same time as the full imputation scheme was introduced, dividend withholding tax on 
franked dividend payments to non residents was terminated. Unfranked dividends paid to foreign 
shareholders continue to be subject to a withholding tax of 15 or 30 per cent of gross dividends 
depending respectively on whether payments are made to a DTA (double-tax-agreement) or non-DTA 
country. If $100 of gross unfranked dividends are paid by an Australian company to a resident of a 
DTA country, the Australian company would pay $15 in withholding tax and a net dividend of $85 to 
the foreign shareholder.
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balance by 1 -  x. The company can use the retained earnings to issue 1 -  x of franked 
bonus shares on which shareholders can claim an imputation credit of x and pay net 
tax of m -  x. Shareholders would be deemed to have acquired the shares at a cost of 
1 -  x for capital gains tax purposes. The final position would be exactly the same as if 
the company had paid 1 -  x as a franked dividend and shareholders had bought new 
shares of this amount.
The bonus share provision was designed to allow the Australian full imputation 
scheme to approximate a fully-integrated company tax system. An important feature 
of the original reform was the alignment of the company tax rate with the top personal 
marginal tax rate. Even in the absence of any capital gains tax, this would have 
provided incentives for firms earned by domestic residents to pay the maximum level 
of franked dividends or issue franked bonus shares instead if they wished to retain 
profits. No domestic residents paid additional tax and some benefited from reductions 
in tax when franked dividends were paid. The capital gains tax reinforced these 
incentives as failing to distribute franked dividends or franked bonus shares leads to 
increased share values and a potential capital gains tax liability when shares are sold. 
If firms had a policy of either distributing franked dividends or issuing franked bonus 
shares so as to maintain a zero franking account balance from year to year, all 
corporate profits would be taxed at the marginal tax rates of shareholders. This would 
be true whether franked dividends were paid or profits retained and bonus shares 
issued. The Australian full imputation scheme was intended to operate like a fully- 
integrated company tax system without legally requiring firms to allocate profits to 
individual shareholders.
Evidence will be provided later that imputation credits declared by individuals are too 
low for firms to be maintaining a zero franking account balance from year to year so 
the full imputation system has not been as close an approximation to full integration 
in practice as the previous discussion might suggest. Part of the reason may be 
changes in the company tax rate. Since the initial reform the company tax rate was 
lowered from 49 per cent to 39 per cent in 1988/89 and further lowered to 33 per cent 
in 1993/94 before being increased to 36 per cent in 1995/96. As changes to personal 
marginal tax rates have been minor, this has fractured the alignment between the 
company tax rate and the top personal marginal tax rate which is currently 48.5 per 
cent (inclusive of the 1.5 per cent Medicare Levy).
New Zealand also announced a switch from a classical company tax system to full 
imputation at much the same time as Australia. Key design features of the full 
imputation schemes in the two countries are very similar. Important differences
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include the fact that New Zealand has no general capital gains tax and that New 
Zealand has kept the company tax rate and top personal marginal tax rate aligned.
This means that incentives to distribute franked dividends or issue franked bonus 
shares have been preserved in New Zealand while these incentives may, in some 
cases, have been undermined in Australia.
1.3 Relationship of Thesis with Other Literature
Many Australian studies have examined aspects of the incentives provided by the 
Australian tax system. Some have adopted variants of the effective tax rate 
methodology of King and Fullerton (1984) such as the Bureau of Industry Economics 
(1988, 1990a, 19906 and 1993), Jones (1993) and Pender and Ross (1993). In these 
studies the effective tax rate is defined as (p -  s) / p wherep  is the real pre-tax rate of 
return and s is the real post-tax rate of return to savers. There have also been a 
number of other studies including Freebaim (1990), Hamson and Ziegler (1990), 
Pender (1991) and Bourassa and Hendershott (1992). Most recently Sieper (1995) has 
examined the cost of capital for deferred-income projects. These studies have 
provided many useful insights into the incentives that the Australian tax system 
provides.
The effective tax rate studies have their analytical foundations in the work of King 
(1974a and 1977) which also forms the foundations for our study. These effective tax 
rate studies focus on how the King-Fullerton methodology should be modified to take 
account of Australian tax settings. However, unlike our study and the earlier work of 
King they do not write down a formal model from first principles and it is often 
difficult to identify key assumptions. Our formal model has the advantage of 
clarifying assumptions and provides insights about corporate financial policy and 
investment biases that differ in important ways from previous studies.
In King (1974a, b and 1977) and King and Fullerton (1984) it is assumed that under 
an imputation scheme all dividends provide imputation credits.15 By contrast in 
Australia (as was outlined above), companies can pay either franked or unfranked 
dividends and only franked dividends qualify for imputation credits.16 Our model
15 Bourassa and Hendershott (1992) also make this assumption.
16 A number of other papers have analysed a parallel issue which can arise under an advance 
corporation tax, ACT, system. Under such system, if a firm pays a dividend of D, ACT of cD/( 1 -c) is 
levied on the firm where c is the rate of imputation credit. However, ACT can be set off against
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modifies King's work by allowing for both franked and unfranked dividends and 
allowing for the Australian indexed capital gains tax provisions. It is the first attempt 
at providing a formal model of the Australian full imputation company tax system 
which takes account of these two important tax provisions and which does not impose 
ad hoc assumptions about a firm's value. Our model follows King (1974a and 1977) 
and Auerbach (1979a) in allowing the value of a firm to be endogenous.
As is discussed further below, a number of other studies have assumed that firms pay 
a fixed fraction of their dividends franked. This is unattractive when examining the 
effects of interest deductibility and capital write-off provisions because these 
provisions affect company tax payments. Payments of company tax can have a 
shadow benefit to shareholders in increasing the level of franked dividends that firms 
can pay. In our model the level of franked dividends that a firm can pay depends on 
company tax payments and this allows us to examine corporate financial policy and 
investment incentives in a consistent manner.
Financial Policy Biases
It is well known that a classical company tax system can introduce a bias in favour of 
debt. One of the aims of the Australian full imputation reform was to ameliorate this 
bias.17 King (1974a and 1977) analysed how any bias in favour of debt depends on 
whether equity is financed by the retention of profits or by the issuing of new equity 
and on the system of company taxation. King (1977, /?. 100) concludes that under a 
full imputation scheme a firm would be indifferent between debt and new equity.
There has been considerable debate over this issue in Australia. Freebaim (1990,/?. 
16) concludes that 'for most investing situations, debt finance is favoured over equity 
finance'. Jones (1993,/?. 70) concludes that his results 'appear to suggest a favouring 
of debt finance for the financing decisions of residents.' He acknowledges that an 
important cause is that the weighted tax rate on those who supply debt capital tends to 
be lower than that on those who supply equity and cites a study by the Bureau of 
Industry Economics (1990a). If a lower effective tax rate on debt merely reflects the
mainstream coiporation tax. Thus, if a firm pays additional mainstream corporation tax, this can 
increase the ACT offset. A number of papers have examined the effects of this provision and other tax 
asymmetries including Edwards and Keen (1985) in a certainty setting and Mayer (1986) and Keen and 
Schiantarelli (1991) in an uncertainty setting.
17 See, for example, Keating (1986 and 1987).
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fact that those supplying debt capital happen to be on lower tax rates, it appears 
difficult to argue that this implies a tax bias in favour of debt. The Bureau of Industry 
Economics study considered effective tax rates on a taxpayer by taxpayer basis 
assuming that suppliers of debt and equity were taxed at the same rate. It claims (p. 
ix) that the 'bias towards debt has been progressively reduced over time but probably 
not eliminated'. By contrast Hamson and Ziegler (1990) provide a numerical example 
to show that taxed resident individual shareholders will be indifferent between 
personal and corporate borrowing. Pender (1991, p. 64) also provides a numerical 
example to argue that 'there is no bias toward debt provided all dividends are paid 
franked and the attached franking credits can be used.'
In chapter 2 our formal model of the company is introduced and used to examine how 
full imputation and the capital gains tax provisions will affect leverage and dividend 
policy for widely-held companies owned by Australian residents. In contrast to the 
studies cited above, it is concluded that in times of inflation Australian tax provisions 
can go further than merely eliminating debt/equity biases and create a bias in favour 
of new equity issues. The formal model is also helpful in distinguishing two types of 
retained profits: those which would have resulted in franked dividends if distributed 
and those which would have resulted in unfranked dividends. Incentives to retain 
profits differ between the two cases. In chapter 2 we document the financial policy 
biases which can be created between debt, new equity and these two forms of retained 
earnings and consider magnitudes of these biases.
Our results on tax biases between other forms of finance and these two separate forms 
of retention are difficult to compare with studies which have used the King-Fullerton 
methodology to examine Australian tax provisions but which have not distinguished 
these two forms of retention. Such studies appear to have arrived at differing 
conclusions about which of retentions or new equity is the cheaper form of finance in 
Australia. Exact reasons are frequently difficult to identify because explanations of 
assumptions are often terse, as is perhaps not altogether surprising given the 
complexity of these models. For example, Jones (1993 ,p. 69) argues that using 1990 
data '. . . retained earnings are generally the tax-favoured form of equity finance. This 
is clearly true for Australia.' In corroboration he estimates a total effective tax rate of 
50.3 per cent for new issues and 40.4 per cent for retained earnings. In another paper 
in the same volume which provides an overview of effective tax rates across nine 
countries and which appears to use the same data, Jorgenson (1993,/?. 19) finds a total 
effective tax rate of 31.2 per cent for new issues and 59.0 per cent for retained 
earnings for Australia in 1990. The only apparent difference in their assumptions is
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that Jones assumes 7 per cent annual inflation while Jorgenson assumes 5 per cent 
inflation which cannot explain the big difference in results.
If there are differences in assumptions about the franking of dividends in the two 
studies, this matter may resolve the apparent conflict. We show that the retention of 
profits which would be unfranked if paid as dividends is tax favoured relative to new 
issues but new issues tend to be tax favoured relative to the retention of profits which 
would be franked if paid as dividends.
Investment Decisions
It is common to analyse the effects of tax incentives on incentives to invest in terms of 
the cost of capital. Jorgenson (1963) proposed analysing investment incentives in 
terms of the 'user cost of capital'. Hall and Jorgenson (1967 and 1971) analysed how 
detailed provisions of the tax code including investment allowances and accelerated 
depreciation could affect the user cost of capital on a marginal investment. Their 
measure of the user cost of capital differs from our measure in being gross of 
depreciation. King (1974a and 1977) clarifies how different forms of finance can 
affect the cost of capital under a number of different company tax systems. Our 
measure of the cost of capital as being the minimum real pre-tax rate of return at 
which investment becomes profitable is equivalent to the financial cost of capital of 
King (1977).
In Chapter 3 we modify King's analysis to take account of detailed provisions of the 
Australian full imputation and capital gains tax provisions. In an Appendix to chapter 
3 we following King (1974a) in allowing for interest rates, inflation rates and 
depreciation provisions which vary through time. We also allow for there to be 
differences in the relative prices of capital goods and output. In the Appendix, 
optimal investment decisions for unincorporated enterprises and widely-held 
companies owned by Australian shareholders are derived. In most of the analysis, 
however, it is assumed that there is a constant interest rate, inflation rate, constant 
depreciation provisions and a constant relative price of capital goods to output. This 
allows us to examine some important effects of taxes on incentives to invest as simply 
as possible.
Costs of capital for unincorporated enterprises and companies are compared and it is 
shown that costs of capital would be the same in the absence of any capital gains
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tax.18 Capital gains taxation will cause costs of capital for corporate and 
unincorporated enterprises to diverge because measures which reduce company tax 
constrain the levels of franked dividends firms can pay. Other things equal, fewer 
franked dividends implies increased retentions which will boost the value of shares. 
This will normally increase capital gains tax liabilities for shareholders. Chapter 3 
analyses the effects of this on costs of capital. The sensitivity of the estimates to a 
number of assumptions including tax rates of shareholders, the frequency of share 
turnover, rates of inflation and the proportion of debt finance are also explored.
Our conclusions are difficult to compare with Australian studies which have used the 
King-Fullerton methodology. First, a number of studies including the Bureau of 
Industry Economics (1988 and 1990a) assume a fixed ratio of franked to unfranked 
dividends. This is unsatisfactory when examining the effects of accelerated 
depreciation and investment allowances as tax payments affect a firm's ability to pay 
franked dividends. The second of these studies considers a closely-associated issue at 
one stage when it presents an 'alternative approach' {pp. 46ff.) which considers how- 
interest deductions can affect a firm's ability to pay franked dividends. It does not, 
however, consider the identical problem of how to analyse the effect of capital write­
off provisions when these affect the firm's ability to pay franked dividends. In a 
number of other studies including the Bureau of Industry Economics (19906), Jones 
(1993) and Jorgenson (1993), it is difficult to identify assumptions about the 
proportion of dividends which are franked.
The Bureau of Industry Economics (1993) analyses the effects of providing a 150 per 
cent deduction for corporate R&D relative to that of a 100 per cent deduction. This 
study considers the clawback of tax preferences available at the company level. To do 
this, however, it examines two polar extreme possibilities. First, it considers the case 
of a firm paying unfranked dividends where the preference is fully clawed back. 
Second, it considers the case where there is no clawback. This requires that capital 
gains taxation be ignored.19 The Bureau of Industry Economics study does not
18 Given that New Zealand has introduced a full imputation scheme which is very like Australia's but 
does not have a general capital gains tax, our analysis suggests that New Zealand may have largely 
removed investment biases between corporate and unincorporated enterprises. Australia's capital gains 
tax will, however, cause costs of capital to differ between corporate and unincorporated enterprises.
19 The BIE's assumptions of how a 100 per cent deduction for R&D affects franked dividend 
payments are obscure which makes it difficult to compare our analysis with theirs more fully.
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consider effective tax rates under less extreme assumptions or examine how an 
optimising firm might behave.
These studies have provided useful insights and have been more ambitious than this 
thesis in considering important issues such as the existence of foreign shareholders 
which this thesis neglects. However, the studies have seemed to ignore important 
issues or have not clearly specified all critical assumptions. Some of these studies are 
also open to other possible criticisms. As Bourassa and Hendershott (1992) note, not 
all measures which impact on effective tax rates need affect investment decisions. For 
example, at a given interest rate, tax rates on bondholders will influence effective tax 
rates but have no effect on investment decisions.20
More recent King-Fullerton studies have attempted to overcome this sort of difficulty 
by separately identifying an effective corporate tax rate and an effective personal tax 
rate on corporate-source income (see, for example, Jorgenson, 1993, and Jones, 1993). 
Jorgenson defines the effective corporate tax rate as being ( p - q )  / p  where q is the 
after-corporate but before-personal tax rate of return. Jorgenson argues (p. 9) that it is 
the effective corporate tax rate which measures incentives to invest. 'Differences 
among these tax rates indicate barriers to efficient allocation of capital among assets 
and industries, since corporations equalize rate of return after corporate taxes.'
Under the Australian full imputation scheme, however, it will not generally be 
optimal for companies to equalise rates of return after company tax. This is because it 
will normally be optimal for widely-held companies to distribute franked dividends 
(dividends with imputation credits) so shareholders can claim the imputation credits 
rather than retaining profits which can lead to a capital gains tax liability for 
shareholders. This means that paying company tax has a shadow benefit to 
shareholders which must be taken into account as company tax payments increase the 
franked dividends that companies can pay.
Suppose, for example, a company taxed at a rate of 36 per cent invested in a 
perpetuity which provided taxable income of $100 per annum which yields $64 per 
annum net of company tax. The $64 per annum would yield $64(1 -  m) / (1 -  x) or 
$100(1 -  m) per annum in after-tax franked dividends assuming that dividends are 
fully distributed. If instead the company invested in a tax-free perpetuity which 
yielded $64 per annum, this would not generally be as attractive to shareholders. If
20 Jorgenson (1993) provides a good discussion of other possible criticisms.
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profits are distributed, dividends would be unfranked (taxable without imputation 
credits) and shareholders would gain only $64(1 -  m) from the stream of unfranked 
dividends. Instead the company might retain the profits. This would still be inferior 
to shareholders receiving a stream of $64(1 -  m) / (1 -  t) per annum in franked 
dividends if, as it is argued will normally be the case, shareholders have a preference 
for franked dividends to be distributed.
Similar issues can arise under an ACT imputation scheme where beyond some point 
dividends become taxable when ACT starts to exceed a company's mainstream 
corporate tax liability. Separating effective tax rates into effective corporate rates and 
effective personal rates does not seem sufficient to identify investment biases.
Pender and Ross (1993) modify the King-Fullerton methodology by assuming that 
marginal investments will be those which are only just attractive to shareholders. 
Effective tax rates are expressed in terms of the pre-tax rate of return on such an 
investment and the post-tax rate of return to shareholders. The interest rate is taken as 
given and tax rates on bondholders do not affect effective tax rates. Pender and Ross 
go beyond this thesis by allowing for risk and uncertainty but fail to do so in a 
consistent manner, discounting riskless interest payments at a risk-adjusted discount 
rate. They mention capital gains tax asymmetries but do not analyse how capital 
gains taxes depend on changes in the overall value of the firm. Perhaps most 
importantly, they assume that whenever a firm retains a dollar, its value rises by a 
dollar. By contrast in our study the value of the firm is endogenous.
Like King-Fullerton studies, Freebaim (1990) presents estimates of investment biases 
in Australia using 'effective tax rates'. However, Freebaim's methodology is very 
different from that of King and Fullerton (1984) and in our view can be misleading.
To understand his methodology, consider investment by an unincorporated business 
whose owner is taxed at rate, m. Assume, as Freebaim does, that an investment is a 
'one-hoss shay' with a life of A years. Freebaim defines his effective tax rate as T / r 
where T = m{r + DE -  DT), DE is what Freebaim describes as the average 
annualised rate of economic depreciation, DT is the average annualised rate of tax 
depreciation and r is the real cost of funds which is assumed to be 5 per cent. 
Freebaim defines
and
d e  = - 1
N7T\ N( \ +r) 5 - 1
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where Z is the present value of tax depreciation discounted at the real cost of funds.
For a specific example, consider the case of expensing (an immediate deduction for 
capital expenditure) when Z = 1 and so DT = 1 / N . Suppose that a taxpayer is on a 
48.3 per cent marginal tax rate and finances investment with his own capital.
Consider investment in either a one-year or a five-year investment. Freebaim 
analyses this case as 'repairs, promotion, etc.' in Table 1 (p. 32). The effective tax rate 
for the one-year investment is 48.3 per cent and the effective tax rate for the five-year 
investment is 30.7 per cent.
The conclusion that the reader is invited to take from this analysis is that the tax 
system favours investment in five-year relative to one-year expensible investments. 
Freebaim does not provide a rigorous justification for his methodology and this 
conclusion seems to contrast with conventional analysis. It is well known that with 
expensing, pre- and post-tax rates of return will be identical. Given the assumed tax 
rate, a taxpayer will finance 51.7 per cent of the cost of an investment and receive 
51.7 per cent of the revenue. As tax reduces the cost of the investment and its 
revenues in the same proportion, the pre- and post-tax rates of return will be the same. 
Given that investments which generate the same pre-tax rate of return also generate 
the same post-tax rate of return, it appears difficult to see any reason for expensing to 
lead to a bias against shorter-lived investments.21
It is clear that Freebaim's analysis is also quite different from that of King and 
Fullerton. Given that pre- and post-tax rates of return are identical, the King-Fullerton 
measure of effective tax rates, ( p -  s) / p will be zero and be independent of asset 
durability. By contrast, in this example, Freebaim's measure of effective tax rate is 
positive and declining with asset durability.
There appears to be another difficulty with the Freebaim study. In calculating 
effective tax rates, Freebaim (Appendix, p. xiii) assumes that equity shareholders are 
taxed like unincorporated investors. Our analysis clarifies the conditions required for 
this to be a reasonable assumption. We will argue that this would be reasonable if 
shares were held forever and so the effective rate of capital gains tax were zero. 
However, in general, capital gains taxation will cause costs of capital for companies 
and unincorporated enterprises to diverge.
21 The neutrality of expensing with respect to asset durability seems well accepted in the literature. 
See, for example, King (1977, Table 8.1), Harberger (1980) and Auerbach (1983).
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It is easier to relate our results to those of Bourassa and Hendershott (1992) who also 
provide a cost of capital expression for Australian firms when examining how 
incentives to invest in the corporate sector compare with incentives to invest in 
housing. Bourassa and Hendershott compare costs of capital across three countries 
(Australia, Sweden and the United States). They also go beyond this thesis in 
examining owner-occupied housing and also in allowing for risk and uncertainty. 
However, in modelling Australian business tax provisions, these authors make a 
number of important abstractions. For example, they treat all dividends as being 
franked, ignore the fact that interest payments affect a firm's ability to pay franked 
dividends and abstract from important details of the Australian capital gains tax 
provisions by assuming nominal gains are taxed at a low rate instead of allowing for 
real gains to be taxed. These abstractions ignore a number of important properties of 
Australian tax provisions which we wish to analyse.
The only study which has carefully modelled detailed provisions of the Australian tax 
system and derived an expression for the cost of capital from first principles is Sieper 
(1995). One difference between our two approaches is that Sieper ignores inflation 
while the effect of inflation on corporate financial policy biases and investment 
decisions is an important issue we wish to analyse. A second difference is that Sieper 
formally models a realisation-basis tax while we adopt the more conventional 
simplification of modelling the tax as an accrual-equivalent tax. Appendix 2.1 shows 
that this simplification can be justified rigorously if (as Sieper assumes) a fixed 
fraction of shares are sold each period. The key difference between our approaches is 
that Sieper assumes that the value of a firm is the sum of its physical capital and 
retained earnings (assumed to be invested in financial assets). This makes the value 
of a firm independent of its stream of future deductions and biases his results. In our 
model the value of the firm is endogenous.
1.4 Key Assumptions and Possible Criticisms
The formal model of an optimising firm developed in chapters 2 and 3 rests on five 
key assumptions.22
First, we abstract from any signalling or agency benefits of dividends or debt. This 
assumption can be criticised. In the United States there has been an extended debate 
between proponents of the new view and proponents of the traditional view of
22 All of these assumptions were used in King (1974a).
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dividends. For recent discussions see Sinn (1991a) or Zodrow (1992). Proponents of 
the traditional view argue that under a classical company tax system the retention of 
profits tends to be tax advantaged relative to distribution. For this reason they often 
argue that dividends must have some signalling function or provide agency benefits 
(by placing desirable constraints on corporate management) which balances their tax 
disadvantage.23 Proponents of the new view have tended to argue that these functions 
may be provided in other ways and the debate is yet to be fully resolved.
In Australia the majority of firms do not pay unfranked dividends. For firms paying 
franked dividends only, our analysis suggests that the payment of these dividends will 
normally be tax preferred. For such firms it is not necessary to introduce signalling or 
agency benefits to explain why dividends might be paid. As the distribution of 
franked dividends is tax preferred, signalling or agency benefits would merely 
reinforce incentives for franked dividends to be fully distributed. Ignoring signalling 
and agency issues seems helpful at least in an initial attempt to investigate the 
incentive effects of the Australian full imputation scheme.
Ignoring signalling and agency issues may perhaps be a bigger problem when 
considering the minority of firms which pay unfranked dividends. Our analysis 
suggests that there will normally be incentives for firms to avoid paying unfranked 
dividends. The question of why firms pay unfranked dividends under Australian full 
imputation appears to provide a stronger puzzle than why firms pay dividends under 
the United States classical company tax system. In the United States people have 
been puzzled why firms do not repurchase shares or purchase equity in other firms as 
a way of providing shareholders with tax-preferred capital gains. Until recent years, 
however, there has been uncertainty over whether share repurchase would be taxed as 
dividends and there may be costs in mounting takeovers which provide impediments
23 Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and Bemheim (1991) provide examples of dividend 
signalling models. Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasise that agency costs can have important 
effects on the financial structure of a firm and Jensen (1986) argues that dividends may provide 
beneficial constraints on managers by restricting free cash flow. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) provide 
empirical support for the free-cash-flow hypothesis and Bemheim and Wantz (1995) for dividend 
signalling. The last article also provides a much more comprehensive survey of the literature on this 
issue.
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to firms using this as a way of rewarding shareholders.24 In Australia firms have an 
important alternative to paying unfranked dividends which can provide shareholders 
with tax-preferred capital gains. By repaying a dollar of debt or lending a dollar, a 
company can provide shareholders with a stream of after-tax franked dividends with a 
present value of a dollar. Modelling signalling or agency issues may be important in 
understanding why firms pay unfranked dividends in Australia.
A second key assumption is that there is no risk or uncertainty.25 Risk and uncertainty 
are likely to be important determinants of corporate financial and investment policy.
In the United States there is a wealth of literature attempting to explain why firms are 
not fully debt financed when debt appears to be tax preferred. One explanation which 
requires no appeal to risk and uncertainty was suggested by Miller (1977) and 
formalised by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980a). This relies on some individuals having 
tax rates which exceed the company rate. If personal taxes on equity are negligible 
and there are short-sales constraints, Miller's analysis leads to an equilibrium where 
those on tax rates which exceed the company tax rate hold equity and those on lower 
tax rates hold debt. Under the new view, if firms are able to meet their equity 
requirements by retaining profits, dividend taxes can be ignored which makes a Miller 
equilibrium more plausible.
After the 1986 tax reforms in the United States, the top personal marginal tax rate fell 
below the company tax rate and a satisfactory explanation of why firms did not 
become fully debt financed may require some appeal to risk and uncertainty. A 
number of authors have argued that the possibility of insolvency explains why firms 
do not become fully debt financed. They argue that firms will issue debt until its 
marginal cost inclusive of the cost associated with a higher risk of insolvency is equal 
to the marginal cost of equity finance, (eg., Gordon and Malkiel 1981). If modelling 
risk and uncertainty is essential in explaining why United States firms are not fully 
debt financed, using a certainty model to explain corporate behaviour in Australia is 
clearly open to criticism. Under the current Australian tax system, however, to the 
extent that tax biases exist they favour new equity rather than debt. The possibility of
24 For data on the increasing use that United States firms have made of share repurchase and corporate 
acquisitions as a means of making distributions to shareholders see Bagwell and Shoven (1989).
25 A minor qualification arises in Chapter 2 where we consider the possibility of a firm changing its 
financial policy in a way which was not previously predicted. We assume, however, that once 
financial policy is determined all agents in the economy take the policy as being certain.
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insolvency merely reinforces biases favouring new equity. Important insights into 
these biases can be derived as simply as possible by ignoring risk and uncertainty.
Thirdly, apart from some brief comments in passing we restrict our attention to firms 
which are in a taxpaying situation. To this extent the analysis is more restrictive than 
papers cited in footnote 16 of this chapter which modelled the effects of the UK ACT 
imputation system which also consider the tax losses. While this the possibility of tax 
losses is an important case to consider, including it would lead to an unwieldy number 
of cases given Australian capital gains tax asymmetries. In our view, it is most 
helpfully left out of an initial study into corporate incentives in Australia.
Fourthly, we abstract from any costs of adjusting capital stock. A large literature has 
drawn on the work of Abel (1979), Summers (1981) and Hayashi (1982) to develop 
the 'q theory of investment'. In these models it is assumed that investment is slow to 
adjust in response to changes in tax policy because of convex adjustment costs. Such 
models have been used to analyse the short-run effects of changes in tax provisions in 
North America and Europe. No studies have sought to apply this literature to analyse 
the short-run effects on corporate investment of changes in tax policy in Australia 
which is not surprising given the lack of formal models analysing the effects of 
Australia's full imputation system. It would be a natural extension of the work in this 
thesis to consider the short-run effects of changes in tax policy in this framework but 
this is left for further work. This thesis focuses on biases which will be produced in 
the longer term if tax provisions are expected to remain stable through time.
Finally, it is assumed that shareholders are resident individuals or superannuation 
funds taxed at a uniform marginal rate, m.26 This is an important abstraction. Even if 
a firm were solely owned by domestic individuals and superannuation funds, there 
will be conflicting objectives when shareholders are taxed at differing marginal rates 
and our assumption sidesteps the important issue of how these conflicting objectives 
are resolved.
Our assumption also abstracts from international equity flows which may be 
important when analysing the cost of capital in Australia. Moreover, we do not 
consider any capital flows explicitly. It would be a relatively straightforward matter 
to analyse international capital flows if debt were the only source of international
26 In Australia superannuation funds are taxed at a rate of 15 cents in the dollar. They are taxed on 
dividends on the same basis as an individual would be if he or she were taxed at that rate.
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capital flow. If, under standard small country assumptions, Australia could borrow or 
lend as much as it wishes at a fixed world interest rate, r*, if there were constant 
returns to scale (or a 100 per cent tax on pure profits) and if consumption goods were 
optimally taxed, it would be optimal for there to be no production distortion (see 
Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971, or Gordon, 1986). This would require that the cost of 
capital on all assets be r* in the absence of any withholding tax paid on interest to 
foreigners. If there is a withholding tax at rate tw which is creditable abroad and if (as 
is the case) Australia is a net capital importer, it would be optimal from an Australian 
perspective for the cost of capital to be r * (1 -  tw) as this would be the cost of 
borrowed funds to the economy.27 The existence of economic rents provides a case 
for higher taxes on capital income than otherwise (see Bruce, 1992).
In practice international capital flows can consist of both debt and equity. Modelling 
international equity flows is complex because of the way in which foreign tax credits 
may sometimes mean that any reduction in company tax in Australia is balanced by 
additional taxes abroad. How such crediting arrangements affect investment 
incentives is still a matter of some controversy. Hartman (1985) argues on parallel 
grounds to the new view of dividends that for 'mature' subsidiaries (ie., those which 
are able to finance marginal investment by retaining earnings) the presence or absence 
of a foreign tax credit should not affect subsidiaries' investment decisions. Leechor 
and Mintz (1993) argue that this result is undermined if the host country and home 
countries tax systems are not proportional to one another.
Allowing for international equity flows could potentially modify results in important 
ways. Boadway and Bruce (1992) argue that in a small open economy with perfect 
mobility of international equity the case for an imputation scheme can be overturned. 
If all international flows were equity, a switch from a classical company tax system to 
full imputation can have no effects on incentives for foreigners to invest and on 
corporate costs of capital if (as in Australia) imputation credits are denied to 
foreigners. Instead the reform would increase the after-tax returns to domestic savers 
in a way that is assumed to be undesirable and costs of capital for unincorporated 
enterprises would increase. An important issue which is only touched on briefly in 
the paper is how to extend the analysis to allow for international flows of both debt 
and equity. In this case Boadway and Bruce concluded that a dividend tax credit can
27 This ignores any interdependence between the welfare of Australians and the welfare of residents of 
other countries and abstracts from any strategic issues which could arise if, for example, decisions on 
Australian tax policy changed tax policy in other countries.
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remove financial non-neutralities and effects on investment distortions will depend on 
whether debt or equity is the marginal source of finance.
A further complication in analysing open economy aspects is that following the work 
of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), who showed a strong correlation between savings 
and investment across countries, there have been extended debates about how mobile 
international capital flows are in fact. Gordon and Varian (1989) argue that even 
small open economies may find that the cost of foreign capital is not fixed if returns 
from investments in their countries are not perfectly correlated with returns from 
investments in other countries. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) provide a clear recent 
review of the literature and present a model where a correlation between savings and 
investment may be caused by informational asymmetries.
It is acknowledged that abstracting from these issues is an important simplification in 
this thesis. Some of our results may need modification in a fuller analysis. In 
particular, subsidiaries of foreign direct investors may pursue different financial 
policies from those we analyse and other firms may modify their policies to attract 
foreign portfolio investors or Australian corporate shareholders in ways we ignore.
1.5 Reasons for the Full Imputation Reform
Background data on changes in capital stock, forms of business enterprise and 
methods of corporate finance will be presented in section 1.6. To interpret the data it 
is helpful to document possible reasons for the full imputation reform. This allows us 
to comment on whether changes in the data appear compatible those that the reform 
was intended to achieve. Further analysis of the effects of Australia's former classical 
company tax system and of the switch to full imputation is provided in chapter 4.
Key efficiency reasons for abandoning a classical company tax system in favour of 
full imputation can be can be grouped as concerns about the following three biases of 
a classical company tax system:
• biases to investment and choice of business organisation;
• biases to dividends and firm financial policy; and
• biases to portfolio decisions.
Biases to Business Investment Decisions and Choice of Organisational Form
Perhaps the most-cited concern about a classical company tax system in the United 
States has been that if corporate income is more heavily taxed than that of 
unincorporated enterprises, this can divert investment capital away from intrinsically
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more profitable investment opportunities in corporate sectors to unincorporated 
sectors. This issue was analysed initially by Harberger (1962 and 1966). This sort of 
bias would mean that the nation as a whole gets lower (risk-adjusted) pre-tax returns 
on its capital than it would if investment income were taxed more neutrally.
Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.1 provides data on gross operating surplus from corporate trading enterprises 
and unincorporated enterprises in a number of sectors in 1985/86. It is clear that some 
sectors were predominantly corporate (such as mining, manufacturing and wholesale 
trade) while others were predominantly unincorporated (such as agriculture, 
construction and to a lesser extent retail trade). It would appear that differential 
taxation of corporate and unincorporated activities had the potential to bias investment 
between sectors of the economy which were predominantly corporate and those which 
were not.
Harberger analysed the classical company tax system as involving an additional layer 
of tax on corporate capital. There are many potential qualifications that can be made 
to Harberger's analysis. For example, if corporate investment is financed by debt at 
the margin, the corporate income tax can be non-distorting (Stiglitz, 1973). Even if 
corporate investment is equity financed, corporate income is normally less than fully 
double taxed because accruing gains on shares are not taxed. Instead tax is typically 
imposed on realisation which lowers fne effective tax impost (Farrer and Selwyn, 
1967).
As has been discussed briefly above, the question of whether dividend taxes affect 
corporate investment decisions has been a matter of some controversy. Proponents of 
the traditional view of dividends argue that taxes on dividends discourage corporate 
investment. Proponents of the new view generally argue that for firms which are able 
to meet their equity requirements without issuing new equity, dividend taxes will be 
non-distorting.
Even if taxes on dividends are non-distorting, there may still have been a bias against 
corporate investment in 1984/85 because most shares owned by Australian individuals 
or superannuation funds were held by those on tax rates below the company rate. This 
might appear to suggest that the tax system biased investment away from the 
corporate sector with the bias being greater under the traditional view than under the 
new view of dividends. Capital allowances also affect the analysis, however, as is 
discussed in chapter 4. Because of the generosity of capital write-off provisions in 
1984/85, the cost of capital for corporate investment was not necessarily higher than 
that for unincorporated enterprises.
Not only can a classical company tax system bias investment between sectors it may 
bias decisions on organisational structure and investment within a sector. Gravelle 
and Kotlikoff (1989) argue that this intrasectoral distortion is likely to be much more 
important source of inefficiency than intersectoral investment distortions and estimate 
that in the United States the efficiency costs of the classical system of company
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taxation could exceed the tax revenue raised. There is, however, debate on the level 
of these costs with the United States Treasury (1992) and Gordon and MacKie-Mason 
(1994), for example, estimating very much smaller costs.
Investment biases were clearly identified as a key reason for Australia to introduce 
integration measures in a commissioned study for the Campbell Report (see Swan, 
1982). The Draft White Paper (p. 195) expressed concerns that the classical company 
tax system could provide incentives for investment to take place through businesses 
other than companies. It would seem that the way in which a classical company tax 
system could bias investment flows and choices of business structure were important 
reasons why Australia decided to adopt full imputation.
Biases to Corporate Financial Policy
One potential concern with the classical company tax system is that it may bias 
corporate finance in favour of debt rather than equity and this may be costly because 
of bankruptcy or because of additional constraints being placed on corporate 
managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Gordon and Malkiel (1981) discuss 
possible agency costs associated with excessive levels of debt. Gordon and Malkiel 
estimate that the costs of debt/equity biases caused by a classical company tax system 
could be as high as 10 per cent of corporate tax revenues in the United States. Some 
other studies such as the United States Treasury (1992) have produced lower cost 
estimates and as we will discuss later, Australian experience appears to provide some 
indirect evidence that the Gordon and Malkiel methodology may produce excessive 
estimates. Concerns about debt/equity biases were voiced by the Campbell 
Committee and by Keating (1986 and 1987).
In Australia prior to 1986/87 the top personal marginal tax rate was 60 per cent which 
exceeded the company tax rate of 46 per cent and there was no capital gains tax.
There need not be any general tax bias against debt if, as in the Miller equilibrium, 
there are two clienteles of capital owners, those who hold debt and those who hold 
equity with the marginal capital owner neutral between debt and equity because lower 
personal taxes on equity offset the benefits of interest deductibility. The extent of any 
tax bias in favour of debt depends on whether new equity or retentions are the 
marginal source of equity finance. The tax bias favouring debt over new equity is 
greater than that favouring debt over retentions.
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As noted earlier, chapter 4 provides evidence that the average marginal tax rate of 
shareholders was significantly lower than the company tax rate. Even if all equity 
were financed by corporate retentions and so (as holders of the new view suggest) 
dividend taxes can be ignored, there would still appear to have been some general tax 
bias in favour of debt for companies owned by shareholders on the average marginal 
tax rate. Under the traditional view of dividends this bias would have been larger.
Both the Campbell Committee (pp. 212-213) and the Draft White paper (p. 195) 
expressed concerns that the classical company tax system might bias firms against 
paying dividends. Whether this is likely to be so depends on the uncertain effects of 
dividend taxes. Under the new view, dividend taxes do not distort dividend decisions 
for established firms which are able to meet all equity requirements through the 
retention of profits. Under the traditional view, dividend taxes tend to lower dividend 
payout ratios. In so doing they may inhibit the signalling or agency benefits of 
dividends. The Campbell Committee (p. 212) expressed concerns that this may also 
lock capital into existing firms rather and place impediments in the way of capital 
flowing to new and developing businesses. Holders of the new view of dividends 
have emphasised that this can happen as a result of a higher tax impost on investment 
financed by new equity issues than that financed by profit retentions.
Portfolio Biases
Finally, the classical company tax system provided portfolio biases in favour of those 
on lower marginal tax rates holding debt and those on higher marginal rates holding 
equities as is discussed by Miller (1977). Concerns about portfolio biases and 
especially low-marginal-rate individuals being locked out of the share market were 
expressed in both the Campbell Report and in Keating (1987).
1.6 Effects  of Full Imputation
It is always difficult to be sure of the effects of any tax change because of 
uncertainties about what would have happened in the absence of the change. The 
system of company tax is only one out of a large number of factors which can affect 
business decisions. Nevertheless, as background for our study it is interesting to look 
at whether or not changes in available data seem consistent with the direction of 
changes that might have been predicted.
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Investment and Forms of Business Organisation
Table 1.1 provides figures on the proportion of real net capital stock (measured in 
1989/90 prices) in different sectors.28 From 1985/86 (the year in which the move to 
full imputation was announced) until 1990/91 there was a steady increase in the 
corporate sector's share of net capital stock (from 33.7 to 36.1 per cent). Shares of 
both unincorporated enterprises and dwellings owned by persons fell. Since then the 
corporate sector's share of net capital stock has remained more or less constant except 
for a slight increase in 1994/95. There has been an increase in the share of dwellings 
and a further decrease in the share of unincorporated enterprises.









1982/83 33.4 14.0 52.6 100.0
1983/84 33.4 14.0 52.7 100.0
1984/85 33.3 14.0 52.6 100.0
1985/86 33.7 13.9 52.4 100.0
1986/87 34.3 13.6 52.1 100.0
1987/88 35.0 13.5 51.5 100.0
1988/89 35.3 13.5 51.2 100.0
1989/90 35.7 13.4 50.9 100.0
1990/91 36.1 13.1 50.8 100.0
1991/92 36.1 12.7 51.1 100.0
1992/93 36.2 12.4 51.4 100.0
1993/94 36.2 12.0 51.7 100.0
1994/95 36.6 11.8 51.7 100.0
This growth in the proportion of real net capital stock held by companies is what 
might be predicted if corporate enterprises were initially taxed more heavily than 
unincorporated enterprises as a result of the classical company tax system and this 
bias was reduced by the full imputation reform. As is discussed further in chapter 4,
28 These data are from ABS Catalogue No. 5204.0 for real net capital stock in $1989/90 excluding 
financial enterprises and real estate transfer expense.
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however, a complication in analysing this case is that there were negative effective tax 
rates on many forms of investment which means that higher statutory tax rates do not 
necessarily imply reduced investment incentives.
Table 1.2: Numbers of Taxpayers (000)
Individuals Companies Partnerships Trusts
1985/86
Primary production 332.3 6.9 156.0 17.3
Mining 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.2
Manufacturing 16.1 23.1 20.2 9.5
Construction 117.5 19.7 78.8 15.3
Wholesale and retail trade 64.1 47.3 105.4 32.3
Transport, storage and 
communications
38.5 9.3 33.3 6.1
Finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services
100.0 126.5 35.5 42.6
Health, education, welfare, 
etc., services
35.0 10.3 7.0 2.6
1992/93
Primary production 251.1 12.5 143.9 16.9
Mining 2.8 3.3 1.2 0.7
Manufacturing 38.4 33.3 26.0 10.7
Construction 157.4 38.9 83.0 15.6
Wholesale and retail trade 104.0 62.1 93.5 26.0
Transport, storage and 
communications
45.3 14.0 30.8 5.3
Finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services
132.7 203.9 52.6 76.5
Health, education, welfare, 
etc., services
46.7 20.5 7.7 6.4
Change: 198 5 /8 6 -1 9 9 2 /9 3
Primary production -81.2 5.6 -12.2 -0.4
Mining 2.0 2.1 0.7 0.5
Manufacturing 22.3 10.2 5.8 1.2
Construction 39.9 19.2 4.2 0.3
Wholesale and retail trade 39.9 14.8 -11.9 -6.3
Transport, storage and 
communications
6.8 4.7 -2.5 -0.8
Finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services
32.7 77.4 17.1 33.9
Health, education, welfare, 
etc., services
11.7 10.2 0.7 3.8
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Table 1.2 shows changes in numbers of entities between 1985/86 and 1992/93 in a 
number of sectors.29 In all sectors other than primary production there has been 
growth in the total number of businesses. In most sectors the greatest growth has been 
in unincorporated enterprises owned by individuals. Often these may be small 
enterprises. For partnerships and trusts, there has been little overall increase or 
decrease in the number of entities except for strong growth in the number of trusts in 
finance, insurance, real estate and business services. Companies are the only form of 
business organisation whose numbers have increased in all sectors. In all sectors the 
number of companies has grown significantly relative to numbers in 1985/86. The 
smallest proportionate rise is in wholesale and retail trade where the number of 
companies increased by 31 per cent. Even in the primary sector the number of 
companies grew by 5,600 (81 per cent) despite declines in the numbers of other 
business entities. Overall, the figures perhaps provide some extremely tentative 
evidence that incorporation has become relatively more attractive especially in the 
primary sector and as an alternative to partnerships and trusts but comparisons are 
difficult given the differences in sizes of different entities.
Biases to Corporate Financial Policy
We have seen that one reason that was given for the full imputation reform was to 
remove the tax bias favouring corporate debt relative to equity. In chapter 2 we will 
see that in combination with Australia's indexed capital gains tax the full imputation 
reform has gone further than merely eliminating this bias and introduced a bias in 
favour of new equity relative to debt.
There are no official statistics available on debt as a fraction of the corporate capital 
stock and how this has changed since the introduction of full imputation. It is well 
known, however, that there was a build up of corporate debt in the 1980s despite the 
introduction of full imputation. Mills, Morling and Tease, 1994, extracted data on 80 
large non-financial companies from the Australian Stock Exchange's STATEX 
service. Their ratios of debt to book-value of equity are reported in Table 1.3.30
29 These data are from the Australian Taxation Office publication 'Taxation Statistics' for 1985/86 and 
1992/93.
30 Mills, Morling and Tease also provide data on debt to market capitalisation although these figures 
are swamped by the volatility of the share market.
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Table 1.3 Debt/Equity Ratios
81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92
0.43 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.67 0.65 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.67
From these data it appears that levels of corporate debt which had had been building 
up prior to the introduction of full imputation in 1987/88 and there was an increase 
rather than a fall in the debt/equity ratio in this year. It seems difficult to argue on the 
basis of these data that full imputation had a si gnificant effect in reducing debt-equity 
ratios unless it is believed that in the absence of the full imputation reform the upward 
trend in debt-equity ratios would have continued. Even though the imputation scheme 
has largely removed the tax bias in favour of corporate debt there seems little 
evidence of this in the data.
A better statistic for measuring corporate exposure to debt would be debt as a 
proportion of the replacement value of assets but data is not available. A 
disadvantage of using debt as a proportion of the book value of equity is that because 
firms do not revalue all assets annually, in times of accelerating inflation the book 
value of equity will tend to fall as a proportion of the replacement cost of assets. This 
might tend to lead to increasing recorded debt/equity ratios without there being any 
real increase in corporate exposure to debt. Conversely recorded debt/equity ratios 
may fall in times of falling inflation. Figure 1.2 shows that the increasing reported 
debt/equity ratios in the latter part of the 1980s cannot be attributed to rapidly 
increasing inflation. Inflation fell rapidly after 1989 or 1990. This may be part of the 
reason for the decline in reported the debt/equity ratio in 1991/92.
One reason why debt/equity ratios have not fallen despite the full imputation reform is 
that there may have been some other changes which have provided opposing 
incentives. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980/?) argue that because measures such as 
investment allowances and accelerated depreciation (which tend to make corporate 
taxable income less than economic income) increase the probability of tax losses for 
companies generating economic profits, they will decrease the attractiveness of debt 
finance. This is because tax losses can only be carried forward without interest. 
Australia terminated its investment allowance at the end of 1984/85 and adopted a 
less-accelerated form of depreciation during 1987/88. Both of these moves may have 
tended to make debt more attractive. Australia also introduced a more-accelerated 






Source of Data: RBA Bulletin via DXDATA service.
It is well known that under a classical company tax system there will be tax biases 
discouraging new equity relative to corporate retentions (see, for example, King,
1974« and 1977). This is discussed more fully with reference to Australian tax 
provisions prior to 1987/88 in Chapter 4. In chapter 2 it is argued that tax biases will 
continue to discourage new equity relative to the retention of unfrankable earnings 
(ie., the retention of earnings which would be unfranked if paid as dividends). The 
majority of firms (considerably more than 90 per cent) do not, however, pay 
unfranked dividends. For firms paying franked dividends only, new equity is now the 
tax-preferred method of finance.
Table 1.4 shows Australian Stock Exchange data on mainboard equity capital raisings 
since 1984/85. There was a substantial rise in new equity issues in 1985/86 and 
1986/87 which may have been bolstered by the announcement of full imputation but 
probably had much more to do with the strength of the sharemarket at that time. The 
sharemarket crash in October 1987 occurred in the first year of the full imputation 
scheme and would have been expected to cut back new equity issues. As Table 1.4
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shows new equity issues declined in nominal terms in each of the four years following 
the crash until 1990/91 before increasing once more.













1987/88 504 12,891 13,395
1988/89 1,551 9,409 10,960
1989/90 2,602 6,387 8,989
1990/91 2,155 4,441 6,596
1991/92 2,157 9,818 11,975
1992/93 2,609 8,042 10,651
1993/94 3,325 19,567 22,892
1994/95 3,343 8,438 11,781
1995/96 3,441 11,878 15,319
Even though we will argue that the full imputation reform has generally removed a tax 
impediment to firms issuing new equity, there appears to no evidence that this reform 
has led to an increase in new equity issues. The figures reported in Table 1.4 are 
much too volatile for the effects of the full imputation reform to be evident.
One noticeable feature of the data is the growth of reinvested dividends which may in 
part be a consequence of the full imputation reform. Dividend reinvestment plans 
allow firms to pay higher levels of dividends which can provide shareholders with 
imputation credits while retaining the capital. We will argue in chapter 2 that it will 
normally be desirable for firms to distribute the maximum level of franked dividends 
and dividend reinvestment plans may help firms to do this.
31 Figures for 1987/88 and subsequent years come from various issues of the Australian Stock 
Exchange publication Monthly Index Analysis. Figures for previous years are contained in the Reserve 
Bank of Australia publication Australian Economic Statistics Occasional Paper No. 8.
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Figure 1.3 reports data from J B Were and Son which suggest that dividend payout 
ratios increased markedly after the introduction of full imputation. There was a slight 
drop in 1992/93 before the payout ratio increased to its highest level in 1995/96. In 
the five years up until 1987/88 the ratio varied between 43 and 48 per cent whereas it 
climbed to 51 per cent in 1988/89 and has since varied between 53 and 61 per cent. 
There appears to be clear evidence that the dividend payout ratio has increased and 
this is likely to be at least in part as a result of incentives for firms to distribute 
franked dividends. However, Figure 1.3 also shows that between 10 and 23 per cent 
of dividends paid by the 109 leading non-bank industrials have been unfranked. Our 
analysis in chapter 2 suggests that the payment of unfranked dividends is a puzzle 
which needs to be explained.
Figure 1.3*
Dividend Payout and Franking Ratios
109 Leading Non-Bank Industrials
81/82 83/84 89/90 91/92
-SK- Payout Ratio Franking Ratio
* Source of Data: JB Were and Son.
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Portfolio Bias
Prior to the imputation system there was a substantial tax bias against individuals on 
tax rates lower than the company tax rate and tax-exempt organisations such as 
superannuation funds holding shares. For example, superannuation funds earned 
interest income tax free whereas equity income in domestic companies received by 
superannuation funds was taxed at the company tax rate because when dividends were 
paid there was no relief from company taxation. Full imputation largely removed the 
tax bias against individuals on low but positive tax rates holding shares. As 
imputation credits are not refundable and hence provide no tax benefits to 
nontaxpayers, however, the tax bias against shares initially continued for both 
superannuation funds and individuals below the tax-free threshold. This bias was 
removed for superannuation funds with sufficient other taxable income to fully utilise 
imputation credits, however, when superannuation funds were made taxable in 
1988/89.
This reduction in portfolio bias is one possible advantage of the full imputation 
scheme. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find consistent data on portfolios and how 
they have change over time that cover the period in question. Addison (1993) notes 
that shares had declined as a proportion of the assets of life offices over the period 31 
December 1986 to 31 December 1991 which is the reverse of what might be expected 
on tax grounds alone. Addison argues that other factors may have proved more 
important than imputation, notably the October 1987 sharemarket crash.
The Data: A Summary
There has been some growth in the corporate sector's share of net capital stock and 
consistent growth across sectors in the number of corporate enterprises despite 
declines in the numbers of individuals, partnerships and trusts in some sectors. There 
has also been a noticeable growth in dividend payments. These changes appear 
consistent with the effects which might conventionally be expected of the full 
imputation reform. The reform has not, however, had an obvious impact on the levels 
of corporate debt and new equity issues are much too volatile for the effects of the 
reform to be evident.
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CHAPTER 2: CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY
2.1 Introduction
The formal model of the corporation is introduced in this chapter and used to examine 
how Australia's full imputation company tax system and capital gains tax provisions 
can affect financial policy for widely-held Australian companies owned by Australian 
residents.1 As was outlined in chapter 1 a number of key assumptions will be 
employed. It is assumed that debt and dividends have no signalling or agency 
benefits, that there is no risk or uncertainty (other than possible one-off surprises 
when firms perturb financial policy), that firms are in a taxpaying position, that there 
are no costs of adjusting capital stock, and that shareholders are resident individuals or 
superannuation funds taxed at a uniform rate, m.
King analysed financial policy biases under a variety of company tax sy stems. He 
distinguished three methods of raising finance: new equity, debt and retained 
earnings. Our first modification of King's analysis is to note that under the Australian 
full imputation scheme the effects of retaining earnings depend on whether, if 
dividends had been paid instead, the dividends would have been franked or 
unfranked.2 These two cases will be referred to as the retention of frankable earnings 
and the retention of unfrankable earnings. We distinguish four possible methods of 
financing investment, namely:
• new equity (NE);
• debt;
• the retention of frankable earnings (RFE); and
• the retention of unfrankable earnings (RUE).
1 Throughout the thesis, the companies being referred to should be thought of as widely held (see 
footnote 1 of chapter 1).
2 As outlined in chapter 1, when a firm retains earnings in Australia it has the option of issuing bonus 
shares in which case the bonus shares will be treated as dividends and shareholders can claim 
imputation credits if the bonus shares are franked. This provision allows shareholders to claim 
imputation credits without the physical distribution of dividends. The treatment is as though the firm 
paid a dividend and then issued an equal value of shares. When analysing the retention of profits we 
assume that the bonus issue option is not used except when we explicitly indicate otherwise.
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A second modification is to allow for the asymmetries in the Australian capital gains 
tax provisions outlined in section 1.2. As noted in that section, there are a number of 
ways in which gains may be taxed. At the margin real gains may be taxed, nominal 
gains may be taxed, or gains may be untaxed.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the basic model of the 
corporation. Some modifications to King's general methodology used when 
estimating the magnitudes of financial policy biases are discussed in section 2.3. 
Section 2.4 examines corporate financial policy biases and makes qualitative 
conclusions on optimal financial policy. Corporate behaviour is at times inconsistent 
with our qualitative conclusions. This may either be because our analysis is 
incomplete or because the incentives identified are very weak. The remainder of the 
chapter examines the likely magnitudes of corporate financial policy biases in order to 
consider whether they are likely to be significant. Assumptions used in making 
numerical estimates of financial policy biases are outlined in section 2.5 and 
numerical estimates are presented in section 2.6. Section 2.7 confronts our analysis 
with some facts and section 2.8 concludes.
2.2. The Model
The basic model of the company which will be used throughout the dissertation is 
outlined in this section. The model draws on King (1974a and 1977) and Auerbach 
(1979a). We consider the behaviour of firms in a discrete-time, infinite-horizon, 
certainty model. Firms finance investment through sales of stock, retention of 
earnings and sales of one-period bonds. At the end of each period, firms distribute 
dividends, pay interest and repay principal on the previous year's bonds, and sell new 
shares ex dividend. Key notation is provided in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Notation
t, = company tax rate in period t;
mt = tax rate of shareholders in period / (assumed to be greater than zero); 
c, = rate at which accruing capital gains are taxed in period t\
Vt° = ex-dividend value of pre-existing shares at the end of period t\
VtN = ex-dividend value of new equity sold at the end of period t;
Vt = ex-dividend total value of equity at the end of period t\
Wt = the cum-dividend-and-shareholder-tax value of shares an instant before 
dividends are paid at the end of period t.
it = nominal interest rate from the end of period t-\ to the end of period t\
D{ = franked dividends paid at the end of period t\
Dut = unffanked dividends paid at the end of period t\
Et = net of tax distribution from a firm at the end of period t\
Kt = capital stock installed at the end of period t which provides output at the end 
of period t+1;
F(K) = output of the firm received at the end of period t+1;
pt = price of output at the end of period
qt = cost of investment goods at the end of period t\
I, = real investment expenditure at the end of period t\
Tt = company tax paid at the end of period t\
Bt = one-year corporate bonds issued at the end of period t\
b, = fraction of the capital stock at the end of period t which is debt financed;
7i, = general measure of inflation from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t
used in calculating the indexed capital gain;
rt = real interest rate from the end of period /-I to the end of period t\ 
a = an index taking the value 1 if real and 0 if nominal gains are taxed;
(j), = rate that a firm should use to discount nominal after-tax cash flows between
the ends of periods t-\ and t. This will be c|), = [/,( l-m ,)-a c ,7 i,] /( l-c ,)  fora 
company and (}), = z, (1 -  m, ) for an unincorporated enterprise; 
kt = rate of investment allowance on capital goods acquired at end of period t\
At u = tax depreciation on a dollar of capital goods acquired at the end of period t,
u periods later;
Z, = present value of tax depreciation discounted at the rate §l+s on a dollar of 
capital goods acquired at the end of period t\
5 = exogenous geometric rate of depreciation of capital stock.
A key difference from King and Auerbach is that the tax treatment of dividends 
depends on whether dividends are 'franked' or 'unfranked'. For the time being, ignore
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any changes in tax rates between years.3 As is discussed more fully in section 1.2, on 
each dollar of assessable income, a company pays t in tax and the remainder, 1 -  x, 
increases its 'franking account balance' which allows it to pay an additional 1 -  x in 
franked dividends. Each dollar of franked dividends reduces the franking account 
balance by a dollar and shareholders on marginal tax rate m > 0 receive 
(1 — m) / (1 — x) in after-tax dividends. Once firms have reduced their franking account 
balances to zero by paying franked dividends, any further dividends are unfranked. 
Unfranked dividends are taxed and so if shareholders receive a dollar of unfranked 
dividends, they will receive 1 -  m after tax.
The ex-dividend value of pre-existing shares in period t is Vr° and new issues in period 
t are VtA' 4 Assuming that new equity is sold at its market value the total ex-dividend 
value of equity in period t is
Vt = V,° + V,N (2.1)
Pre-existing shares which continue to be owned in period t or shares which are 
acquired in period t will receive dividends one period later. Franked and unfranked 
dividends paid in period t+1 on shares which are owned or acquired in period t are 
denoted by D[+x and Z)"+1 respectively.
Australia's capital gains tax provisions were outlined in section 1.2. We noted that if 
shares are eventually sold for more than their real inflation-indexed original cost of 
acquisition, the real capital gain will normally be taxed at a shareholder's full marginal 
tax rate. If shares are eventually sold for less than their nominal acquisition cost, the 
nominal loss can be used to offset other income from capital gains or be carried 
forward to be offset against such income in future years. Provided a taxpayer has 
other income from capital gains, at the margin a dollar of nominal gains will lower 
deductions by a dollar. In this case the tax is operating like a tax on nominal gains. If 
shares eventually depreciate in real terms but appreciate in nominal terms, at the 
margin capital gains will be untaxed.
The net-of-tax distribution that shareholders holding shares in period t receive in the 
next period depends on the treatment of capital gains. We consider the possibility that
3 When ignoring changes in tax rates between years, time subscripts are dropped.
4 Here and elsewhere when "period t" is referred to this should be interpreted as the end of period t.
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real gains are taxed, that nominal gains are taxed, and that capital gains are untaxed.5 
In year t capital gains tax is assumed to be levied at a rate ct on accruing gains.6 
Denoting inflation from period t to period t+\ by n t+l, the net-of-tax distribution that 
shareholders receive is
' / + 1
i — x /+i /
DL  + (1 -mjDl,-c ,+1( C  -(1 + a  n M(2.2)
where a  is 1 if real gains are taxed and 0 if nominal gains are taxed. If capital gains 
are untaxed, cl+] = 0.7
5 The case where nominal gains are taxed takes account of gains by sharetraders and gains on sales 
within 12 months of acquisition where nominal gains are taxable as well as the case where nominal 
losses accrue.
6 In practice capital gains are taxed on realisation rather than accrual. On grounds of analytical 
tractability it is common to assume that gains are taxed on accrual at an accrual-equivalent tax rate 
c, < mt where the lower rate of capital gains tax takes account of the benefits of tax deferral.
Appendix 2.1 discusses the internal consistency of modelling a realisation-basis tax in this fashion. It 
confirms that treating a realisation-basis tax as though it were a tax on accrual at some rate, cp is 
internally consistent if, as in King (1977), a fixed fraction of shares are sold in each period. This is 
true irrespective of whether real or nominal gains are taxed. With time varying tax rates, it need not 
necessarily be valid to assume c, < m, even if nominal gains are taxed. If tax rates are expected to rise 
in the future, the opposite case is possible. However, at least if tax rates remain constant, it will be 
appropriate to assume c < m so long as less than 100 per cent of shares are sold in each period. If real 
gains are taxed, there is an extra complication. Even if tax rates remain constant through time, it will 
not necessarily be the case that c < m. The accrual-equivalent tax rate, c, will be less than m only if the 
real after-tax interest rate of shareholders is positive. At current nominal interest rates and inflation 
rates, real after-tax interest rates seem likely to be significantly positive even for those on the top 
personal marginal tax rate. Throughout later sections of this chapter when considering the case where 
tax rates remain constant through time, it will be assumed that c < m even though the opposite case is 
theoretically possible when real gains accrue.
7 Equation (2.2) assumes that imputation credits depend on the company tax rate in the year that 
franked dividends are paid. Each time the company tax rate has changed, franking credits that arose 
before the change have been treated differently. The company tax rate fell from 49 to 39 per cent in 
1988/89 and from 1989/90 shareholders could only claim credit for 39/61 of franked dividends in line 
with (2.2). However, when the tax rate fell to 33 per cent in 1993/94 two separate franking accounts
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In general, Australian companies are permitted to buy back up to 10 per cent of their 
share capital in any 12-month period (Lipton and Herzberg, 1995,p. 213). However, 
the tax rules applying to share repurchases are relatively complex and (unlike the 
United States) not very concessional.* 8 To simplify the analysis it is assumed that 
shares are not repurchased, ie. VtN >0, V/.9
In Australia nominal interest income is taxable and nominal interest expense on 
money borrowed to purchase shares is deductible. If it+] is the nominal interest rate 
from period t to t+1, in equilibrium
(i+«w ( i - m . 1))r, = £ (tI+ C  (2-3)
were kept. Shareholders could claim credit for 39/61 of franked dividends paid from pre-1993/94
profits and 33/67 of franked dividends paid from subsequent profits. When the company tax rose to 36
per cent in 1995/96 the two account approach was scrapped and the franking account balance was
imperfectly adjusted to take some account of the fact that company tax had been levied at different
rates. Thus, in equation (2.2) we abstract from complications which have arisen on two of the three
occasions when the company tax rate has changed.
8 If shares are bought back by a company through 'off-market purchases' (ie., purchases which are not 
made in the ordinary course of business of a stock exchange), the difference between the purchase 
price and the issue price is treated as a dividend. 'On-market purchases', are not treated as dividends, 
but moneys spent on share repurchases give rise to franking account debits which reduce the level of 
franked dividends that firms can pay. For further details see Commerce Clearing House (1995, pp. 
328-329). These provisions would normally not make share repurchase a tax-preferred form of 
distribution. A complication which has become evident recently and which we do not consider is that 
share repurchase can become tax favoured if, as in the recent repurchase by the Commonwealth Bank, 
shares are allowed to be repurchased at much below market value. There can be capital gains tax 
advantages in this case.
9 The assumption that shares cannot be repurchased has been criticised in United States studies as a 
very important but unrealistic assumption in new-view models. The United States tax code provides 
incentives for firms to refrain from paying dividends and repurchase shares instead so this becomes a 
very important assumption. In modelling the Australian tax system it is likely to be less important 
because there are strong incentives created for firms to pay franked dividends. Indeed, in modelling 
investment decisions and the cost of capital in chapter 3 it is assumed in our base case that firms wish 
to pay the maximum possible level of franked dividends and the restriction on share repurchases is 
slack.
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Equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) jointly imply
(i+<hJr,= 1 M
( l - x „ , ) ( l - C M ) 1 - C M
where =(i,+1(l-m ,tl) - a c , tln(+l) / ( l - c (tl). Thus,
Dr + 1 m‘*' D“ - V N +V
^ t + \ ~  , 1 D + l ^  D+] (2.4)
1-«i, Df +ly»'
( l - x ,) ( l - c ,)  ' 1 (2.5)
no+o
5=1
provided the sum on the right-hand-side is defined.10 It is assumed that <|> > 0, Vs.11
The firm's revenue in period t is p f { K tA) where pt is the price of output in that period 
and KtA is the firm's capital stock from the previous period. It is assumed that 
F \  ) > 0 and F \  ) < 0. Nominal investment expense in that period is q j t where qt is 
the cost of capital goods and It is real investment expenditure. Denoting company tax 
paid in period t by Tt and one-year bonds issued in period t by Bt, the firm's cash flow 
constraint is
D{ + D“ =p,F(K,_l) -q , I l - T l +Bl - ( l +  /,)*,_, + (2.6)
Tax revenue is
T,=x (2.7)
where kt is the rate of deductible investment allowance and As u is the depreciation 
allowance on a dollar of capital goods acquired in period s, u periods later.
10 This requires the transversality condition that
lim
/ * - >  00 n (i+*,)
.v = l
= 0
11 In the case where real capital gains are taxed, equation (2.5) potentially allows the discount factor in 
period t to be less than one if it (1 -  m,) < acn ,. This would mean that a shareholder would prefer the 
firm to pay an additional nominal dollar of dividends in period t than in period /-I. This extreme case 
would require a very low real interest rate or high tax rates or both and it is ruled out by assumption.
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The firm's capital stock is assumed to depreciate at a constant geometric rate 8 so12
Kt = It + (\-b)K,_\ (2 .8)
In any period franked dividend payments must not exceed the maximum allowable 
amount. Thus,
i 1  —  T - T  - D f > 0 (2.9)
2.3 Some Preliminaries
Assuming that the firm sets out to maximise its value, in principle one could move 
directly to solving the firm's constrained optimisation problem. However, as King 
(1974a) points out, it can be more instructive to start by examining firm financial 
policy for a given investment policy. This is the approach adopted in this chapter.
With a given investment policy many elements in the firm's cash flow will be 
autonomous. Denoting the firm's autonomous cash flows by CFt,
CF, =(l-T ,)p ,F(Kl_I) - ( l -T ; lkl)qlIl +x, ± A SJ.sqJ,  (2.10)
s  =  — 00
In this chapter it is assumed that the firm takes CFt as given and chooses 
D(  , D f , Bt and F/v . Only three of these sets o f variables can be chosen 
independently as is clear from (2.6) which can be rewritten as
D{ + D“ = CFt + B,-(l + i,(l -  x + (2.6')
Given the choice variables, V, will be determined recursively and Vt° will be 
determined residually from equation (2.1).
When analysing the effects of a perturbation in financial policy it is common to 
analyse how changes to dividend policy, debt policy and new equity issues affect the 
value of the firm as given by an equation equivalent to (2.5) eg., King (1974a and 
1977) and Poterba and Summers (1985)13. This is the consequence of assuming
12 The assumption of geometric depreciation is unimportant in this chapter but will be drawn on in 
Chapter 3.
13 Benge (1997) draws on an early version of material in this chapter and also adopts this approach.
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perfect certainty. Any perturbation in financial policy is assumed to be known about 
in advance and affects the value of the firm in prior periods.
It seems somewhat confusing to attempt to quantify the gains from a firm perturbing 
its financial policy under these assumptions as a change in financial policy announced 
now changes the value of the firm in prior periods. This also makes it more difficult 
to provide intuitive explanations for the effects of a perturbation. Our assumption is 
that even though shareholders treat the future as certain, they can obtain a one-off 
surprise when a firm decides to perturb its financial policy. This assumption tends to 
reduce the magnitude but not the direction of any gains from perturbations in firm 
financial policy.
Suppose that a perturbation increases the value of a firm and capital gains are taxed. 
Under our assumption, this perturbation does not affect the value of the firm before 
the decision is made. An implication is that the gain from the perturbation is taxed at 
the capital gains tax rate. With perfect certainty, however, the capital gains tax impost 
would be reduced because the value of the firm would also have been higher in the 
previous period. In reality, a perturbation in financial policy cannot affect the value of 
the firm before a decision to perturb the policy is made so our assumption seems 
preferable when attempting to quantify any gains from perturbing financial policy.14
To simplify interpretation of our results it is also helpful to work in terms of the cum- 
dividend (and all shareholder taxes) value of equity (fVt). Define
W,=E,+V° (2.11)
From (2.1) and (2.2)
W = r r 0
l - ”*o 
V 1 _ T o j
Dq + ( \ -m 0)Du0 + ( l - c 0W 0-V 0N) + c0V_l(\ + an0) (2.12)
It will be assumed that decisions to perturb financial policy take place just before the 
end of year 0. Given that VA is fixed
dW0 = 1 -  m,
1 — Tv 1 l o y
dD{ + ( l - m 0)dD“- ( \ - c 0)dV0N+ ( \ - c 0)dV0 (2.13)
14 This modification is unimportant if, as in the studies by King, and Poterba and Summers, the focus 
is on the sign rather than the magnitude of the gain from a financial policy perturbation.
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Finally, taking differentials of (2.5) and substituting
dW0 = ( l - c 0)Z
1 -  m.
( 1 - T , ) ( 1 - C , )  \ - C,
r i a + U
dD{ + -—— dD“
(2.14)
u
using the convention (adopted throughout the thesis) that f ] ( l  + <\>s) = 1.
Equation (2.14) can be used to examine the effects of changes in financial policy on 
the cum-dividend value of a firm when tax rates, inflation and the interest rate are 
changing through time. This allows a very wide range of different possibilities to be 
considered.
To confine the analysis, the remainder of the chapter abstracts from changes in these 









Equation (2.15) will be the basic equation used to examine financial policy biases.
2.4 Financial Policy Biases
Four possible methods of financing investment have been identified, namely, the 
retention of unfrankable earnings (RUE), the retention of frankable earnings (RFE), 
new equity issues (NE) and debt. This section examines the effects of a firm 
replacing one form of finance with another.
One goal of our study is to provide some intuition for the gains from financial 
perturbations which we will derive formally. To assist intuition, it is helpful to start 
by considering the costs to shareholders of a firm raising a dollar of capital in each of 
these four possible ways and 'burning' the proceeds. This simplifies the analysis by 
allowing the capital raised to have no effects on either investment or other sources of 
finance. Perturbations in financial policy can then all be explained in terms of 
additions and subtractions of these primitive costs of finance. Suppose, for example, 
that relative to some base plan a firm retains a dollar of unfrankable earnings and 
issues a dollar less new equity. The net cost will be that of retaining a dollar of
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unfrankable earnings and burning the proceeds minus that of issuing a dollar of new 
equity and burning the proceeds.
This section starts by examining the costs of raising and burning a dollar of the four 
forms of capital. It then derives gains from financial perturbations more formally.
The Costs of Raising and Burning a Dollar of Finance
To boost retained unfrankable earnings by a dollar, a firm reduces unfranked 
dividends by a dollar. Provided the firm bums the dollar it retains, shareholders gain 
no benefit from this retention. The cost to them is the after-tax dividend forgone, viz., 
1 - m .
To boost retained frankable earnings by a dollar, a firm must retain a dollar of franked 
dividends. If the dollar that is retained is burned, the cost to shareholders will be the 
after-tax dividend forgone, viz. (1 -  m) / (1 -  x).
If a dollar of new equity is issued, new shareholders need to receive a flow of benefits 
from the shares with a present value of a dollar. This means that a dollar of new 
equity lowers the value of existing equity by a dollar. Assuming the dollar of new 
equity is burned, this costs existing shareholders 1 -  c net of capital gains tax.
The most complex case is that of debt. Suppose that a firm borrows a dollar and bums 
the proceeds. It will need to pay a stream of interest payments of i per annum and 
save h  in tax. In order for there to be no effects on other forms of finance (in 
particular retained frankable earnings), it will be necessary for the firm to reduce 
franked dividends by z(l -  x) per annum and it will be assumed that this is what 
happens.
The cost of the dollar of debt is that shareholders forgo a stream of franked dividends 
of z(l -  x) per annum. Because shareholders receive (1 - m) / (1 -  x) on each dollar of 
franked dividends, this has an after-tax cost to shareholders of i{ \ -m)  per annum.
An after-tax revenue stream of z'(l-  m) has a present value of a dollar. In the absence 
of any capital gains tax, the cost to shareholders of the firms issuing a dollar of debt 
and burning the proceeds would be a dollar.
There are, however, two complications. First, with a nominal capital gains tax, this 
loss would reduce capital gains tax payments by c so the cost to shareholders would 
be 1 -  c. With a nominal capital gains tax the cost of new equity and debt would be 
the same.
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With a real capital gains tax and inflation, there is a further effect. Suppose that the 
value of the firm falls by v. This reduces the basis of shares for capital gains tax 
purposes which increases capital gains tax payments by vcn per annum. Thus, shares 
will fall in value both because of the fall in franked dividends and because of the 
reduction of the basis for capital gains tax purposes.
In both the case of nominal gains being taxed (a = 0) and real gains being taxed 
(a  = 1) the fall in the value of the firm is given by
i( \-m ) + acnv 
i ( \ -m )
Solving,
v = -----------------
i ( \ -m ) -a c n
Thus, the new cost to shareholders of a firm issuing a dollar of debt and burning the 
proceeds will be
__ *(! — m )
z(l — m) — acn (})
Table 2.2 records the costs to shareholders of these four forms of finance.
Table 2.2: Costs of Raising a Dollar of Capital and Burning the Proceeds
Form of Finance Cost
RUE 1 — m
RFE (1 — m) / (1 — x)
NE 1 — c
Debt i(\ — m) / (j>
Perturbations in Financial Policy
It will be optimal for firms to perturb financial policy by replacing more expensive 
forms of finance recorded in Table 2.2 with less expensive forms of finance.
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As there are four methods of financing investment in Australia, there are six possible 
pairs of financing options (which for convenience will be considered in the following 
order - RUE/NE, NE/Debt, RUE/Debt, Debt/RFE, NE/RFE and RUE/RFE).
i. RUE/NE
Proposition 2.1: The retention of unfrankable earnings (ie., reducing unfranked 
dividend payments) dominates new equity issues provided c <m.
Suppose that relative to some base plan a firm decides to increase unfrankable 
earnings and to reduce new equity issues by a dollar in period 0 keeping all the other 
choice variables (ie., unfranked dividends and new equity issues in other periods and 
bonds and franked dividend payments in all periods) unchanged.15 This satisfies the 
firm's cash-flow constraint (2.6'). The changes in the variables appearing in (2.6') 
other than CFt (which is assumed to be exogenous) are as follows:
Period dD' dDut dB, dVtN
0 0 -1 0 -1 0




0 0 0 0 0
That these changes satisfy (2.6') while leaving CFt unchanged is easily checked. 
Assuming that this decision is made just before dividends are paid in period 0, the 
gain to its shareholders is found by substituting dD“ = dVtN = -1 into (2.15). The 
gain is
dW0 = -(1 -  m) + (1 -  c) = m -  c (2.16)
The gain from reducing new equity issues by a dollar and increasing retained 
unfrankable earnings (reducing unfranked dividends) by a dollar is m -c .  This is 
positive assuming c < m. As noted above, the intuition is clear if one compares the 
costs of raising of dollar of finance in these two primitive ways (issuing new equity
15 Without loss of generality, perturbations will all be assumed to take place in period 0.
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and retaining unfrankable earnings) and burning the proceeds. From Table 2.2, the 
cost to existing shareholders of a dollar of new equity is 1 -  c and the cost of retaining 
a dollar of unfrankable earnings is 1 -  m .
Assuming c < m, unfranked dividends should not be paid in any period in which firms 
are issuing new equity. By reducing unfranked dividend payments and new equity 
issues the firm can add to the wealth of its current shareholders.16
ii. NE/Debt
Proposition 2.2: Issuing new equity weakly dominates debt. Debt will never be 
preferred to new equity issues and at times new equity will be preferred to debt.
One aim of Australia's move to full imputation was to remove distortions in corporate 
financing decisions between debt and new equity. In the absence of capital gains 
taxation, tax biases would be completely eliminated if both firms and their 
shareholders were in a taxpaying position and if firms were distributing the maximum 
level of franked dividends.17
The intuition is straightforward and follows from our earlier discussion of the cost of 
issuing a dollar of new equity or a dollar of debt and burning the proceeds. A dollar 
of new equity reduces the value of old equity by a dollar. A dollar of debt reduces the 
value of franked dividends a firm can pay by z(l -  x) which costs shareholders 
i{ 1 -  m) per annum. The present value of this stream is also dollar.
Australia's capital gains tax provisions can, however, result in a tax bias in favour of 
new equity in times of inflation. If firms reduce debt and increase new equity leaving 
other sources of finance unchanged, this will add to shareholder wealth if real gains 
are taxed (i.e., if real gains accrue). It will leave shareholder wealth unchanged in 
other cases. As has been outlined in Section 1.3, this conclusion contrasts with those
16 Others have provided a similar line of argument to demonstrate that new equity should not be 
issued and dividends paid in the same period under a classical company tax system (see, for example, 
Poterba and Summers, 1985). One difference is that in Poterba and Summers the gain is (w-c)/(l-c). 
This difference stems from their implicit assumption that the decision to perturb dividend policy was 
known about in the previous period.
17 There also would be no distortion between these forms of finance and retained frankable earnings if 
firms availed themselves of the bonus issue option (see footnote 1 above).
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of other Australian studies which have differed over whether Australia's tax 
provisions completely eliminate or only partially eliminate a bias in favour of debt 
finance.
To see this formally, suppose that relative to some base plan the firm decides to issue 
an additional dollar of new equity in period 0 and uses this to reduce debt by the same 
amount in all future periods. This reduces interest payments by i and tax payments by 
ft per period. In order for this change to leave sources of finance other than new 
equity issues and debt unchanged (ie., leave RFE and RUE unchanged), franked 
dividends must rise by this amount in each future period. Changes can be summarised 
as follows:
Period dDj dD“ dB, dVtN ( l  +  I ( l - T ) p ß , _ ,
0 0 0 -1 1 0




z(l-x) 0 -1 0 —[l + i( l-x )]
This implies
^ 0 = - ( l - O  + l M  = - ( l - c )  + ^  (2.17:
,=l(l+ <!>)' <l>
Again, this can be explained by comparing the costs of issuing and burning a dollar of 
new equity and a dollar of debt (see Table 2.2).
Rearranging,
dWn
i ( \ - m ) - ( i ( \ - m ) - a c n )  acn
* <t>
(2.18)
Thus, if the inflation rate is positive and c > 0, this policy of increasing new equity 
issues to retire debt will increase the value of the firm provided real gains are accruing 
(so a  = 1). If shares do not appreciate in real terms (so either a  or c is zero), the value 
of the firm will be unchanged. The value of the firm would also be unchanged if all 
potential shareholders were sharetraders as in this case nominal gains are taxable so 
a  = 0. Thus, issuing new equity to replace debt and perturbing dividend payments in
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the manner outlined above to keep RFE and RUE unchanged never lowers the value 
of the firm and increases it if n is positive, c> 0 and real gains are accruing. This 
establishes Proposition 2.2.18
The intuition behind the preference for new equity finance is straightforward if one 
considers the case of a company owned by a single individual. If an individual puts a 
dollar of equity into a company which lends the proceeds, the firm's equity rises and 
net debt falls by a dollar. This is equivalent to a substitution from debt to equity.
In the absence of any capital gains tax the individual would be neutral between 
earning interest income on personal account or using his capital to set up a company 
which earns interest and pays after-tax interest as franked dividends. Given full 
imputation, in both cases the individual would earn the net-of-personal-tax interest 
rate on his capital.
Now suppose, however, that there is an indexed capital gains tax and a positive 
inflation rate. If the firm pays out its after-tax nominal interest as franked dividends, 
its nominal value will remain constant and its real value will fall. Clearly, if 
shareholders could deduct real capital losses, there would be an advantage to an 
individual in incorporation. By establishing a company an individual would be able 
to claim deductions for real capital losses on top of receiving the net-of-personal-tax 
interest rate on his capital. The end result would be that the individual would be taxed 
on real rather than nominal interest income.
In Australia real capital losses are not deductible but suppose that an individual owns 
some bonds as well as being the owner of a company which is appreciating in real 
terms. If the individual holds the bonds on personal account, he will be taxed on the 
nominal interest he receives. If, however, he sells the bonds and injects the funds into 
his company as additional equity capital, the company can use the capital to buy 
bonds and pay its nominal interest income as a franked dividend to the shareholder.
At the same time the additional equity capital will lead to higher indexation
18 In the analysis above, it is assumed that the company is in tax profit. If one allows for the 
possibility of the company itself being in a tax-loss position, the tax preference for new equity becomes 
even stronger. Even if shares were not expected to appreciate in real value, issuing new equity would 
be tax preferred. An offsetting consideration is that imputation credits are not refundable and so if a 
shareholder is in a tax-loss position, imputation credits are wasted. Debt could be tax preferred if there 
is a possibility of those supplying capital being in a tax-loss position.
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deductions when capital gains tax is computed on the shares. In effect this means that 
rather than the individual being taxed on nominal interest income, he is taxed on real 
interest income once more. 19
It is worth noting that our analysis appears to lead to a somewhat troubling 
conclusion. In valuing the firm we have assumed that individuals could borrow or 
lend at the interest rate, i. Now, however, we have shown that individuals will not 
wish to lend so long as shares generate real capital gains. This raises the question of 
who the lenders will be. In our model's frictionless world, the conclusion would 
appear to be that all lending would be done by nontaxpayers, sharetraders, companies 
or foreigners.
Individuals should not lend on their own account but instead buy shares in companies 
which lend the capital or reduce debt instead so long as this can be used as a way of 
reducing capital gains on shares.20 If this model is pushed to its logical limit, it would 
appear that individuals should continue to borrow to buy shares in companies which 
reduce their debt or lend the proceeds so long as these companies have any prospect of 
generating real capital gains. As companies reduce debt or lend, real capital gains 
become less likely. In theory, any prospect of capital gains might be eliminated if a 
company issues enough new equity and lends the proceeds.21 In practice, some shares 
clearly do rise in real value. Companies might need to issue very large amounts of 
new equity and lend the proceeds in order to ensure that real gains are avoided in all 
possible states of the world. Issues not considered such as transactions costs and
19 If the individual who owns the appreciating company had no bonds initially, a variant of this 
strategy could be used. The individual could borrow money which he uses to purchase additional 
equity in the company. Nominal interest on the borrowings would be deductible but if the company 
acquires bonds and pays its interest income as a franked dividend, once again only real interest income 
would be taxed. This is a wealth pump with the individual deducting nominal interest but being taxed 
only on the real component of interest income.
20 Note that this does not invalidate equation (2.3). Interest can be deducted on money used to acquire
shares so (2.3) would continue to be valid for companies owned by individuals on tax rate m. The cost 
of investing in shares would be as a consequence of the cost of borrowing individuals face.
21 If real capital losses had been treated symmetrically with real capital gains and made deductible, in 
principle this process would continue until investors had bought sufficient shares to eliminate their tax 
liabilities.
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possible concerns about corporate management's abilities to misappropriate large cash 
balances may be important constraints preventing firms from adopting a financial 
policy which eliminates real capital gains in all states of the world.
Finally, note that the conclusion that new equity is tax preferred relative to debt rests 
on the assumption of a single marginal tax rate on suppliers of capital. Multiple tax 
rates and depreciation provisions which do not correspond to economic depreciation 
introduce complications we have not analysed. This is true not only for companies 
but even for unincorporated enterprises. As is discussed further in section 3.3, 
accelerated depreciation reduces the cost of capital for unincorporated enterprises 
below the real interest rate by an amount which increases with the owner's marginal 
tax rate. This will provide incentives for unincorporated enterprises investing in tax- 
preferred activities to be owned by those on higher marginal rates, possibly borrowing 
the capital from those on lower marginal rates. If there are limited areas of investment 
where depreciation is not accelerated, this will tend to provide incentives for those on 
lower marginal rates to hold debt rather than an equity share in an unincorporated 
enterprise. The cost of capital for companies will also tend to be bid down below the 
real interest rate by an amount which increases with the marginal tax rate of 
shareholders. Again if depreciation is accelerated this may provide a bias in favour of 
those on lower marginal rates holding debt rather than equity in companies.
iii. RUE/Debt
Proposition 2.3: The retention of unbankable earnings (ie., reducing unfranked 
dividends) dominates debt as a method of financing investment provided c <m.
This follows directly from propositions 2.1 and 2.2. The retention of unfrankable 
earnings dominates new equity which weakly dominates debt and so the retention of 
unfrankable earnings must dominate debt.
Suppose that relative to some base plan a firm reduces unfranked dividends by a 
dollar in period 0, uses the proceeds to reduce bonds and pays out the increase in 
after-tax profits as a dividend each period to keep RFE unchanged. Changes can be 
summarised as follows:
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Period dD{ dD“ dB, dVtN (l + i( l - T))rfS,_,
0 0 -1 -1 0 0




i( l-x ) 0 -1 0 -[l -H ( l - T)]
The change in the cum-dividend value of the firm would be
dWQ = - ( \ - m )  +
l + <\>
+ . . . =  - ( 1  -  m )  +
/(I -  m)
4>
This is the cost of issuing a dollar of debt and consigning this to the fire (viz.,
/(I -  m) / <j>) minus the cost of retaining a dollar of unfrankable earnings and 
consigning this to the fire (viz., 1 -m).  Observing the similarity of the right-hand ^ide: 
of this expression to that of (2.17) it is straightforward to see that
a m
dW0 = m - c  + —  (2.19)
<l>
This will be positive if a  > 0, assuming m> c.
In the absence of inflation the gain from replacing debt with retained unfrankable 
earnings would be the same as that from replacing new equity with retained 
unfrankable earnings. If real gains are taxed and n > 0, there is an additional benefit 
in replacing debt with retained unfrankable earnings brought about by the higher value 
of shares and greater stream of indexation deductions that retentions produce.
Thus, not only should firms refrain from paying unfranked dividends in any year 
where they are issuing new equity (Proposition 2.1), they should also refrain from 
paying unfranked dividends if they can thereby reduce corporate borrowing or 
increase corporate lending. As this would always seem possible, the strong 
conclusion would appear to be that unfranked dividends should never be paid.
The proposition that firms should refrain from paying unfranked dividends may at 
first seem surprising to those familiar with the new view of dividends. Proponents of 
the new view have argued with reference to a classical company tax system that if 
firms cannot reward their shareholders with tax-preferred capital gains (by share
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repurchase or the acquisition of shares in other companies) it may be optimal to pay 
dividends.
There is a key difference between a classical company tax system and Australia's full 
imputation provisions. Under a classical company tax system, not only will the 
retained earnings be taxed when eventually distributed as a dividend, any earnings on 
these earnings also will be taxed as dividends. This means that if a company retains a 
dollar and uses this to purchase bonds, it will generally not be able to pay shareholders 
a stream of dividend payments with an after-tax present value of a dollar. Under full 
imputation, however, if a firm retains a dollar of unfrankable earnings and uses this to 
purchase bonds, it will be able to provide shareholders with an after-tax dividend 
stream of /(I -  m )  per annum which has a present value of a dollar. Why some firms 
pay unfranked dividends under full imputation seems, if anything, more puzzling than 
the conventional dividend puzzle of why firms pay dividends under a classical 
company tax system.
iv. Debt/RFE
Proposition 2.4: Debt dominates the retention o f frankable earnings (ie., reduced 
payments offranked dividends) if and only if(x + c(l -  x) -  m)i > acn .
Consider a perturbation in which relative to some base plan a company issues an 
additional dollar of debt in period 0 to increase franked dividend payments in that 
year. The additional debt leads to a stream of interest payments in future periods. As 
before, it is assumed that the rise in debt is permanent so interest payments increase 
by i per annum, tax payments fall by re per annum and franked dividends fall by 
i( 1 -  x) per period leaving retained frankable earnings one dollar lower in all future 
periods.22 NE and RUE are unchanged. Changes are assumed to be as follows:
22 It might be objected that if the franking account balance would have been zero in some future year, 
this perturbation would not be possible. The additional dollar of franked dividends in period 0 
necessitates a dollar less franked dividends in that period. This means that rather than there being a 
permanent rise in debt and fall in equity, the change would only be temporary. This would reduce the 
size but not the direction of the changes analysed in this section.
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Period dDf dD" dB, dV,N
0 1 0 1 0 0




- / ( 1 - t ) 0 1 0 [1 + /(1 —T)]
In this case
dW0 I - / 7 7  “ /(I -  m) 1-/77 /(I -  m)
1 -  T (|>
(2 .20)
This is the cost of retaining a dollar of frankable earnings and burning it (viz., 
(1 -  m) / (1 -  x)) minus the cost of issuing a dollar of debt and burning it (viz., 
i{\ — m) / ()>).
Expanding (2.20) yields
dW0 (1 - / 7 7 )  (  7 ( 1 — /7 7 )  — 0CC7T
( l - T ) ^ V  C
or
JTTr I-/77 /(x + c(l — x) — 777) — ac 7idw =-----------  ----------------------------------
(1 — x)(|) 1_ 1- c
In order for this expression to be positive, the numerator of the expression in square 
brackets must be positive which establishes proposition 2.4.
v. NE/RFE
Proposition 2.5: New equity issues dominate the retention o f frankable earnings (ie., 
reduced payments offranked dividends) if and only if  x + c(l -  x) > m.
Consider a firm which increases new equity issues to increase franked dividend 
payments by a dollar in year 0 relative to some base plan. Assume that the franking 
account balance is not zero in any future year and that in year t franked dividends and 
new equity issues increase by the same amounts, leaving choice variables unchanged
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in future years.23 For each dollar of additional franked dividends and new equity 
issues, changes would be as follows:
Period dDf dD\' dB, d V f (1 + / ( 1 - t ) ) ^ _ ,
0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 and 0 0 0 0 0
future
years
The change in the value of the firm would be
dW0 = _ (i _ c) _ ü ü t i z l t z i ü
1 -  T 1 -  T
( 2.21)
This is the cost of retaining a dollar of frankable earnings and burning it minus the 
cost of issuing a dollar of new equity and burning it. Thus, increasing new equity 
issues to increase franked dividend payments raises the value of the firm if and only if 
x + c(l -  x) — m > 0.
vi. RUE/RFE
Proposition 2.6: The retention of unfrankable earnings (ie., reduced payments o f 
unfranked dividends) always dominates the retention o f frankable earnings (ie., 
reduced payments o f franked dividends).
Consider a firm which is paying unfranked dividends in period 0 while paying less 
than the maximum possible level of franked dividends in that period. It increases 
franked dividends by a dollar in that period and reduces unfranked dividends by the 
same amount. Assume that under the base plan it is not paying the maximum level of 
franked dividends in any future period and that it can leave all other choice variables 
unchanged. Changes in choice variables would be as follows:
23 Again, if under the base plan the franking account balance would be zero in some future year, 
boosting franked dividends in year 0 implies a reduction in franked dividends in some future year. 
Once again this affects the size but not the direction of changes analysed in this section.
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0 1 -1 0 0 0




0 0 0 0 0
The change in the value of the firm would be
dWa 1 -  m
1 - T
-(1 - m )
(1 -  m)x
1 - T
( 2.22)
This will always be positive. This is the cost of retaining a dollar of frankable 
earnings and burning the proceeds minus the cost of retaining a dollar of unfrankable 
earnings and burning the proceeds. As shareholders gain imputation credits on 
franked dividends but not unfranked dividends, it makes sense for firms to pay 
franked dividends before paying any unfranked dividends.24
Optimal Financial Policy: A Summary
Table 2.3 summarises optimal financial policy and how this depends on tax rates and 
capital gains on shares. The preferred ordering of financial policy is read from left to 
right. For example if shares are rising in real value and if x + c(l -  t) -  m > cn / i , 
retained unfrankable earnings dominates new equity issues which dominates debt 
which dominates retained frankable earnings. The symbol V indicates that changing 
between two methods of financing leaves the value of the firm unchanged. Thus, 
unless shares are rising in real value changing between new equity and debt leaves the 
value of the firm unchanged.
24 In Australia there are rules preventing firms from paying unfranked dividends if they have a 
positive franking account balance and so this optimal policy is enforced by regulation (see Commerce 
Clearing House, 1995, p. 101). The regulation is intended to place impediments in the way of different 
types of dividends being streamed to shareholders in different tax positions. This complication cannot 
be analysed in our simple model which treats all shareholders as being taxed at the same marginal rate.
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Table 2.3: Optimal Financial Policy in Year t
Shares rising in Optimal Financial Policy
real value (Left to Right)
x + c(l -  x) -  m > cn /  i > 0 RUE, NE, Debt, RFE
0 < x + c(l -  x) -  m < cn /  i RUE, NE, RFE, Debt
x-f c ( l - x ) -  m < 0 RUE, RFE, NE, Debt
Shares falling in
real & rising in
nominal value
x > m RUE, NE/Debt, RFE
x < m RUE, RFE, NE/Debt
Shares falling in
nominal value
x + c(l -  x) > m RUE, NE/Debt, RFE
x + c(l -  x) < m RUE, RFE, NE/Debt
Irrespective of the precise values of m and t, our analysis appears to lead to two strong 
conclusions. First, firms should pay no unfranked dividends. RUE is always the 
cheapest source of finance. Rather than paying unfranked dividends, firms should pay 
franked dividends, reduce new equity issues or reduce corporate debt. As corporate 
debt can always be made negative (the company can lend), no unfranked dividends 
should be paid.
Our second conclusion is that if there is a positive probability of real gains and 71 > 0, 
firms should issue new equity instead of debt. If real gains accrue, new equity is 
preferred to debt and if real gains do not accrue, whether new equity or debt is issued 
is a matter of indifference. Some qualifications are in order. We have noted that 
sharetraders will be indifferent between debt and new equity and shareholders in tax 
loss may prefer debt. On the other hand, if the company itself has any prospect of 
being in tax loss, this will increase the bias in favour of it issuing new equity instead 
of debt.
Ifx + c ( l - x ) > m , a  third conclusion emerges. Increasing new equity to increase 
franked dividends (reduce RFE) adds to the value of the firm. It will be argued below
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that this inequality appears likely to hold under plausible rates of share turnover for 
any plausible value of m. Thus, firms should pay as many franked dividends as 
possible, replacing the capital by issuing new equity.
2.5 Assumptions Used in Deriving Numerical Estimates
As will be discussed more fully in section 2.7, not all firms appear to distribute the 
maximum level of franked dividends, some unfranked dividends are paid and firms 
are partially debt financed. Part of the explanation could be that tax incentives we 
have identified encouraging the payment of franked dividends and discouraging both 
debt finance and the payment of unfranked dividends may be very weak. It is 
important to attempt to quantify the financial biases outlined above. The remainder of 
this chapter aims to do this.
In order to estimate the extent of financial policy biases it is necessary to make 
assumptions about the marginal tax rate of shareholders, m, and the accrual-equivalent 
rate of capital gains tax.
The Value of m
There is no particularly satisfactory way of compressing a range of marginal tax rates 
of shareholders into a single value of m. A common approach is to use the mean 
marginal tax rate on shareholders but there seems to be little good reason for choosing 
this rate. A problem in using this rate in Australia is that most domestic final 
shareholders are on one of two tax rates. Superannuation funds are taxed at a rate of 
15 per cent and individuals on the top marginal tax rate of 48.5 per cent (inclusive of 
the 1.5 per cent Medicare Levy) hold the large majority of shares owned by 
individuals. Choosing the mean marginal tax rate ensures that m is chosen between 
these two extreme marginal tax rates. In practice more shares are held by 
superannuation funds and by individuals taxed at the top marginal tax rate than by 
taxpayers close to the mean marginal rate and it seems at least possible that some 
companies are attempting to act in the interests of shareholders taxed at these more 
extreme rates. For this reason as well as making the conventional assumption that m 
is the mean marginal tax rate of shareholders, we also consider the possibility that m is 
the marginal tax rate of superannuation funds and that m is the top personal marginal 
tax rate.
The most recent data which would allow a mean marginal tax rate to be calculated are 
from the Australian Taxation Office publication 'Taxation Statistics 1994/95'. The 
data is recorded in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4 Total Dividend Income of All Individuals 1994/95
Taxable Income {$) Actual Number with Actual Amount ($m)
Under 10,000 30,953 10
10,000- 14,999 84,255 71
15,000 - 19,999 91,327 123
20,000 - 24,999 108,156 149
25,000 - 34,999 191,482 322
35,000 - 49,999 209,535 538
50,000 and over 210,100 2,747
Non-taxable 152,424 171
Table 2.5 shows marginal tax rates by income in 1994/95 and estimates of dividend 
receipts by income class. Shareholding by income class is assumed to be the same as 
dividend receipts by income class. Dividend receipts by marginal tax rate group are 
derived from Table 2.4 with prorating across income ranges.
In 1994/95 there was a 1.4 per cent Medicare Levy. This levy was not payable if an 
individual had income of less than $12,688 or a family had income of less than 
$21,366 if they had no children, with amounts increasing with dependent children. 
Once these income ranges were reached, the Medicare Levy was shaded in at a rate of 
20 per cent. As shading-in provisions vary with family circumstance in a complex 
way, our calculations of marginal tax rates for dividend recipients abstract from these 
complications and treat the levy as a proportional 1.4 per cent levy on all income. 
Given that the very large majority of dividends are received by those on incomes 
above the shading-in range, this simplification is unlikely to have much effect on 
estimates of the average marginal tax rate.
The data in Table 2.5 imply an average marginal tax rate on taxpaying individual 
dividend recipients of 44.6 per cent and an average marginal tax rate on all individuals 
of 42.7 per cent.
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Table 2.5 Dividends Received by Marginal Tax Rate 1994/95
Taxable Income {$) Assumed Marginal Tax Estimated Dividends
Rate Inclusive o f  
Medicare Levy (%)
Received ($m)
0 - 5,399 1.4 5.4
5,400 - 20,699 21.4 219.5
20,700 - 37,999 35.4 557.7
38,000 - 49,999 44.4 430.4
50,000 and over 48.4 2747.0
Non-taxable 171.0
As well as individuals receiving dividends, the unincorporated sector derives 
dividends through partnerships and trusts. The Australian Taxation Office's 
publication 'Taxation Statistics' indicates that individuals declared $4,132 million in 
dividends in 1994/95 and partnerships and trusts declared $1,785 million. The 
taxation of trust income depends on whether or not it is taxed as income of the trustee 
or beneficiaries' income. Income of the trustee is taxed at the top personal marginal 
rate and beneficiaries' income is taxed at the marginal tax rates of beneficiaries. There 
are no data which would allow us to calculate the marginal tax rates applying to 
dividend income earned by partnerships and trusts. We assume that this income is 
taxed at the average marginal tax rate of individual shareholders of 42.7 per cent.
Superannuation funds and life insurance offices are other important groups of 
shareholders. Assumptions on the proportions of shares held by households and by 
life offices and superannuation funds are based on ABS figures.25 ABS data indicate 
that while households derived $5,807 million in dividends in 1994/95, life insurance 
companies and superannuation funds received $3,517 million. Superannuation funds 
were normally taxed at a rate of 15 per cent and life offices at a rate of 39 per cent on 
their non-superannuation business.
25 See ABS Catalogue No. 5204.0.
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In June 1995, domestic shares and units in unit trusts which were superannuation fund 
assets totalled $71.8 billion.26 Those which were assets of life offices but not 
superannuation fund assets totalled $11.0 billion.27 This implies that 86.7 per cent of 
shares owned by life offices and superannuation funds were superannuation fund 
assets. Accordingly, 86.7 per cent of dividends received by life offices and 
superannuation funds are assumed to be taxed at a rate of 15 cents in the dollar and the 
remainder at 39 cents in the dollar. This implies an overall average marginal tax rate 
for individual and institutional final domestic shareholders of approximately 33 per 
cent for 1994/95.
Apart from some very small adjustments to the rate of Medicare Levy, there have 
been no changes to marginal tax rates since that time. As the bulk of dividends 
received by individuals on the top marginal tax rate in 1994/95 and there has been 
little inflation since then, it is unlikely that the mean marginal tax rate has changed 
much since that time. It is assumed that the mean marginal tax rate of shareholders 
continues to be 33 per cent.
Accrual-Equivalent Rate of Capital Gains Tax
The most common way of estimating an accrual-equivalent rate of capital gains tax is 
that of King (1977). King assumes that a fraction, a, of shares are sold each year. If 
the value of shares rises by a dollar, shareholders would be taxed on a immediately, 
a( \ -  a) after one year, a { \ -  a)2 after two years and so forth. If there were a 
constant interest rate of i per annum, and nominal gains were taxed, the present 
discounted value would be
c = ma 1 -  a
V
,=oU + i { \ -m )
ma(\ + i ( \ -  m)) 
i ( \ -  m) + a
(2.23)
This is equation (3.14) of King (1977).
If instead real gains were taxed, the accrual equivalent tax rate would be
26 See Table 3 of the Insurance and Superannuation Commission Bulletin, September 1995.
27 ABS 5655.0 Table 3 indicates that life insurance offices owned $38.7 billion and Table 6 of the 
Insurance and Superannuation Commission Bulletin, September 1995 indicates that $27.7 billion of 
these were superannuation assets.
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c = ma Y
1=0
r { \-a){\  + n) 
K \ + i(\ — m)
Y
Simplifying,
ma(l + i ( \ - m )) 
i(\ -  m) + a -  n(\ -  a)
(2.24)
In our calculations, (2.24) is used to calculate c when real gains accrue and (2.23) is 
used when nominal losses accrue. This approach is justified more fully in Appendix 
2 . 1.
To compute c, assumptions must also be made about the proportion of shares sold in 
any year, a. It is commonly assumed (e.g., King and Fullerton, 1984,/?. 24) that a is 
approximately 0.1. This seems low relative to average rates of share turnover in 
Australia. In Australia shares in listed companies turn over approximately once every 
two years although this may involve traders turning over shares very rapidly while 
many shareholders hold shares for longer periods.28 In our base case it is assumed 
that a = 0.2 although rates of 0.1 and 0.5 are also used.
2.6 Numerical Estimates of Financial Policy Biases
Estimates of the magnitudes of financial policy biases are presented below under a 
variety of assumptions about m, a and n. It is assumed that the company tax rate is 36 
per cent as is currently the case. For simplicity, the decisions to perturb financial 
policy examined in this section are assumed all to involve a dollar change in financial 
policy and to take place in period 0 just before dividends are paid. The equations used 
in deriving the effects of perturbations on shareholder wealth are (2.16), (2.18), (2.19), 
(2.20), (2.21) and (2.22).
Table 2.6 summarises the expressions derived earlier for the change in shareholder 
wealth as a result of one dollar perturbations in financial policy. For example we saw 
earlier that the gain from replacing a dollar of new equity with a dollar of RUE is 
m - c ,  the gain from replacing a dollar of debt with a dollar of new equity was ac7i / (j) 
and so forth.
28 The Australian Stock Exchange publication 'Monthly Index Analysis: June 1997 reports a turnover 
of 48.0 per cent in 1995/96 and 54.9 per cent in 1996/97. These figures comprise the (average daily 
turnover x trading days in the year) / average market capitalisation.
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Table 2.6 Effects on Shareholder Wealth of Permanent Perturbations in
Financial Policy
Raise RUE by 
$1
Raise NE by $1 Raise Debt by $1 Raise RFE by $1
Reduce R UE 
by $1
0 c -m acnc - m ------- - ( 1  -  m)x
1 -  X
Reduce NE 
by $1
m - c 0 -acn
*
, 1 -  m








0 i ( \ - m )  1 - m
(|> 1 -  X
Reduce RFE 
by $1
(1 -  m)x 
1 -  X
\ -m
, (1 c )
1 — X
1 — m z ( l  -  m) 
1 -  x <|>
0
To quantify the financial policy biases, it is initially assumed that a = 0.2, m = 0.33 
(the average marginal rate of shareholders), x = 0.36 (the current company tax rate) 
the real interest rate is 5 per cent per annum, and that there is a constant inflation rate 
of 2 per cent per annum29. This implies that the nominal interest rate is i = 0.071. It 
is also assumed that real gains accrue (so real gains are taxed) which implies that 
c = 0.299 and <j) = 0.059. Changes in the value of the firm under these assumptions 
are recorded in Table 2.7.
These figures can be explained in terms of the costs of raising a dollar of finance in 
different ways and burning the proceeds. The cost of raising and burning a dollar of 
RUE, RFE, NE and Debt are under these assumptions, respectively, 1 -  m -  0.67,
(1 - r Y i ) l (1 —  x) =  1.047, l - c  =  0.701 and i ( l - m ) / §  =  0.802. The gain from replacing 
a dollar of new equity with a dollar of retained earnings is 0.031 = 0.701 -  0.67, the 
gain from replacing a dollar debt with a dollar of new equity is 0.101 = 0.802 -  0.701 
and so forth.
29 These assumed rates are broadly consistent with actual inflation and interest rates in recent years. 
The average rate of CPI inflation between June 1995 and June 1997 was 1.7 per cent. The inflation is 
at the low end of the Reserve Bank's long-run target for inflation of 2 - 3 per cent per annum. Interest 
rates on three-year government stock issued in varied between 8.5 and 5.9 per cent.
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Table 2.7 Effects on Shareholder Wealth of Permanent Perturbations in 
Financial Policy when Real Gains Accrue, a = 0.2, r = 0.05,7i = 0.02, i = 0.071
Raise R UE by 
$1
Raise NE by $1 Raise Debt by $1 Raise RFE by $1
Reduce RUE 
by $1
0 -0.031 -0.132 -0.377
Reduce NE 
by $1
0.031 0 -0.101 -0.345
Reduce Debt 
by $1
0.132 0.101 0 -0.245
Reduce RFE 
by $1
0.377 0.345 0.245 0
Table 2.8 enlarges Table 2.7 to consider not only the case when real gains are 
accruing (a  = 1) but also the case where real losses but nominal gains accrue (c = 0) 
and the case where nominal losses accrue (a = 0). In the case where real losses but 
nominal gains accrue, i(1 -  m) / (j) = 1. In the case where nominal losses accrue, 
i ( \-  m) / <|> = 1 -  c . As discussed earlier, this implies that there is no gain from 
replacing debt with new equity in either of these last two cases.
If, as before, it is assumed that a, r, n and i are 0.2, 0.05, 0.02 and 0.071 respectively 
and m = 0.33, from (2.23) c = 0.279 if nominal losses accrue. The middle three 
columns of Table 2.8 present results when m is assumed to be 0.33. As mentioned 
earlier, there is no strong reason for assuming that m can be approximated by the 
average marginal tax rate of shareholders and Table 2.8 also considers the possibility 
of m being 0.15 (the tax rate of superannuation funds) or 0.485 (the top marginal tax 
rate in 1997/98). In Table 2.8 RUE/NE is the gain to shareholders from replacing a 
dollar of new equity with a dollar of retained unfrankable earnings (i.e., paying a 
dollar less unfranked dividends), RUE/Debt is the gain from replacing a dollar of debt 
with a dollar of retained unfrankable earnings and so forth.
Table 2.8 allows us to estimate the magnitudes of financial policy biases under a 
variety of different possible assumptions. The intermediate case where m -  0.33 has 
figures shown in bold type. Figures for the fourth column (ie., the first bold-face 
column) where m -  0.33 and entitled RG (real gains) are derived from Table 2.7.
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Table 2.8 Effects on Shareholder Wealth of Permanent Perturbations in 
Financial Policy, a = 0.2, r = 0.05, n = 0.02, i = 0.071
m = 0.15 m = 0.33 m = 0.485
RG RLNG NL RG RLNG NL RG RLNG NL
RUE/NE 0.020 0.15 0.028 0.031 0.330 0.051 0.029 0.485 0.060
RUE/Debt 0.059 0.15 0.028 0.132 0.330 0.051 0.210 0.485 0.060
RUE/RFE 0.478 0.478 0.478 0.377 0.377 0.377 0.290 0.290 0.290
NE/Debt 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.000
NE/RFE 0.458 0.328 0.450 0.345 0.047 0.326 0.261 -0.20 0.230
Debt/RFE 0.419 0.328 0.450 0.245 0.047 0.326 0.080 -0.20 0.230
Incentive to Replace Debt With New Equity
The figures in Table 2.8 suggest that the benefit from a firm replacing debt with new 
equity may not be trivial even at an inflation rate as low as 2 per cent per annum. If 
real gains are expected to accrue and m = 0.33, shareholders gain 10.1 cents from a 
firm replacing a dollar of debt with a dollar of new equity assuming as we do in all 
cases that the change in financial policy is permanent (the stock of debt falls by a 
dollar and the stock of equity rises by a dollar in perpetuity). As the benefits of 
inflation indexation increase with the marginal tax rate, this benefit is larger (18.1 
cents) if m -  0.485 and smaller (3.9 cents) if m = 0.15.
In practice real gains are not certain to accrue and if real gains do not accrue, there is 
no benefit from replacing debt with new equity. Thus, in practice the benefit from 
replacing a dollar of debt with a dollar of new equity is likely to be somewhere 
between the value recorded when real gains accrue and zero.
Incentive to Avoid Paying Unfranked Dividends
Table 2.8 shows that there are gains from using RUE to replace any of the three other 
forms of finance irrespective of m and of whether real gains, real losses but nominal 
gains or nominal losses are expected to accrue. Incentives to replace RFE with RUE 
(ie., to pay franked rather than unfranked dividends) are of little practical interest 
given the provision requiring firms to pay franked dividends before unfranked 
dividends (see footnote 24). Incentives to retain unfrankable earnings ahead of
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issuing new equity appear to be small (no more than 6.0 cents in the dollar even if 
m = 0.485) unless real losses but nominal gains are expected to accrue.
If real gains are expected to accrue, there can be a more significant gain from retaining 
a dollar of unfrankable earnings rather than issuing this amount of debt (5.9, 13.2 or 
21.0 cents depending on whether m is 0.15, 0.33 or 0.485 respectively). This suggests 
that the question of why firms pay unfranked dividends rather than reducing debt or 
lending seems an important puzzle at least in the case of firms with a reasonable 
prospect of generating at least nominal capital gains. If m = 0.33, paying a dollar of 
unfranked dividends rather than reducing debt by a dollar is estimated to cost 
shareholders 13.2, 33.0 or 5.1 cents depending, respectively, on whether real gains, 
real losses but nominal gains or nominal losses are expected to accrue.
Incentives to Distribute Franked Dividends
Provided the possibility of real losses but nominal gains is not considered to be very 
significant, much the strongest financial bias appears likely to be for firms to pay as 
many franked dividends as possible (or, equivalently, issue franked bonus shares) and 
to issue new equity or (less favourably) debt to replace the firm's capital. The 
possibility of real losses but nominal gains seems likely to be small at present given 
recent low rates of inflation. Clearly, as inflation tends to zero, the probability of this 
case becomes zero.
Suppose for the moment that we ignore the possibility of real losses but nominal 
gains. If m = 0.33, retaining a dollar of frankable earnings is estimated to cost 
shareholders between 24.5 and 34.5 cents depending on whether it is assumed that 
debt or new equity would have been issued instead and on whether real gains or 
nominal losses are expected to accrue on shares. The gains would be even higher 
(41.9 to 45.8 cents) if superannuation funds were marginal taxpayers. The gain from 
issuing new equity ahead of RFE would still be significant (8.0 to 26.1 cents) even if 
those on the top personal marginal rate were marginal shareholders. This raises the 
puzzle of why some firms fail to pay the maximum level of franked dividends or 
franked bonus shares.
One possible reason for firms not paying too many franked dividends is that if firms 
need to issue new equity to replace their capital, this may involve important 
transactions costs. In principle, the bonus share provision appears likely to be a way 
of allowing franking credits to flow to shareholders without firms needing to issue 
new equity and without undue transactions costs. Shareholders can claim imputation 
credits without firms relinquishing their capital. Even if there were impediments
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Standing in the way of firms issuing franked bonus shares or paying franked dividends 
and issuing new equity in replacement, our analysis suggests that there are likely to be 
large gains from paying franked dividends and issuing debt in replacement. Our 
analysis suggests that there are strong incentives for firms to maintain a more-or-less 
zero franking account balance.
Capital Gains Taxation and the Value of a
The financial biases identified are very dependent on the capital gains tax. It is of 
some interest to ask how these biases would have been affected if Australia, like New 
Zealand, had not introduced a capital gains tax and if all other tax parameters in 
Australia were unchanged.
This case can be analysed by examining the real loss but nominal gain (RLNG) 
columns in Table 2.8 as if shares rise in real but not in nominal value, there is no 
capital gains tax impost. In the absence of any capital gains there would be no 
benefits from inflation indexation and there would be no bias between debt and new 
equity. With no capital gains tax, the cost of retaining unfrankable or frankable 
earnings relative to issuing new debt or equity falls. This increases the bias favouring 
the retention of unfrankable earnings over debt or new equity. It decreases the 
positive bias favouring debt or new equity relative to retained frankable earnings if m 
is 0.15 or 0.33 and changes the sign of this bias if m = 0.485. For example, if 
m = 0.33, the gain from retaining a dollar of unfrankable earnings instead of issuing a 
dollar of debt or new equity is 33 cents whereas the gain from issuing a dollar of new 
equity or debt rather than retaining a dollar of frankable earnings is only 4.7 cents. 
Here the biggest bias would seem to be for firms to avoid paying unfranked dividends 
with incentives to pay franked dividends being relatively weak.
Given uncertainty about the most appropriate value of a, Table 2.9 modifies Table 2.8 
by allowing for two different possible values of a, namely, 0.1 and 0.5. The direction 
of results is as would be expected. With a smaller value of a, values of c fall and this 
boosts the gains from using retained unfrankable earnings to replace new equity or 
debt and reduces the gains from using debt or new equity to replace retained frankable 
earnings. There is also a slight reduction in the gain from using new equity in lieu of 
debt when real gains accrue because with a lower rate of capital gains tax the benefits 
from inflation indexation fall. With a higher value of a the adjustments are in the 
opposite direction.
It is worth noting that if the chance of real losses but nominal gains is ignored, even if 
a = 0.1 and m = 0.485, there continues to be a gain to shareholders from paying a
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dollar of franked dividends and issuing new equity or debt.30 Thus, our analysis 
suggests that firms will face incentives to distribute franked dividends and new equity 
or even debt in replacement under a wide range of possible assumptions.
Table 2.9 Effects on Shareholder Wealth of Permanent Perturbations in 
Financial Policy, r = 0.05, n = 0.02, / = 0.071
m = 0.15 m = 0.33 m = 0.485
RG RLNG NL RG RLNG NL RG RLNG NL
a = 0.1
RUE/NE 0.038 0.150 0.051 0.063 0.330 0.096 0.061 0.485 0.117
RUE/Debt 0.072 0.150 0.051 0.156 0.330 0.096 0.235 0.485 0.117
RUE/RFE 0.478 0.478 0.478 0.377 0.377 0.377 0.290 0.290 0.290
NE/Debt 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.000
NE/RFE 0.440 0.328 0.427 0.314 0.047 0.281 0.229 -0.20 0.173
Debt/RFE 0.406 0.328 0.427 0.221 0.047 0.281 0.055 -0.20 0.173
a — 0.5
RUE/NE 0.005 0.150 0.008 0.008 0.330 0.014 0.008 0.485 0.017
RUE/Debt 0.049 0.150 0.008 0.115 0.330 0.014 0.192 0.485 0.017
RUE/RFE 0.478 0.478 0.478 0.377 0.377 0.377 0.290 0.290 0.290
NE/Debt 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.000
NE/RFE 0.473 0.328 0.470 0.368 0.047 0.363 0.282 -0.20 0.273
Debt/RFE 0.430 0.328 0.470 0.262 0.047 0.363 0.097 -0.20 0.273
30 Indeed there continues to be a gain from paying franked dividends and issuing new equity in 
replacement even if a is as low as 0.025 and there continues to be a gain from paying franked 
dividends and issuing debt in replacement even if a is as low as 0.05.
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Sensitivity to Inflation Rate Assumptions
The assumed inflation rate of 2 per cent per annum is low compared to average 
inflation rates up until comparatively recently. Average CPI inflation over the 10 
years to 1995/96 was 4.9 per cent per annum. Table 2.10 shows gains from financial 
perturbations with an assumed inflation rate of 5 per cent per annum. It is assumed 
that inflation has no effect on the real interest rate which is assumed as before to be 5 
per cent per annum (i.e., it is assumed that the unmodified Fisher effect holds).31 
Thus, the nominal interest rate, i, becomes 10.25 per cent. As in Table 2.8, it is 
assumed that a -  0.2.
Table 2.10 Effects on Shareholder Wealth of Permanent Perturbations in 
Financial Policy, a = 0.2, r = 0.05, n = 0.05, / = 0.1025
m = 0.15 m = 0.33 m = 0.485
RG RING NL RG RLNG NL RG RLNG NL
RUE/NE 0.018 0.150 0.036 0.022 0.330 0.067 0.005 0.485 0.081
RUE/Debt 0.089 0.150 0.036 0.222 0.330 0.067 0.439 0.485 0.081
RUE/RFE 0.478 0.478 0.478 0.377 0.377 0.377 0.290 0.290 0.290
NE/Debt 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.433 0.000 0.000
NE/RFE 0.460 0.328 0.442 0.355 0.047 0.309 0.285 -0.20 0.209
Debt/RFE 0.389 0.328 0.442 0.155 0.047 0.309 -0.15 -0.20 0.209
At 5 per cent inflation the gain from replacing a dollar of debt with a dollar of new 
equity would rise to 20.0 cents if m = 0.33 and real gains accrue (compared with 10.1 
cents at 2 per cent inflation). The gain increases with higher inflation because the 
benefit of inflation indexation rises. The gain is less than proportional because 
changes in inflation also affect c and (|). Higher inflation has little effect on incentives 
for firms to issue new equity rather than paying unfranked dividends. However, the
31 King and Fullerton (1984, p. 291) assume a modified Fisher Effect where nominal interest rates rise 
more than point for point with inflation. As Jorgenson (1993) discusses, a number of other authors 
have assumed an unmodified Fisher Effect. Hansson and Stuart (1986) provide theoretical support for 
an unmodified Fisher Effect and Summers (1983) provides empircal evidence which strongly rejects 
the idea of interest rates rising more than point for point with inflation.
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increased cost of debt relative to new equity increases tax biases encouraging firms to 
repay debt ahead of paying unfranked dividends. If m = 0.33 and real gains accrue, 
the cost of issuing a dollar of debt to pay a dollar of unfranked dividends is now 22.2 
cents (compared to 13.2 cents at 2 per cent inflation). Higher inflation has little effect 
on incentives for firms to pay franked dividends and to issue new equity instead. 
However, the increased cost of debt relative to new equity reduces incentives for firms 
to distribute franked dividends and issue debt instead. In particular if m = 0.33 and 
real gains accrue, the benefit from issuing a dollar of debt to boost franked dividends 
by a dollar is only 15.5 cents (compared to 24.5 cents at 2 per cent inflation) if real 
gains accrue. If m = 0.485, the benefit is -15.0 cents (compared with 8.0 cents at 2 per 
cent inflation). Thus, the main effect of higher inflation is to increase the cost of debt 
relative to other sources of finance if real gains accrue.
2.7 Reconciliation with the Data
The analysis in section 2.6 suggests that under a wide range of possible assumptions 
firms aiming to maximise the wealth of their shareholders should:
• pay the maximum possible level of franked dividends issuing new equity or (less 
favourably) debt in replacement;
• pay no unfranked dividends using the capital to reduce debt or (less favourably) 
new equity issues; and
• replace debt with new equity with these incentives being stronger the greater the 
likelihood of real gains accruing on shares.
This section examines actual corporate behaviour in Australia. Our analysis may 
provide an explanation for some of the trends in financial policy which have become 
evident since the introduction of full imputation. It is clear, however, that corporate 
behaviour is often inconsistent with what our model would predict. This section 
outlines where our analysis appears to conflict with the facts and offers some possible 
explanations.
Payments of Franked Dividends
Section 1.6 provided data on corporate financial policy in recent years. Figure 1.3 
showed that there was a significant increase in the corporate payout ratio for the 109 
leading non-bank industrials following the switch to full imputation. Over the five 
years to 1987/88 this ratio varied between 44 and 48 per cent. Over the seven years 
between 1989/90 and 1995/96 the ratio has varied between 53 and 61 per cent. This 
very clear increase in payout ratios is likely to have been driven in large part by the 
shift to full imputation and the incentives created for firms to distribute as many
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franked dividends as possible. As noted in chapter 1, some have argued that a 
classical company tax system discourages the payment of dividends. If this were so, 
the surge in dividend payments could also reflect the removal of this barrier to firms 
paying dividends.
While our analysis may explain the reason for the direction of the change in dividend 
policy, it is clear that not all widely-held companies are paying the maximum level of 
franked dividends (or franked bonus shares). There are no published data on 
accumulated levels in franking account balances. However, both anecdotal comments 
in the press and data on company tax payments and on imputation credits claimed by 
shareholders suggest that franking account balances are significantly positive for some 
firms. Data are available on imputation credits claimed by individuals (but not by 
superannuation funds and life insurance companies). These data on imputation credits 
claimed by individuals indicate that imputation credits claimed are too low for 
companies to all be paying the maximum possible level of franked dividends.
Data are presented in Table 2.10.32 In 1994/95 company tax paid by resident non-life 
companies was $12,769 million.33 If all companies followed the policy of distributing 
the maximum level of franked dividends and any Australian companies receiving 
franked dividends passed these on to their shareholders instantaneously, final 
shareholders would have received $12,769 million of imputation credits. These 
credits could have been used by households, superannuation funds and life offices but 
not by foreigners.
Data are available only on imputation credits received by households. Households 
claimed imputation credits of $2,838 million (22.2 per cent of company tax payments) 
but received 31.5 per cent of dividends to final shareholders. If firms were all paying 
the maximum possible level of franked dividends, household imputation credits 
should have been approximately 31.5 per cent not 22.2 per cent of company tax
32This is from ABS Catalogue 5204.0 and Australian Taxation Office 'Taxation Statistics', for various 
years.
33 Mutual life insurance companies are not permitted to maintain a franking account balance and so 
tax paid by these companies will not give rise to imputation credits. ATO data does not separately 
identify tax paid by mutual and non-mutual life insurance companies and the data reported subtracts 
tax payments by all life insurance companies. This may slightly understate the level of company tax 
which could potentially give rise to imputation credits.
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payments. On face value, these data seem to suggest that franked dividend payments 
are slightly more than 70 per cent of the amount that would be required for firms to be 
following a policy of fully distributing franked dividends. Table 2.10 shows that in 
previous years, imputation credits claimed by households were often less than 50 per 
cent of the level that would be compatible with firms all paying the maximum level of 
franked dividends.
Table 2.10 Company Tax and Imputation Credits Claimed by Households
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95
Com pany Tax P aid  by 
R esident N on-Life  
C om panies ($m )
11,319 10,993 11,410 12,786 12,769
Im putation Credits C laim ed  
by H ouseholds
1,580 1,493 1,724 2,045 2,838
H ousehold  Im p Credits as 
Percentage o f  Comp Tax
14.0 13.6 15.1 16.0 22.2
D ividends R eceived by 
H ouseholds ($m )
2,781 2,752 3,328 3,812 4,250
Total D ividends Paym ents to 
F ina l Shareholders ($m)
10,382 9,438 10,196 10,954 13,478
H ousehold  D ividends as 
Percentage o f  Total 
D ividends
26.7 29.2 32.6 34.8 31.5
These data are puzzling. They are difficult to reconcile both with anecdotal comments 
from the business sector about how important it is for firms to be able to pay franked 
dividends and with the strong incentives for firms to pay franked dividends that we 
have identified.
Part of the explanation may be that the data in Table 2.10 relate to all companies and 
not just those that are widely held. As was discussed in footnote 1 of chapter 1, for 
closely-held companies capital gains taxation may often be much easier to avoid than 
for widely-held firms. Closely-held companies owned by those on tax rates greater 
than the company tax rate may find it optimal to retain profits up until the time when 
any shares will be sold rather than paying franked dividends.
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This is not, however, a full explanation. Some closely-held companies will pay 
franked dividends. The majority of company tax paid in Australia is by public 
companies (60 and 65 per cent in 1993/94 and 1994/95 respectively). Closely-held 
companies retaining profits may be an important part of the explanation why in 
1994/95 franked dividends reported by individuals were only a bit over 70 per cent of 
the level required for firms to be following a policy of paying the maximum level of 
franked dividends. However, it is clearly inadequate as an explanation of why franked 
dividends reported by individuals in the previous year were less than 50 per cent of 
such a level. The data suggest some widely-held companies have been paying less 
than the maximum possible level of franked dividends in some years despite our 
analysis suggesting that there will normally be strong incentives for them to do so.
One possible reason for corporate behaviour being inconsistent with our model is that 
we may have ignored important classes of shareholder. One possible class is 
Australian corporate shareholders. However, Australian corporate shareholders 
receive franked dividends tax free because of the intercorporate dividend rebate but 
are taxed on capital gains. Distribution of franked dividends appears to be in their 
interest especially as the receipt of franked dividends by Australian companies 
increases their franking account balances which increases their ability to pay franked 
dividends. A second important class of shareholder is foreign shareholders. It is 
difficult to say whether foreign shareholders would generally prefer full distribution 
of frankable earnings or not because of complex interactions between Australian and 
foreign tax provisions.
There are other possible explanations of why firms do not pay as many franked 
dividends or franked bonus shares as possible. Some companies may be attempting to 
establish a reservoir of imputation credits so that they can maintain a policy of 
constantly paying franked dividends. If firms were aiming to create reservoirs of 
franking credits, it might be expected that the ratio of household imputation credits to 
company tax would have increased more rapidly over time than the ratio of household 
dividends to total dividends. In early years of the imputation scheme firms may have 
been reluctant to pay too many franked as they were attempting to establish their 
desired reservoirs. However, as reservoirs are established, it might be expected that 
firms should become more amenable to increasing payments of franked dividends. 
While there is no evidence of this being the case prior to 1994/95, there was a large 
increase in imputation credits claimed by households as a fraction of company tax 
payments in 1994/95 despite the decline in household dividends as a fraction of total 
dividends. Whether the reservoir story is a good explanation will only become 
evident in the future. Data on dividend payout ratios for the 109 leading non-bank
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industrial companies reported in Figure 1.3 indicate a significant rise in the payout 
ratio in 1995/96 which may give further tentative support for the reservoir story.
Unless company tax also rose markedly in this year, it is possible that this the rise in 
dividend payout is because of firms becoming more inclined to pay franked dividends 
rather than having ever-increasing franking account balances.
There are other possible reasons for why firms may be retaining frankable earnings. 
First, some firms owned by those on higher marginal tax rates may retain some 
frankable earnings because of a lack of understanding by shareholders of the way that 
corporate retentions can affect their capital gains tax liabilities. If this lack of 
understanding is being rectified over time, this might be a second reason for the full 
distribution of frankable earnings to be becoming more common. Second, capital 
gains taxes are notoriously easy to avoid because of timing deficiencies inherent in a 
realisation-basis capital gains tax. If capital gains tax can easily be avoided or evaded, 
the capital gains tax impost and the benefits from paying franked dividends may both 
be much lower than we have analysed. Third, it is possible that some companies 
building up large franking account balances may be aiming at a clientele of 
shareholders on high marginal tax rates with very low rates of share turnover. Fourth, 
it is possible that some companies may be controlled by shareholders who are 
temporarily in tax loss and who see benefits in the company retaining profits until 
franking credits can be utilised.
A final reason why firms may not fully distribute frankable earnings and issue new 
equity in replacement is the transactions costs of issuing new equity which this study 
(along with much of the literature) ignores. Bishop, Crapp, Faff and Twite (1993, p. 
443) report relatively small transactions costs for issuing new equity in Australia.
They suggest total flotation costs of about 3.5 per cent of issue value, of which 2.5 per 
cent is an underwriters' fee. If the underwriters' fee merely compensates underwriters 
for the true cost of the risk of the issue being undersubscribed, it is solely a source of 
insurance and should be excluded from the calculation of transactions costs of issuing 
new shares. When shares are undersubscribed, existing shareholders gain by having 
the underwriters acquire shares at more than true market value. This would suggest 
transactions costs of as little as one per cent of the value of new issues. King (1977, 
pp. 105-106) cites two studies which suggest transactions costs (inclusive of 
underwriters' fees) varying between 1.33 per cent and 10.24 per cent of the value of 
the issue. Moreover, the figures show a strong inverse relationship between the size 
of the issue and transactions costs as a proportion of equity raised.
77
Transactions costs may be an important reason why firms do not fully distribute 
frankable earnings and issue new equity each year in replacement. The transactions 
costs of small issues of new equity may be excessive. It is less clear, however, why 
transactions costs would prevent firms from passing imputation credits to 
shareholders by issuing franked bonus shares. Moreover, the transactions costs of 
issuing debt are likely to be small compared with those of issuing new equity and our 
analysis suggests that it would normally seem optimal for frankable earnings to be 
fully distributed even if debt rather than new equity were used as a replacement source 
of finance.
Payments of Unfranked Dividends
Despite our prediction that firms should not pay unfranked dividends, it is clear that 
some do. This is evident from data presented on the 109 leading nonbank industrials 
in Figure 1.3. Australian Taxation Office data show that unfranked dividends paid by 
all companies are a significant percentage of total dividend payments (ie., 30.0, 23.6, 
26.4, 32.3 and 21.4 per cent in 90/91 to 94/95 respectively).34 Relatively small 
proportions of firms pay these unfranked dividends. In 1992/93, 36,598 firms paid 
franked dividends and only 3,118 paid unfranked dividends. In 1993/94 the figures 
were 42,262 and 3,229 respectively. In 1994/95 the figures were 58,585 and 3,843 
respectively. Thus, unfranked dividends appear to be paid by a small and declining 
proportion of dividend-paying firms. Nonetheless, these data are clearly incompatible 
with the conclusion that no unfranked dividends should be paid.
Part of the answer may be that firms paying unfranked dividends may be controlled by 
superannuation funds facing low rates of tax which often turn shares over quickly. If 
this is the case, any penalty on paying unfranked dividends may be very slight. A 
second possibility is that some companies paying unfranked dividends may be 
controlled by classes of shareholder we have ignored. Australian corporate 
shareholders for whom dividends are effectively exempt (under the provisions of 
Australia's intercorporate dividend rebate) but for whom capital gains are taxed may 
have a preference for the distribution of unfranked dividends. It is difficult to predict 
whether foreign shareholders would generally prefer the distribution or retention of 
unfrankable earnings because of the complexity of interactions between Australian 
and foreign tax provisions. If superannuation funds face a very small tax penalty on 
the payment of unfranked dividends and Australian corporate shareholders and
34 See Australian Taxation Office, 'Taxation Statistics', various volumes, AGPS.
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possibly some foreign shareholders can gain a positive tax benefit, it might be 
suspected that companies paying unfranked dividends would tend to be owned 
predominantly by shareholders other than taxpaying individuals. A third possible 
reason why firms may pay unfranked dividends is that some shareholders may be 
unaffected by the tax penalty we have analysed because they fail to declare these 
unfranked dividends as income.
Any or all of these three explanations may be important in explaining why individuals 
reported only 8.9, 8.7, 9.0, 9.0 and 9.1 per cent of dividends received in 1990/91 to 
1994/95, respectively, as being unfranked in spite of firms declaring that the 
percentages of dividends that were paid unfranked were 30.0, 23.6, 26.4, 32.3 and 
21.4 per cent respectively.
A final possible reason for payments of unfranked dividends is that they may have 
important signalling or agency benefits in constraining free cash flow. Of these two 
possibilities, signalling benefits seem hard to justify. It is difficult to see why firms 
could not signal profitability by reducing corporate debt rather than paying unfranked 
dividends. It may be more difficult, however, for firms to reduce corporate debt 
without this increasing free cash flow.
Debt versus New Equity Issues
The third implication of our analysis is that full imputation provides incentives to 
issue new equity instead of debt. Some US commentators have suggested that in the 
absence of any tax preference for debt, firms might be fully equity financed because 
increasing debt increases the possibility of bankruptcy. For example Gordon and 
Malkiel (1981) make this assumption while expressing appropriate qualifications.
The assumption is critical in the high deadweight losses they estimate for the United 
States classical company tax system.
No official statistics are kept on corporate debt/equity ratios but data from Mills, 
Morling and Tease (1994) were presented in Table 1.3. Their figures demonstrate that 
firms did not become fully equity financed with the introduction of full imputation in 
1987/88. Indeed the figures suggest that debt/equity ratios climbed in the year that 
full imputation was introduced despite the fact that one of the goals of the full 
imputation reform was to reduce the tax bias favouring debt. The fact that Australia's 
switch to full imputation has not been accompanied by a large reduction in debt/equity 
ratios provides some indirect evidence that the Gordon and Malkiel estimates of 
deadweight losses are likely to be too high. It is clear that the absence of a tax bias in 
favour of debt has not caused companies to become fully equity financed.
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It would appear that other factors may be much more important than tax 
considerations in determining debt/equity ratios.35 One reason why firms may not 
become fully equity financed is because of the transactions costs of issuing new 
equity discussed above. Increased payout ratios may also have put upward pressure 
on debt/equity ratios by reducing retentions.
2.8 Concluding Comments
In this chapter we have set out a formal model to investigate the financial policy 
incentives faced by widely-held companies as a result of Australia's full imputation 
scheme and capital gains tax provisions. The model has been drawn on to analyse 
financial policy biases.
Four ways of financing corporate investment have been identified: the retention of 
profits which would have been unfranked if paid as dividends (RUE); the retention of 
profits which would have been franked if paid as dividends (RFE); new equity and 
debt. We have examined optimal corporate financial policy and how this depends on 
tax rates, inflation and the nominal interest rate.
At recent low rates of inflation, widely-held companies appear to face strong 
incentives to distribute the maximum possible level of franked dividends issuing new 
equity or (less favourably) debt in replacement. Even if shares could only be owned 
by individuals on the top marginal tax rate, it would seem likely that it would 
normally be optimal for widely-held companies to distribute the maximum possible 
level of franked dividends at plausible rates of share turnover so long as the possibility 
of real losses but nominal gains is not viewed as being very significant. This is likely 
to be an important part of the explanation of why dividend payments rose after the full 
imputation scheme was introduced.
Some firms do not appear to have followed a policy of distributing the maximum 
level of franked dividends. To the extent that some such firms are widely-held 
companies owned and controlled by domestic residents this is a puzzle. A number of
35 Australia was not alone in experiencing a build up in levels of corporate debt in the 1980s. For a 
discussion of a similar build up in the United States see United States Treasury (1992). The reasons for 
the build-up in corporate debt levels in both the United States and Australia are poorly understood, 
although Mills, Morling and Tease (1994) provide a helpful review of the literature and examine some 
possible causes.
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possible explanations have been discussed. Data for 1994/95 may very tentatively 
suggest a tendency for payments of franked dividends to be increasing.
Full imputation also provides incentives for unfrankable earnings to be retained. This 
raises the puzzle of why firms pay unfranked dividends when there appear to be 
preferable ways of rewarding shareholders especially reducing corporate debt or 
increasing corporate lending. This may be a more difficult puzzle to answer than the 
conventional puzzle of why firms pay dividends under a classical company tax 
system. Under a classical company tax system if a dollar of dividends are not paid, 
firms cannot typically invest the dollar in bonds and finance a dividend stream with a 
present value of a dollar to shareholders. However, this is what full imputation 
allows. The payment of unfranked dividends may lend support to those who argue 
that dividends provide signalling or agency benefits. Another possibility is that 
unfranked dividend payments are influenced by the demands of corporate or foreign 
shareholders, or that firms paying unfranked dividends tend to be controlled by 
superannuation funds. For companies controlled by superannuation funds, any 
penalty on the payment of unfranked dividends is likely to be extremely mild.
A number of authors have discussed whether Australia's full imputation scheme 
eliminates or only partially eliminates any bias in favour o f debt relative to new equity 
issues. Our study suggests that in the absence of inflation the full imputation scheme 
would have eliminated any tax bias in favour of debt, provided companies and their 
shareholders were in a taxpaying position. Perhaps the most important conclusion of 
this chapter is that with inflation, a bias in favour of new equity relative to debt can 
arise as a result of the capital gains tax provisions if real gains are expected to accrue. 
Thus, rather than merely eliminating any bias in favour of debt, the direction of the 
bias has been reversed. While in the United States studies have tried to explain why 
firms are not fully debt financed, the puzzle in Australia is why firms are not fully 
equity financed.
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Appendix 2.1 Modelling the Australian Realisation-Basis Capital 
Gains Tax as a Tax on Accrual
In the text the capital gains tax is modelled as an accrual-basis capital gains tax. In 
practice gains are taxed on realisation. This Appendix explores how allowing for a 
realisation-basis capital gains tax affects the analysis if, as in King (1977), it is 
assumed that shareholders liquidate a fixed fraction, a, of their share portfolio each 
year.
King assumes that if shares rise by a dollar, the fraction a is taxed immediately, 
a( \ -  a) after one year, a(l -  a)2 after two years and so forth. Suppose that there is a 
contant interest rate of i per annum and constant marginal tax rate of m each year. 
King treats the accrual-equivalent rate of capital gains tax as being the present 
discounted value of future capital gains tax payments. Thus,
This is effectively equation (3.14) of King (1977).
It was not immediately obvious (at least to the author) that this was necessarily a 
consistent way of modelling a realisation-basis capital gains tax. At first sight, this 
derivation appears to assume that any capital gain is permanent. Moreover, it was not 
immediately obvious how this analysis should be extended to an indexed capital gains 
tax.
The results in this Appendix may not be surprising to some readers as they merely 
support King's formulation in the case of an unindexed capital gains tax. However, 
the results were helpful at least to the author in clarifying the robustness of King's 
formulation under his assumption of a constant rate of share turnover.
Unindexed Capital Gains Tax
Initially suppose that the capital gains tax is not indexed. In chapter 2 where capital 
gains tax is assumed to be on an accrual basis, equations (2.2) and (2.3) imply
This is the Fundamental Equation of Yield. The opportunity cost of capital must 
equal the net-of-tax cash flow plus the net-of-tax capital gain.
c = ma l
t=0
( 1 -  a  ^ ma(l + i ( \ -m))
vl + z(l-m) J i ( \ -m)  + a
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With a realisation-basis capital gains tax the Fundamental Equation of Yield becomes
where PVACGT is the present value of the additional capital gains tax liability 
(evaluated in period t+1 terms) incurred because the shares were purchased at a cost Vt 
in period t rather than the fraction 1 -  a of these shares being purchased at a cost 
(1 -  a)Vt°+1 in period t+1. Here V°+l measures the value of period t shares to a new 
purchaser who buys all of these shares in period t+\. Shares need not be worth the 
same in period H-l to a person who acquired the shares in the previous period because 
of differences in capital gains tax payments.
An individual who acquired all shares in period t and sells the fraction a each year 
would gain a stream of revenue from selling shares. Denote this by i?,fl in period H-l, 
Rl+2 in period t+2, Rt+3 in period t+3 and so forth. This revenue would be taxable. Tax 
on this revenue stream would be offset by deductions of aVt in period /+1, a( l -a)Vf 
in period t+2, a ( \ - a ) 2 Vt in period t+3 and so forth.
If instead the fraction 1 -  a of these shares were purchased in period H-l, a purchaser 
who sell the fraction a of his portfolio at the end of each year would also receive 
taxable revenue of Rt+2 in period t+2, Rl+3 in period t+3 and so forth. Tax on this 
revenue would be offset by deductions of a{\ -  a)Vt in period t+2, a(l -  a)2 Vt in 
period t+3 and so forth.
This means that the additional capital gains tax paid by a person who acquires the 
shares in period t would be
Note that s starts from period 2 because the present value of the additional capital 
gains tax is being evaluated in period H-l terms. The additional stream of capital 
gains tax payments depends on (Vt°+l -V t) but not on capital gains in future years and 
so in King's formulation there is no implicit assumption of permanent gains in the 
value of shares.








PVACGT = cm (V°,-V,) (2.29)
Substituting into (2.26) yields (2.25). Thus, under the assumptions of a constant rate 
of share turnover it is consistent to treat the capital gains tax as though it were a tax on 
accrual.
In the special case where m and i are constant through time,
c = ma 1 +
1 — a
+
1 — a V
l + i(l — m)
(2.30)
This is King's formulation under these assumptions. This is equation (2.23) of 
Chapter 2. It is the accrual-equivalent tax formula we use when nominal gains are 
taxed.
Note that if a = 1, c = m. The realisation basis tax is equivalent to a full accrual-basis 
tax because all shares are sold each year. At the other polar extreme if a = 0, c -  0. 
Shares are never sold so there is indefinite deferral and it is as though there were no 
taxation of capital gains. As a rises from 0 to 1, c rises monotonically
dc m(\ + i ( \ -m )) i ( \ -m)  
da (i(\ — m) + a f
Finally, note that in the more general case when m and i are not constant through time, 
ct+] depends on the stream of future values of m. If a < 1 and m is rising through time, 
it is possible that ct+l > mt+v
Indexed Capital Gains Tax
In the presence of an accrual-basis indexed capital gains tax equations (2.2) and (2.3) 
lead to the Fundamental Equation of Yield
1
v 1 ~  T +i
D f.M  1 -  mtl)Z£, + C  - V -  U c  -  (1 + *,♦, w )( 2-31)
With a realisation-basis capital gains tax, the Fundamental Equation of Yield is once 
more (2.26). Now a purchaser who acquires the company in period t and sells the
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fraction a of shares in each period would have a stream of deductions of a(l + nt+l )Vt
in period t+1, a ( l-a )( \  + n l+i)(\ + nt+2)Vt in period t+2,
a ( l - a ) 2(l + 7i,+])(l + 7r/+2)(l + 7i,+3)T, in period t+3 and so forth. A person who
acquires the fraction (1 -a ) of these shares in period t+\ would acquire a stream of
deductions of a(\ -  a)(\ + n l+2)Vt°+i at the end of period t+2,
a{l — a)2(\ + n t+2)(l + n t+3)Vt°+l at the end of period t+3 and so forth.
Thus, the additional capital gains tax paid by the individual acquiring the shares in 
period t would be
PVACGT=a
V“-' 5 =  2
l + 7t,H \ \
Jjj ( C - V  + *m )K) (2-32)
In this case define the accrual-equivalent rate of capital gains tax as being




1 + - m, «)
(2.33)
Then
PV&CGT = c J C  - ( \  + n,JV,) (2.34)
Substituting (2.34) into (2.26) yields (2.31). Thus, with an indexed capital gains tax it 
is also consistent to treat a realisation-basis tax as though it were an accrual-basis tax 
so long as a constant fraction of shares are sold in each period.
When i, m and 7i remain constant through time
(
c -  am 1 + ( l - t f ) ( l  + 7l) f (l-<2)(l + 7l)+
i{ \-m ) + a - n ( \ - a )
(2.35)
Alternatively, c can be expressed as
c = am( 1 - a f l - a  )
2 ^
1+ + + . . .
^ 1 + r' l l  + r ' J J
ma(\ + r') 
r'+a
where r’ is the real after-tax interest rate, r'= (i(l -  m) -  n) / (1 + 7t)
Once again if a = 0, c = 0 and if a = 1, c = m. This time
dc _ m(l + r ' ) r '  
da ( r '+ a )2
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If r'> 0, de/ da > 0 as in the case where nominal gains are taxed. As a rises from 0 to 
1, c rises monotonically from 0 to m.
If, on the other hand -1 < r ' < 0, dc / da < 0. As a rises from 0 to 1, c falls 
monotonically except for a discontinuity when r'+a = 0. This means that for values 
of a in the range -r ' < a <1, c> m. It is theoretically possible for the accrual- 
equivalent rate of capital gains tax to exceed m.
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CHAPTER 3: OPTIMAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS AND THE COST
OF CAPITAL
3.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the analysis of chapter 2 to consider optimal investment 
decisions and the cost of capital. As was discussed in chapter 1, there has been a very 
large international literature examining the effects of tax provisions on investment 
decisions via the cost of capital. However, there has been very little analysis of this 
issue in Australia. Of the studies analysing investment decisions under the Australian 
full imputation provisions, there are two, those by Bourassa and Hendershott (1992) 
and Sieper (1995), which provide formal cost of capital expressions.
As was also mentioned in Chapter 1, the Bourassa and Hendershott study abstracts 
from a number of key features of the Australian tax system including the fact that only 
some dividends are franked and that the capital gains tax is inflation indexed. Sieper 
ignores inflation and explicitly models realisation-basis capital gains taxation. By 
contrast our model allows for inflation while being more conventional in treating the 
capital gains tax as though it were a tax on accrual. This treatment has been justified 
in Appendix 2.1.
In the absence of inflation there are differences between Sieper's and our estimates of 
costs of capital in many cases. Appendix 3.2 shows that this is because of a source of 
bias in Sieper's approach stemming from his assumption that the value of a firm is the 
sum of its physical capital and its retained earnings. This makes the value of a firm 
independent of its stream of future tax deductions. In our model the value of the firm 
is endogenously set by shareholders discounting future cash flows.1
In chapter 2 it was shown that the tax system provides incentives for firms to issue no 
debt and instead be fully equity-financed if there is any possibility of real capital gains 
accruing. As documented in chapter 2, however, the bias in favour of new equity 
relative to debt appears to be relatively mild at least when compared with the bias
1 In commenting on this paper Sieper has shown that if this source of bias is corrected, his results 
become equivalent to ours under the baseline assumptions reported in the body of this chapter. In 
addition to correcting this bias, our approach has the attraction of being simpler and being easily 
adapted to allow for differing assumptions, some of which are explored in Appendix 3.1.
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favouring the distribution of franked dividends or franked bonus shares. Moreover, 
the data presented in chapter 1 showed that Australian debt/equity ratios have changed 
little since the introduction of full imputation. In this chapter the analysis is modified 
to allow for the possibility of firms being partly debt financed.
This chapter provides estimates of the cost of capital (i.e., the minimum real pre-tax 
rate of return at which investment becomes profitable) for unincorporated enterprises 
and for widely-held companies. It examines how costs of capital can vary between 
different assets owned by both of these forms of business organisation.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Assumptions underlying cost of capital 
expressions for corporate and unincorporated enterprises are discussed in section 3.2. 
Formal derivations under our baseline assumptions and a discussion of additional 
possible cases is provided in Appendix 3.1. In section 3.3 costs of capital are 
analysed under some idealised depreciation provisions. This is helpful in obtaining 
some intuition for the effects of full imputation on costs of capital. It also clarifies 
how incentives to invest can differ between companies and unincorporated 
enterprises. Key assumptions underlying numerical estimates of costs of capital are 
outlined in section 3.4 and numerical estimates are presented in section 3.5. Section 
3.6 concludes.
3.2 Costs of Capital for Widely-Held Companies and 
Unincorporated Enterprises
There are a number of reasons why firms might issue debt in spite of the tax costs 
outlined in Chapter 2. These include differences in transactions costs or that debt and 
equity may provide different incentives to management. Value-maximising firms will 
choose the least-cost method of finance which implies that if firms are financing 
investment with both debt and new equity at the margin, the marginal cost of each 
form of finance should be the same.
A full analysis would attempt to capture differences in transactions costs or 
managerial incentives formally and make leverage endogenous. However, this is a 
complex task. In this chapter we abstract from this complication by assuming that 
corporate debt is an exogenously set fraction bt of the value of the capital stock in 
period t. Thus,
B, = b,q,K, (3.1)
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Suppose that a company maximises V0 as given in equation (2.5) subject to the 
equality constraints (2.6), (2.7), (2.8) and (3.1), the inequality constraint (2.9) and the 
constraints that franked and unfranked dividends and new issues in any period must 
be nonnegative. The Lagrangian for the firm's optimisation problem and the first- 
order conditions are set out in Appendix 3.1.
Optimal investment decisions for a widely-held company will depend on the 
nonnegativity constraints assumed to be slack and a large number of possible cases 
can be considered. Appendix 3.1 works through three possible cases.
One case is where firms pay unfranked dividends. In chapter 2 it was argued that 
firms should never pay unfranked dividends. They should issue less new equity if this 
is feasible or repay debt or lend instead. In line with this chapter's assumption of an 
exogenous ratio of debt to capital stock, we assume that companies do not lend. This 
means that if firms wish to undertake less investment than could be financed by them 
retaining unfrankable earnings, they will pay some unfranked dividends.2
As noted in section 2.7, only a relatively small minority of firms pay unfranked 
dividends (numbers of firms paying unfranked dividends as a proportion of those 
paying franked dividends were 7.6 per cent and 6.6 per cent in 1993/94 and 1994/95 
respectively). A relatively small percentage of dividends declared by individuals (9.0 
per cent in 1993/94 and 9.1 per cent in 1994/95) are unfranked. A greater percentage 
of dividends paid by Australian companies are unfranked (32.3 per cent in 1993/94 
and 21.4 per cent in 1994/95) but these may largely flow to corporate or foreign 
shareholders. Because the case of firms paying unfranked dividends appears to apply 
only to a relatively small number of firms, discussion of this case is relegated to 
Appendix 3.1.
In the other two cases, it is assumed that the firm wishes to equity finance more 
investment than its level of untaxed profits. Retained unfrankable earnings are always 
the cheapest source of finance so unfranked dividends should not be paid by such a 
firm. Whether remaining equity should be financed by retaining frankable earnings or 
new equity depends on tax rates.
2 In principle, firms may pay unfranked dividends in some periods but not in others. Our model can 
be extended to consider this case but when examining firms paying unfranked dividends the Appendix 
focuses solely on firms paying unfranked dividends in all periods.
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If X + c(l -  t) > m or, equivalently, c > (m -  x) / (1 -  t) , it will be optimal for such a 
firm to maintain a zero franking account balance, paying the maximum level of 
franked dividends and financing marginal equity investment by issuing new shares. 
This will be assumed to be the 'normal' or 'base case' discussed in the text of this 
chapter. It is the case which is effectively assumed in both Freebaim (1990) and 
Sieper (1995). These inequalities are more likely to hold the lower is m. For them not 
to hold, m must be large. However, given the current company tax rate of x = 0.36 
even if m were approximated by the top personal marginal tax rate (m = 0.485), these 
inequalities would hold under plausible rates of share turnover if either real gains or 
nominal losses accrue.3
Chapter 1 provided evidence showing that some and possibly many widely-held firms 
are not maintaining a zero franking account balance. One possibility is that some 
firms may be attempting to maintain a positive franking account balance so that they 
can maintain a consistent policy of paying franked dividends. This would be very 
similar to the base ease analysed in the text of this chapter. Reductions in company 
tax would have a shadow cost in depleting a firm's reservoir of franking credits which 
is similar to their shadow cost in the base case. In the extreme case where a firm 
maintained a fixed but positive franking account balance, costs of capital would be 
identical to those in the base case.
However, another possibility is that firms see no benefit in paying franked dividends 
and issuing new equity in replacement. As a final case, Appendix 3.1 analyses the 
case where the constraint (2.9) limiting the level of franked dividends a firm can pay 
is slack in all periods. This would be optimal only if x + c(l -  x) < m .
While Appendix 3.1 considers more general cases, if that all tax rates and r, n, i, b, <|>, 
k and Z remain constant through time and that all prices appreciate at the same rate, 7t, 
the cost of capital for a widely-held company is given in equation (3.22) of Appendix 
3.1 and is repeated here for convenience. The cost of capital is
pF' ( \ - c  — (m -  c)(k + Z))(<j)-7i + 5(l + 7r)) + bacn
Company: p = ------- o = --------------------------------------------------------------- o (3.2)
q (1 -  m){\ + 7t)
where <t> =
i(l — m) -  acn 
1 - c
3 These inequalities would hold even if as few as 2.5 per cent of shares were sold each year assuming 
a 5 per cent real interest rate and 2 per cent inflation.
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As follows from the derivation in the Appendix, Z is the present value of depreciation 
deductions discounted at the rate <|>.
Note that the cost of capital is independent of x. This is because these firms find it 
optimal to pay the maximum level of franked dividends, D( = (1 -  x)7J / x, \ / t . 
Increases in the company tax rate increase company tax and reduce personal tax 
payments by equal and offsetting amounts leaving shareholders unaffected. Also note 
that if real gains are taxed (a = 1) and c and n are both positive, the cost of capital 
rises with b. This follows from chapter 2 which discussed how new equity can be tax- 
preferred to debt in times of inflation. As debt is more costly, the cost of capital rises 
with leverage.
Appendix 3.1 also derives the cost of capital for an unincorporated enterprise. An 
unincorporated enterprise may be a sole proprietorship or a partnership. With a few 
exceptions (such as the 125 per cent deduction for R&D which is available only for 
companies), the tax base for an unincorporated enterprise is the same as for a 
company. However, rather than being taxed at the company tax rate, the taxable 
income of an unincorporated enterprise is taxed directly as the income of the owners. 
In the case of a sole proprietorship the income is taxed at the owner's marginal tax rate 
and in the case of a partnership it is split between the partners and taxed at their 
marginal rates.
A major difference between a company and an unincorporated enterprise is that if a 
company receives tax-free income, the income cannot be passed through to 
shareholders as tax-free income. If paid as an unfranked dividend, the income will be 
taxed. If firms do not pay unfranked dividends as is assumed in the base case 
discussed in this chapter, retention of the untaxed income will add to the value of 
shares. This will result in a tax liability for shareholders when shares are sold. This 
means that taking account of how reductions in company tax affect retentions and the 
price of shares is essential when examining the effects of the Australian full 
imputation system on incentives to invest. By contrast, untaxed income can be taken 
directly out of an unincorporated enterprise and spent on consumption goods by the 
owners of the firm without any further layer of tax.
We assume that unincorporated enterprises, like companies, are infinitely lived and 
never sell used assets. A potential complication is that (unlike the sale of shares in a 
company) if an interest in a partnership is sold, the partnership will normally be 
dissolved. This can affect the tax liabilities of the partners as a result of provisions
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governing the tax treatment of trading stock, depreciable property and capital gains.4 
However, this complication is likely to be of relatively minor importance and is 
ignored by assuming that ownership of unincorporated enterprises does not change. 
Unlike a company, there need be no general clawing back of the benefits of measures 
which have reduced the taxable income of the unincorporated enterprise when an 
interest is such an enterprise is sold.
The cost of capital for an unincorporated enterprise is derived formally in equation 
(3.28) of Appendix 3.1. Assuming that all prices inflate at the constant rate of n per 
annum and that the values of r, n, i, m, k and Z remain constant through time, the cost 
of capital is
Unincorp. Ent. p = ^  -  S = + ~ ~ * +8.0 + ”»  _ g (3.3'
q (1 -  m)(l + 7i)
The cost of capital for an unincorporated enterprise is independent of b because 
i (1 -  m) is the nominal opportunity cost of both the owner's own capital and of 
borrowed funds. In general the cost of capital for corporate and unincorporated 
enterprises will differ. The size of the difference will depend on the value of c.
If c were zero, the expression on the right-hand side of (3.2) collapses to equal the 
right-hand side of (3.3). The tax system provides incentives for all frankable earnings 
to be distributed and so all taxable income ends up being taxed at the tax rate of 
shareholders. This is the case in New Zealand which operates a similar imputation 
system to the Australian scheme but where the company tax rate and top personal 
marginal tax rate are aligned and where there is no capital gains tax.
3.3 Cost of Capital under Idealised Depreciation Provisions
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) can be used to estimate costs of capital under any capital 
write-off provisions. In section 3.5 costs of capital will be examined under actual 
capital write-off provisions in Australia. However, in interpreting estimates of costs 
of capital under actual capital write-off provisions, it is helpful to start by comparing 
the cost of capital for a company with that of an unincorporated enterprise under three 
idealised sets of depreciation provisions:
• nominal economic depreciation under which a deduction is allowed for the fall in 
the nominal value of an asset;
4 See Commerce Clearing House (1995, p. 122).
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• real economic depreciation under which a deduction is allowed for the fall in the 
real value of an asset; and
• expensing under which an immediate deduction is allowed for the acquisition cost 
of an asset.
Each of these idealised depreciation schemes would be weakly neutral in the sense of 
Auerbach (1983). The cost of capital would be independent of 6.
To explain the meanings of nominal and real economic depreciation, it may be useful 
to provide some examples. Consider first the case where there is no investment 
allowance (k = 0) and nominal economic depreciation is deductible. Suppose, for 
example, a taxpayer acquires an asset costing $100,000 at the end of year 0. The 
taxpayer rents this asset out for a year and receives a rental payment of $35,000 at the 
end of year 1. Assume that immediately after the rental payment is received, the 
money value of the asset is $80,000. The nominal value of the asset would have 
fallen by $20,000 over the year so nominal economic depreciation is $20,000. If 
nominal economic depreciation were deductible, the taxpayer would be taxed on 
$15,000 (rental income of $35,000 less depreciation of $20,000). In this case the 
owner of an unincorporated enterprise would be taxed on the full nominal income 
generated by the asset on the same basis as interest is currently taxed.5
Now suppose instead that real economic depreciation is deductible. Assume that in 
the example above, there is 5 per cent inflation. In year 1 terms the real value of the 
asset in year 0 would be $105,000, ie., $100,000(1 + 7i). This means that the fall in 
the real value of the asset (or real economic depreciation) would be $25,000 
($105,000 minus $80,000). The taxpayer would be taxed on $10,000 (rental revenue 
of $35,000 less depreciation of $25,000).6
5 To see the resemblance to interest, consider a second person who places $100,000 in a bank in year 
0, receives $15,000 in taxable nominal interest one year later and who withdraws $20,000 at that time. 
The two people are in identical positions. Both have $35,000 in 'revenue', an asset worth $80,000 and 
a tax liability of $15,000w.
6 This would be equivalent to the tax treatment of interest if interest income were inflation indexed for 
tax purposes. To see this, suppose that a second person places $100,000 in a bank, earns $15,000 in 
interest, withdraws $20,000 and is taxed on only the real interest income of $10,000 (again assuming a 
5 per cent inflation rate). This second person would be in an equivalent position to the person who
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If an asset provides cash flows which decay at the geometric rate 5, the nominal value 
of an asset costing a dollar would be (1 + 7 i ) ( l  -  8) after one year, [(1 + 7 i ) ( l  -  8 )]2 
after two years and so forth. This implies that nominal economic depreciation would 
be 5(1 + 7i)  -  7C in the first year, [5(1 + n) -  7 i ] ( l  + tc) (1 -  5) in the second and so 
forth. The present value of nominal economic depreciation would be
NED Z
5(l +  7 l ) - 7 l  
1 +  4)
( i - 5 ) ( i + ti) Y
7=0  ^ 1 +  (j) j
5(1 +  7l) — 71 
<|> ~  71 +  8(1 +  7U)
(3.4a)
if (|) is the rate at which nominal cash flows are discounted.* 7
Real economic depreciation would be 5(1 + tu)  in the first year,
5 (l + 7i)[(l + 7 i) ( l-5 ) ]  in the second year and so forth. The present value of real 
economic depreciation would be
RED
5(1 +  71) f Y (l-S )(l +  7 t ) V  
1 +  4> 7=0 v 1 +  <|> j
5(l +  7i)
4> -  71 +  5(1 +  7l)
(3.46)
Finally, under expensing capital expenditure would be deductible immediately. This 
means that the present value of depreciation would be
Expensing Z = 1 (3.4c)
Costs of capital for an unincorporated enterprise can be derived by noting that in this 
case § = i ( \ - m ) ,  substituting (3.4a), (3.46) and (3.4c) into equation (3.3) and using 
the fact that the real interest rate, r, is (i -  n) / (1 + n ) . If k = 0, costs of capital in the 
three cases will be as follows:
Unincorporated Enterprise: Nominal Economic Depreciation
m ( 8 ( l  +  7 i ) - 7 i )
P =
1 -
z ( l - m ) - 7 i  +  5 ( l  +  7i)
(i(l -  m) -  n + 5(1 + 7t))
(1 — m ) ( l  +  7i)
- 5
invested in the real asset on which real economic depreciation was deductible. Both have 'revenue' of
$35,000, an asset worth $80,000 and a tax liability of $10,000/n.
7 Note that under nominal economic depreciation, firms would not necessarily be able to claim a net 
deduction. If 5(1+7i) < n, the present value of depreciation deductions would be negative. A taxpayer 





= r (3.5 a)
Unincorporated Enterprise: Real Economic Depreciation
mö( 1 + 7i)
P =
1 -
z ( l -m ) - 7i + 5(l + 7i)
(z(l -  m) -  71 + 5(1 + 7i))
(1 -m ){\ + 7i)
- 5
Simplifying,
i(\ — m) — 7i mn
^ (1 — m){\ + 7i) (l + 7i)(l-m )
Unincorporated Enterprise: Expensing
( l - r a ) ( / ( l - m ) - 7 i  + ö(l + 7i))
p = -------------------------------------- 5
(1 — 77l) (1 + 7l)
Simplifying,





Equation (3.5a) says that the real pre-tax rate of return on a marginal investment 
equals r. If nominal economic depreciation were deductible, an investment would be 
taxed on the same basis as interest. Thus, an investment with a real pre-tax rate of 
return of r provides the same after-tax yield as bonds.
Before interpreting the other two cost of capital expressions, note that as nominal 
interest is taxable, the real after-tax interest rate an individual on rate m receives will 
be
, i(\ -  m) -  n [>(1 + 7i) +  7 i l ( l  -  m) -  n . mnr - -------------- = -------------------------------= r ( l  -  m) -
1 + 71 1 + 71 1 + 71
(3.6)
Equation (3.5c) says that, under expensing, the cost of capital is equal to the after-tax 
real interest rate, r'. This result is well known and can be explained in two steps. 
First, in order for an investment to be just profitable, its real after-tax rate of return
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must be equal to real opportunity cost of funds, r'.8 Second, with expensing the 
government by giving an immediate deduction effectively finances the fraction m of 
the investment as well as taking the fraction m of its revenues. As tax reduces costs 
and revenues in the same proportion, the pre- and post-tax rates o f return will be 
identical. Together, this means that the cost of capital will equal r\ For a marginal 
project the value of the tax deduction will equal the present value of future taxes and 
so the project is effectively untaxed.
Finally, consider the case of real economic depreciation. Equation (3.5b) says that in 
this case the cost of capital is p = r '/( l -  m) . This is because real economic income 
from an investment is taxed and so the real after-tax rate of return on a marginal 
investment is p(l -  m) = r \  After the real return from the investment is taxed, 
investors end up with the same after-tax yield they would derive if they had earned 
interest income.
While these depreciation provisions are clearly idealised, each of these sets of 
depreciation provisions is of some relevance in Australia. Trading stock is taxed on a 
'first-in first-out' basis. If trading stock is valued at cost and turns over quickly, the 
treatment approximates nominal economic depreciation. For assets which are viewed 
as being nondepreciating, no depreciation deductions are allowed as would be 
appropriate if real economic depreciation were deductible. A number of forms of 
capital expenditure can be expensed including equipment with an economic life of 
less than three years, staff training, advertising and, for unincorporated enterprises, 
research and development.
For investment in most forms of equipment and buildings, depreciation allowances 
are accelerated but not as accelerated as expensing. Thus, nominal economic 
depreciation and expensing put helpful bounds on likely costs of capital for most 
forms of investment.
A final point to note is that the combined effect of taxing nominal interest and 
allowing expensing is to reduce costs of capital for unincorporated enterprises below 
the real interest rate by an amount which increases with m. While the thesis abstracts 
from differences in tax rates these may be important. Accelerated depreciation can 
provide incentives for unincorporated enterprises to be owned by those on higher
8 An investment will have a zero net present value if its real after-tax cash flows discounted at the rate 
r' have a zero net present value.
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marginal tax rates with those on lower marginal rates being debt rather than equity 
participants. As was noted in chapter 2, this may affect the degree of leverage in ways 
we have not analysed.
For a company the expressions for k+Z will be the same as for an unincorporated 
enterprise although in this case (j) = [i( 1 -m )~  acn] / (1 -  c). Once more assuming 
k = 0, the cost of capital for a company under these three depreciation regimes can be 
derived by substituting <\> and the values of k + Z from equations (3.4a), (3 Ab) and 
(3.4c) into equation (3.2). Costs of capital in the three cases are as follows:
Companies: Nominal Economic Depreciation
_ i(  1 -  m) -  acn -  (1 -  m)n + bacn
^ (l-m )(l + 7t)
Simplifying,
ac7i(l -b )
p = r ------------------
( l - m ) ( l  + 7i)
Companies: Real Economic Depreciation
_ i ( \ -  m) -  a c n -n ( \ - c )  +bacn
 ^ ( l - m ) ( l  + 7r)
Simplifying,
n[m -c{\ - a ( l  -b)))  
( l - m) ( l  + n)
Companies: Expensing
(<|> -  7i)(l -  m) + bacn 
( l - m ) ( l  + 7i)
Simplifying,
m — c 1 - a 1 - b 1 - c
\ - m \   ^  ^ v




Costs of capital for unincorporated enterprises and companies are summarised and 
compared in Table 3.1.
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r ac7i(l — b) 




(1 + 7i)(l-m )
7 t[m -c ( l-a ( l-b )) ]  
( l-m )(l + 7i)
Expensing r(l m) mn 
1 + 71
(  (  n - c ' i Y f
ji m — c 1 - a  1 -------------------
/ 1  — L V V U - m j j )
V l - c J  (1 + 7l)(l — c)
To interpret the cost of capital expressions, start by considering costs of capital for 
companies and unincorporated enterprises for equity-financed investment (b = 0) in 
the absence of inflation (n = 0). For simplicity, consider non-depreciating assets 
which are effectively perpetuities although the same results would hold irrespective of 
depreciation rates.
In the absence of inflation, real and nominal economic depreciation are identical. If 
the asset were nondepreciating, under real or nominal economic depreciation no 
depreciation deductions would be allowed. Suppose that an asset costs a dollar and 
generates p per annum in each subsequent year. With no depreciation deductions the 
owner of an unincorporated enterprise would pay tax of pm in each subsequent year 
and receive p(l -  m) after tax. This will be a zero net present value investment if and 
only if the present value of the after-tax revenue stream, p(l -  m) / r(l -  m), is equal 
to a dollar, so p = r . This accords with the first two entries in the 'Unincorporated 
Enterprise' column of Table 3.1 given the assumption 7i = 0.
Suppose instead that the investment were undertaken by a company which finances it 
by issuing a dollar of new equity. The company would earn p in each subsequent 
year, pay px in tax and p(l -  x) in franked dividends. Shareholders would receive 
p(l -  m) per annum in after-tax dividends and again the investment would have a zero 
net present value if and only if p = r. This accords with the first two entries in the 
corporate column of Table 3.1 in the case where n = 0. Thus, in the absence of 
inflation, the cost o f capital for both an unincorporated enterprise and a company 
would be r if economic depreciation were deductible. In this case full imputation
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would have removed any bias over whether investment was undertaken by companies 
or unincorporated enterprises.
Now suppose that the investment can be expensed. For an unincorporated enterprise 
the after-tax cost in the initial year would be 1 - m  and the after-tax revenue in 
subsequent years would be p(l -  m). This will be a zero net present value investment 
if 1 -  m = p(l -  m) / r(l -  m) or if p = r(l -  m).
If instead the investment were undertaken by a company, the cost to shareholders is a 
little more complex. Company tax would fall by x in the initial year which would 
lower the after-tax dividends that the firm could pay by 1 -  x. Asa result shareholders 
would forgo 1 - m  in after-tax dividends. In addition they would face a capital gains 
tax because of the retention-financed investment. This is the key difference between 
the company and the unincorporated enterprise. The increase in the value of the firm 
would be the present value of the additional after-tax dividends, namely 
p ( l - w ) / r ( l - m )  = p/  r. This will be a zero net present value investment for 
shareholders if 1 -  m -  cp / r = p / r or if p = r(\  -  m) / (1 -  c).
Thus, if c = 0, the cost of capital for a company would be r(l -  tn) just as for an 
unincorporated enterprise. This is because the after-tax cost of the investment to 
shareholders would be 1 - m  which is the same as the cost of the investment to the 
owners of an unincorporated enterprise. If at the other extreme, c -  m, then p = r. In 
this case the capital gains tax claws back the benefits of accelerated depreciation 
completely when an investment is undertaken by a company.
Thus, in the absence of inflation, capital gains taxation can drive a wedge between 
costs of capital for companies and unincorporated enterprises. Capital gains tax claws 
back the benefits of measures which accelerate depreciation allowances relative to 
economic depreciation from companies but not from unincorporated enterprises. If at 
the extreme c = m, then accelerated depreciation has no effects on corporate 
incentives to invest.
In the presence of inflation, in order to interpret the corporate cost of capital 
expressions in Table 3.1, it is helpful to consider some polar cases: no capital gains 
tax or a full accrual-basis capital gains tax (c = 0 or m) and no debt finance or 100 per 
cent debt finance (b = 0 or 1). These polar cases are examined below for the case 
where real gains are taxed (a = 1) and where nominal gains are taxed (a  = 0).
First, consider the case where a company can deduct nominal economic depreciation. 
If a  = 0 or c = 0 or b = 1, then p = r as can be checked by substitution into the first
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expression in the 'Company' column of Table 3.1. This is the same as the cost of 
capital for an unincorporated enterprise when nominal economic depreciation is 
deductible. In these cases, we will say that nominal economic income is effectively 
being taxed. If instead c = m, and both a  = 1 and b -  0, then 
p = r -  mn / (1 + 7i)(l -  m) . This is the same as the cost of capital for an 
unincorporated enterprise if real economic depreciation is deductible. Effectively real 
economic income is being taxed.
Now suppose that a company can deduct real economic depreciation. If c = 0 or if 
a  = 1 and b = 0, the cost of capital for a company would be p = r -  mn / (1 + 7i)(l -  m) . 
This is the same as that for an unincorporated enterprise if real economic depreciation 
is deductible. Effectively real economic income (RY) is effectively being taxed. If 
instead c = m and a  = 0 or b = 0, then for a company the cost of capital is p = r. 
Effectively nominal economic income (NY) is being taxed.
Finally, consider the case of expensing, if c = 0, p = r(l -  m) -  mn / (1 + n ) . As for an 
unincorporated enterprise subject to expensing, investment income is effectively 
untaxed. If instead c = m, there are two polar cases to consider. If a  = 0 or b = 1, 
p — r and nominal economic income is effectively being taxed. If a  = 1 and b = 0, 
p = r -  mn / (1 + 7i)(l -  m) and real economic income is effectively being taxed.
Table 3.2 below summarises these results. When p = r, nominal economic income is 
effectively being taxed. This is denoted by 'NY'. When p — r — mn / ((1 + 7i)(l -  m) ) , 
real economic income is effectively being taxed. This is denoted by 'RY'. If 
p = r(l-w i)-/M 7r/(l + 7u) = r',the return from a marginal investment is effectively 
exempt. This is denoted by 'Nil'.
Costs of capital are the same for companies as for unincorporated enterprises if c = 0. 
In the absence of any capital gains tax, the shareholders of companies which distribute 
the maximum possible level of franked dividends and pay no unfranked dividends 
would be taxed on the same basis as if they were partners in an unincorporated 
enterprise. This is true whether investment is debt or equity financed. If a company 
borrows a dollar and pays i in interest, this will lower company tax by fu and the level 
of franked dividends that the firm can pay by i(\ -  x) which will reduce after-tax 
franked dividends by i (1 -  m) . The cost to shareholders would be the same whether 
they borrow or the company borrows.
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c = 0 c = m
cr II o b = 1 II o b = 1
a  = 0 a  = 1 a  = 0 a  = 1
NED NY NY NY NY RY NY NY
RED RY RY RY NY RY NY NY
Exp Nil Nil Nil NY RY NY NY
"Nil" =^> investment is effectively untaxed, "NY" =^> nominal income is taxed and "RY" => real income
is taxed.
Now consider the case when c = m and there is full equity finance so b = 0. If no 
company tax were paid, a company could pay no franked dividends and so would be 
forced to retain profits. This would lead to a rise in share values which would be 
taxed under the capital gains tax provisions. If a  = 0 (nominal gains are taxed), the 
nominal economic income from an investment ends up being taxed and if a  = 1 (real 
gains are taxed), real economic income ends up being taxed. To the extent that some 
company tax is paid, the company will pay franked dividends and shareholders will 
pay tax on the profits at their marginal rates as a result of imputation credits.
However, this will have no effect on the overall tax liability because capital gains 
taxes will fall by an offsetting amount. Thus, if b = 0, c = m and a  = 0, nominal 
income is taxed irrespective of depreciation provisions. If b = 0, c = m and a  = 1, real 
income is taxed irrespective of depreciation provisions.
The most complex case is where c = m and investment is fully debt financed. This 
case is most easily explained by considering an investment which costs a dollar and 
which produces nominal revenue of 1 + p(l + n) + n one year later and then expires. 
This provides a real pre-tax rate of return of p.
Start by assuming that revenue is untaxed. If a firm borrows a dollar to invest in the 
asset in year 0, this leaves its after-tax cash flow unaltered in year 0. In the next year 
revenue rises by l + p(l + 7r) + 7i,  interest plus principal payments rise by 1 + i , tax
101
falls by /I and franked dividends fall by z'(l -  x). This means that shareholders lose 
z'(l -  m) in after-tax franked dividends in year 1 but the firm ends up with additional 
retained earnings of p(l + 71) + n . This lowers the amount of new equity needed to be 
issued and increases the value of existing equity by p(l + 7i) + 7i. Shareholders will 
be indifferent about the investment if the loss of after-tax dividends is equal to the net- 
of-capital-gains-tax capital gain, ie., if
z(l — m) = (1 -m )(p (l + 7t) + 7i)
This implies that i = p(l + 7i) + n so p = r. Whether capital gains tax is indexed or 
not is irrelevant because with debt-financed investment, there is no increase in the 
firm's equity base and hence no increase in inflation deductions. Again, if income 
were partly or fully taxed in the company's hands, this would have no effect on tax 
payments. To the extent that company tax is paid, the company will be able to pay 
more franked dividends. Taxable corporate profits will be taxed in shareholders' 
hands as a result of the imputation system but capital gains taxes will fall by an 
offsetting amount.
3.4. Assumptions Underlying Numerical Estimates
Numerical estimates of costs of capital under actual tax provisions applying in 
1997/98 will be presented in section 3.5. Key assumptions are outlined below.
Assumptions on the marginal tax rates of shareholders were outlined in Chapter 2.
We consider the possibilities of m being the tax rate of superannuation funds (15 per 
cent), the average marginal tax rate of shareholders (estimated as being approximately 
33 per cent) and the top personal marginal tax rate (48.5 per cent).
For estimates of economic depreciation of plant and equipment the starting point is 
the Commissioner of Taxation's estimates of economic lives of assets. These 
estimates are used to calculate basic rates of prime cost depreciation. Taxpayers have 
long been given an option of using prime cost depreciation or diminishing value 
depreciation at 150 per cent of prime cost rates. It is assumed that 8 is 150 per cent of 
the prime cost rate implied by the Commissioner of Taxation's estimates of economic 
lives. Any differences between true rates of economic depreciation and those implied 
by the Commissioner's estimates are ignored. This is likely to understate differences 
in costs of capital.
For buildings a rate of economic depreciation of 2.5 per cent per annum is assumed. 
This is within the range of the rates calculated for the United States by Hulten and
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Wykoff (1981) which included industrial structures (3.6 per cent), commercial 
buildings (2.5 per cent), educational buildings (1.9 per cent), hospitals and institutions 
(2.3 per cent) and other (4.5 per cent). It is similar to the 2.3 per cent rate used by 
Bourassa and Hendershott (1992).
For research and development, two possible cases are considered: an economic life of 
3 years (5 = 0.5) and an economic life of 10 years (8 = 0.15).
Firms are allowed to deduct the cost of trading stock acquired or produced during a 
year. However, the difference between the value of trading stock on hand at the end 
of the year and trading stock on hand at the beginning of the year is taxable. Stock 
can be valued at cost price, at market value or at replacement value. If cost is used, 
this means that the cost of acquiring trading stock is only effectively deductible when 
the stock is sold. We treat trading stock as being acquired in one period and sold one 
period later with a net deduction for the cost of the stock at that time. This means that 
for the purposes of calculating the cost of capital, 8 = 1 and Z = l / ( 1  + <|>). This is 
effectively nominal economic depreciation.
We consider investment in equipment with economic lives of 3 years, 5 years, 10 
years, 20 years and 30 years for which tax depreciation is, respectively immediate 
deduction, and dv rates of 0.6, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.2. Buildings are allowed prime cost 
deductions of 2.5 per cent for 40 years unless used for 'eligible industrial activities' or 
for 'short-term traveller accommodation' where a higher 4 per cent deduction applies. 
It is assumed that the lower 2.5 per cent deduction applies. Corporate research and 
development qualifies for a 125 per cent deduction and unincorporated research and 
development for a 100 per cent deduction.
In the initial case examined in section 3.5 it is assumed that r is 5 per cent per annum, 
7i is 2 per cent per annum, b is 0.4 and a is 0.2 per annum. The effects of varying 
some of these assumptions are also discussed.
3 .5 . Numerical Estimates
Initially assume m = 0.33,r = 0.05,n = 0.02,i = 0.071 and i ( l -m)  = 0.0476. Under 
these assumptions, <|> for an unincorporated enterprise is i ( l -m)  = 0.0476. For 
shareholders c = 0.2986 and (|) = 0.0593 if real gains accrue; c = 0 and (|) = 0.0476 if 
real losses but nominal gains accrue; and c = 0.2793 and <j) = 0.066 if nominal losses 
accrue.
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In 1997/98 no investment allowance is available so k = 0 in all cases. For 3-year 
equipment, capital expenditure can be expensed so Z = 1. For 5-year, 10-year, 20- 
year and 30-year equipment, depreciation is deductible on a diminishing-value basis 
so
Z =
r l - S * y
1 + (j) /=oy 1 + (j) <(> +  6
where 5* is the rate o f dv depreciation allowed for tax purposes outlined in section 
3.4.
For trading stock Z = l /  (l + (j)) and for research and development (R&D), Z = 1 in the 
case o f an unincorporated enterprise or Z = 1.25 in the case o f a company. Finally for 
buildings deductions are allowed on a prime cost basis. Let d* be the rate o f prime 
cost depreciation and T = 1 Id * .  Provided T is an integer,
Z = d * £  (l + <!>)■'= d * (l -  (1 + <t>)_7j  / <t>
t=\
Using these expressions, the values o f k + Z  are presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Values of k + Z
m = 0.33, r — 0.05, ti = 0.02, a — 0.2







Unincorp Ents 1.000 0.927 0.863 0.808 0.808 0.955 1.000 1.000 0.444
Companies
Real Gains 1.000 0.910 0.835 0.771 0.771 0.944 1.250 1.250 0.380
Real Loss but 
Nom Gain
1.000 0.927 0.863 0.808 0.808 0.955 1.250 1.250 0.444
Nom Losses 1.000 0.901 0.820 0.752 0.752 0.938 1.250 1.250 0.349
It is worth noting that with the exception o f R&D (where the tax base for companies 
and unincorporated enterprises differ) the values o f k + Z  for unincorporated 
enterprises are the same as those for companies in the case where real losses but 
nominal gains are assumed to accrue. This is because in both o f these cases 
<|> = i ( \ - m )  = 0.0476. Except for 3-year equipment and R&D where deductions are 
immediate, values o f k + Z  for companies are lower if  nominal losses accrue than if
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real gains accrue. This is because of the higher value of § if nominal losses accrue 
(0.066 rather 0.0593). Similarly, values of k + Z  for companies are lower if real gains 
accrue than if real losses but nominal gains accrue because of the higher value of <|> in 
the former case.
Estimates of costs of capital under 1997/98 tax provisions can be found by 
substituting these values o f k + Z into equation (3.2) for companies and (3.3) for 
unincorporated enterprises. Results are provided in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Costs of Capital: Base Case
m = 0.33 r = 0.05, 71 = 0.02, a = 0.2







Unincorp Ents 2.7 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.4 5.0 2.7 2.7 4.1
Companies
Real Gains 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.5 3.6 4.0 4.4
Real Loss but 
Nom Gain
2.7 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.4 5.0 -3.8 0.5 4.1
Nom Losses 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 5.0 3.5 4.1 4.9
Wtd. Average 
(0.6, 0.1, 0.3)
4.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.7 2.8 3.7 4.5
Table 3.4 records, for example, that under the assumptions outlined above costs of 
capital for an unincorporated enterprise investing in 3-year equipment and in trading 
stock are 2.7 per cent and 5.0 per cent respectively. This means that these forms of 
investment need to generate real pre-tax rates of return of 2.7 per cent and 5.0 per cent 
respectively to be marginally profitable.
Conventional economic analysis would suggest that, possible externalities aside, it 
would be desirable for different forms of possible investment to be taxed as neutrally 
as possible. This was Harberger's argument against the double-taxation of corporate 
income under a classical company tax system discussed in chapter 1. If costs of 
capital vary for different forms of investment undertaken by companies or 
unincorporated enterprises or for investment occurring in the corporate or 
unincorporated sectors, there is a prima facie case that investment will be diverted 
away from the areas where it will provide highest returns for the nation as a whole.
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Biases between types of investment goods that a given firm might purchase will be 
referred to as an inter-asset bias. Biases between whether investment takes place in 
the unincorporated or corporate sectors will be referred to as an intersectoral bias.
The tax system creates both of these types of investment biases although the figures 
suggest that with the exception of R&D, inter-asset biases within the corporate sector 
tend to be very small.
Consider first the case of an unincorporated enterprise. Table 3.4 indicates that 
investments in equipment with real pre-tax rates of return of between 2.7 per cent and 
3.9 per cent will provide the same after-tax return to investors as investment in trading 
stock and buildings generating real pre-tax rates of return of 5.0 and 4.1 per cent 
respectively. Thus, investment in equipment can generate between 54 and 78 per cent 
of the pre-tax rate of return from investing in trading stock while being as attractive 
on an after-tax basis.
In two recent papers De Long and Summers (1991 and 1992) have argued on the basis 
of cross sectional studies that there are positive externalities from equipment 
investment which could provide grounds for a tax subsidy to such investment. 
However, whether there is any such externality is controversial with Auerbach,
Hassett and Oliner (1994) finding no evidence of externalities for OECD countries or 
even for the entire sample of countries analysed by De Long and Summers if one 
country (Botswana) is excluded. Even if externalities exist, the appropriate course of 
action would be to identify forms of equipment investment that generate externalities 
rather than providing an across-the-board subsidy. As Gravelle (1993) notes, 
equipment investment is heterogeneous including items as diverse as computers, 
trucks, coffee machines and moveable room dividers. Even if some forms of 
equipment generate significant positive externalities, it seems difficult to believe that 
this will provide a strong case for subsidising all forms of equipment. In Australia the 
government (at least to the author's knowledge) has not ever announced that as a 
policy goal it wishes to promote investment in equipment relative to investment in 
trading stock and buildings or suggested externalities as being a possible reason for 
doing so. In commenting on investment biases, we will ignore the possibility of 
externalities for equipment investment. In the absence of externalities, the tax bias in 
favour of equipment and against trading stock and buildings appears to be of potential 
policy concern.
For companies, the capital gains tax has attenuated inter-asset distortions unless real 
losses but nominal gains are deemed certain to accrue. These inter-asset distortions 
are identified separately for the cases where real gains are believed to be certain to
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occur (RG), where real losses but nominal gains are believed to be certain to occur 
(RLNG) and where nominal losses are believed to be certain to occur (NL). The last 
case also covers the case of sharetraders who are taxed on nominal gains. In reality, 
for shareholders other than sharetraders there will be some prospect of each of these 
cases arising. While obviously moving outside the certainty model used to generate 
cost of capital estimates, the final line provides a weighted average of these three 
cases assuming fairly arbitrary weightings of 0.6, 0.1 and 0.3 for RG, RLNG and NL 
respectively. In practice over extended periods of time shares have tended to increase 
in real value and the high weighting on real gains reflects this. The low weighting 
given to RLNG reflects the fact that at least at the low rates of inflation experienced in 
recent years, this case seems relatively unlikely.
With the exception of R&D (where the tax bases for companies and unincorporated 
enterprises differ because the 125 per cent deduction is limited to companies), the 
directions of inter-asset biases are the same for companies as for unincorporated 
enterprises. Costs of capital for companies tend to be lower for equipment (especially 
short-lived equipment) than trading stock and buildings. However, differences in 
weighted average costs of capital are very small (4.1 to 4.4 per cent for equipment) 
compared with 4.7 per cent for trading stock and 4.5 per cent for buildings. These 
differences are very much smaller than for unincorporated enterprises because of the 
way in which capital gains taxation claws back the benefits of accelerated 
depreciation.
For companies the lowest costs of capital are for R&D because of the 125 per cent 
deduction. This is a deliberate concession explicitly aimed at encouraging companies 
to undertake R&D. A possible justification is that R&D may generate positive 
externalities if the benefits from R&D can be appropriated in part by other firms. On 
the other hand, R&D may at times create negative externalities if a firm's R&D allows 
it to gain a patent which prevents other firms from being able to create and develop 
the same innovation. As the level of positive (or negative) externalities are unknown 
it is impossible to comment on whether this tax concession is likely to increase 
economic efficiency. However, there are undoubtedly some odd aspects to this 
concession because of its restriction to companies. Companies are encouraged to 
invest in R&D with a lower pre-tax rate of return than 3-year equipment whereas 
unincorporated enterprises are not.9 Companies are also encouraged to invest in
9 The value of the concession can also vary between companies. It is o f no immediate benefit to firms 
in a tax-loss position. For taxpaying firms, the value of the concession will depend on the marginal tax
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shorter-lived R&D with a lower pre-tax rate of return than longer-lived R&D while 
unincorporated enterprises are not.
Estimates of costs of capital for buildings in Table 3.4 assume that the capital cost of a 
building is deducted on a straight-line basis over 40 years at a rate of 2.5 per cent per 
annum. It was noted earlier that the cost of buildings used for 'eligible industrial 
activities' or 'short-term traveller accommodation' can be deducted at the higher rate of 
4 per cent per annum. This increases the present value of depreciation deductions.
This has a small effect on costs of capital but changes are sufficient to bring costs of 
capital for buildings within the range of those for equipment. At this higher rate the 
cost of capital for buildings acquired by unincorporated enterprises would fall from 
4.1 to 3.8 per cent and the weighted average cost of capital for buildings acquired by 
companies would fall from 4.5 to 4.4 per cent.
There appears to have been a general bias in favour of investment by unincorporated 
enterprises relative to widely-held companies. The capital gains tax increases 
corporate costs of capital above those for unincorporated enterprises for all forms of 
investment other than trading stock.10 Especially for assets where depreciation is 
substantially accelerated, there can be important differences between costs of capital 
for widely-held companies and unincorporated enterprises. For example, the cost of 
capital for investment in 3-year equipment (where capital expenditure can be 
expensed) is 2.7 per cent for unincorporated enterprises whereas the weighted average 
cost of capital for such in vestment by companies is 4.1 per cent. This means that 
capital invested in an unincorporated enterprise can generate a 34 per cent lower real 
pre-tax rate of return while being as attractive on an after-tax basis. The magnitude of 
the biases in favour of unincorporated enterprises are sensitive to assumptions about 
the effective rate of capital gains tax. As is analysed further in Table 3.6, higher rates 
of capital gains tax would tend to compress inter-asset distortions within the corporate 
sector but increase intersectoral biases while lower rates of capital gains tax would do 
the opposite.
rates of its shareholders. It will provide a bigger incentive the higher the marginal tax rates of 
shareholders.
10 It is of interest that despite the higher rate of deduction for corporate R&D, costs of capital for R&D 
undertaken by widely-held companies are higher than that for unincorporated enterprises.
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Differences in Assumed Value of m
As was noted in chapter 2 there is no compelling theoretical reason for using the 
average marginal tax rate of shareholders to approximate m. Table 3.5 examines costs 
of capital for m = 0.15 and m = 0.485 with other assumptions being the same as in 
Table 3.4. Note that because of different values of m the values of k + Z  will differ 
from those presented in Table 3.3 but the basis of calculation is the same.
Table 3.5 Costs of Capital if m = 0.15 or m = 0.485 
r = 0.05,7i = 0.02, a = 0.2








Unincorp Ents 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.7
Companies
Real Gains 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.4 4.6 4.8
Real Loss but 
Nom Gain
4.0 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 5.0 1.6 3.1 4.7
Nom Losses 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 4.3 4.6 4.9
Average 
(0.6, 0.1, 0.3)
4.6 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.9 4.1 4.4 4.8
m = 0.485
Unincorp Ents 1.6 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.6 5.0 1.6 1.6 3.6
Companies
Real Gains 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 2.9 3.4 3.9
Real Loss but 
Nom Gain
1.6 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.6 5.0 -10.5 -2.3 3.6
Nom Losses 4.3 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.5 5.0 2.7 3.7 4.8
Average 
(0.6, 0.1, 0.3)
3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.4 1.5 2.9 4.1
109
Results are qualitatively are very similar to those reported for the case where 
m = 0.33.11 For both unincorporated enterprises and widely-held companies, 
equipment appears to be tax preferred relative to trading stock and buildings. Under 
both assumptions about m, there is a tax bias favouring investment by unincorporated 
enterprises relative to widely-held companies in equipment and buildings. The main 
effects of differences in m is that a lower value of m tends to compress (and a higher 
value of m tends to amplify) both inter-asset and intersectoral distortions. Thus, 
uncertainties about the most appropriate value of m may lead us to be cautious about 
arriving at conclusions about the sizes and importance of investment biases.
However, the direction of changes required to reduce investment biases appears to be 
to a large extent independent of the assumed rate of m.
Differences in Assumed Value of a
There is also considerable uncertainty about the most appropriate assumption about 
the rate of share turnover, a. As was discussed in section 2.5, it is often assumed (e.g., 
King and Fullerton, 1984,p. 24) that a is 0.1 while on average shares in listed 
companies appear to change hands about once every two years. Table 3.6 presents 
estimates of costs of capital for a = 0.1 and a = 0.5. Differences in assumed values of 
a affect assumed values of c. Once again this affects the magnitude of investment 
biases but has very little effect on the directions of these biases.
The effects of different assumed values of a on costs of capital are described in Table 
3.6. Costs of capital for unincorporated enterprises are unaffected by these changes in 
assumption and are as in Table 3.5. For both the case where a = 0.1 and the case 
where a = 0.5 corporate costs of capital continue to be lower for equipment than 
trading stock and buildings except that when a = 0.5 there is so little variation in 
corporate costs of capital that rounded to one decimal the figures reported for 
buildings are identical to those for 5- and 10-year equipment. For all forms of 
investment other than R&D a lower value of a tends to reduce and a higher value of a 
increase intersectoral biases. With R&D there is an additional complication because 
of the 125 per cent deduction which is available to companies but not unincorporated 
enterprises. With a = 0.1, corporate investment in 3-year R&D tends to be favoured
11 There is one minor qualitative difference in the three cases. The cost of capital for 3-year R&D is 
slightly lower for widely-held companies than for unincorporated enterprises if m is 0.485 but not if m 
is 0.15 or 0.33.
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relative to unincorporated investment. With a = 0.2 or 0.5 the direction of this bias is 
reversed.
Table 3.6 Costs of Capital if a = 0.1 or a = 0.5
m -  0.33, r = 0.05, 71 = 0.02







Unincorp Ents 2.7 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.4 5.0 2.7 2.7 4.1
Companies
a = 0.1
Real Gains 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.5 2.7 3.6 4.4
Real Loss but 
Nom Gain
2.7 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.4 5.0 -3.8 0.5 4.1
Nom Losses 4.1 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.4 5.0 2.2 3.4 4.7
Average 
(0.6, 0.1, 0.3)
3.9 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.7 1.9 3.2 4.4
a = 0.5
Real Gains 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.4
Real Loss but 
Nom Gain
2.7 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.4 5.0 -3.8 0.5 4.1
Nom Losses 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 4.6 4.7 5.0
Average 
(0.6, 0.1, 0.3)
4.3 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.7 3.5 4.1 4.5
Differences in Assumed Value of n
It was noted in chapter 2 that a 2 per cent inflation rate is low when compared to 
average rates of inflation over the last decade. Over this more lengthy time period the 
average rate of inflation has been approximately 5 per cent per annum. Table 3.7 
explores how costs of capital would change with a 5 per cent rate of inflation 
assuming that this has no effect on r which as in Table 3.4 is assumed to be 5 per cent 
per annum. Thus, i becomes 10.25 per cent. Other assumptions are as in Table 3.4.
I l l
For unincorporated enterprises, the higher rate of inflation tends to reduce costs of 
capital for 3-year and longer-lived equipment more than short-lived equipment and 
trading stock. Differences between costs of capital with 5 per cent and 2 per cent 
inflation are shown in italics. Thus, inflation tends to increase the bias in favour of 3- 
year and longer-lived equipment relative to these other assets. At the same time 
inflation lowers the cost of capital for buildings more than equipment. Investment in 
buildings becomes tax preferred relative to investment in 5-year and 10-year 
equipment.12
Table 3.7 Costs of Capital, n = 0.05
m -  0.33, r -  0.05, a = 0.2







Unincorp Ents 1.8 3.4 3.3 2.9 2.6 5.0 1.8 1.8 3.2
Difference* -0.9 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 0.0 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0
Companies
Real Gains 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.0 3.3 3.6
Real Loss but 
Nom Gain
1.8 3.4 3.3 2.9 2.6 5.0 -4.6 -0.3 3.2
Nom Losses 4.1 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.4 5.0 2.7 3.6 4.6
Wtd. Average 
(0.6, 0.1, 0.3)
3.5 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.2 2.2 3.0 3.8
Difference* -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7
Wtd. Average 
(0.6, 0.25,0.15)
3.1 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.4 4.2 1.1 2.5 3.6
Difference* -1.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.5 -1.7 -1.2 -0.9
*Differences in costs of capital are expressed relative to Table 3.4
12 By comparison, the higher 4 per cent deduction for certain types of buildings would have a 
relatively minor effect reducing the cost of capital for buildings acquired by unincorporated enterprises 
from 3.2 to 3.0 per cent.
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For companies costs of capital also fall more for 3-year and longer-lived equipment 
and buildings than for 5-year or 10-year equipment and trading stock. When 
examining changes in weighted average costs of capital, two different cases are 
examined. In the first case, unchanged weightings are assumed. However, higher 
inflation will tend to increase the chance of real losses but nominal gains accruing.
The final two rows of Table 3.7 examine this possibility by assuming, arbitrarily, that 
the higher rate of inflation increases the weighting given to real losses but nominal 
gains from 0.1 to 0.25 and reduces the weighting given to nominal losses from 0.3 to 
0.15. As the probability of there being no capital gains tax rises, costs of capital fall.
Assumed Rate of b
Debt finance tends to increase the cost of capital for corporate investment if 7i > 0 and 
real gains are accruing. It follows from (3.2) that dp / db = acn / ( l - w ) ( l  + 7i). If 
m = 0.33, r = 0.05,7i = 0.02,/ = 0.071 and a = 0.2, c = 0.299 if real gains accrue so 
dp I db -  0.0088. This means that the cost of capital is not very sensitive to b at 
modest rates of inflation. If b were 0 rather than 0.4 and if there were a 60 per cent 
probability of real gains accruing, weighted average costs of capital would fall by 
approximately 0.2 percentage points (ie., 0.6 times -0.4 times dpt db) relative to 
figures reported in Table 3.4. This would clearly have no effect on the direction of 
inter-asset biases within the corporate sector but would tend to reduce the tax bias 
favouring investment by unincorporated enterprises relative to companies.
3.6 Concluding Comments
This chapter has examined costs of capital for a number of corporate and 
unincorporated investments under both idealised depreciation provisions and under 
recent and current Australian tax rules. In the absence of any capital gains tax, costs 
of capital for the companies considered in the text which pay no unfranked dividends 
and for which x + c(l -  x) > m would be the same as those for unincorporated 
enterprises. New Zealand has no capital gains tax and its full-imputation reform may 
have largely removed biases concerning whether investment is undertaken by 
companies or unincorporated enterprises.
However, when depreciation is accelerated relative to economic depreciation or when 
there are other capital allowances, capital gains taxation can result in the benefits of 
these tax preferences being clawed back from companies but not unincorporated 
enterprises. This can bias investment in favour of unincorporated enterprises. If 
accelerated depreciation and other capital allowances are prevalent, it cannot 
necessarily be concluded that Australia's full imputation reform is an important step
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towards removing intersectoral investment biases. On the other hand the capital gains 
tax will tend to compress inter-asset biases in the corporate sector.
Under current tax rules and at low rates of inflation, costs of capital for 
unincorporated enterprises tend to be lower for 3-year equipment and longer-lived 
equipment than for other shorter-lived equipment, buildings and trading stock. This 
will bias investment decisions for these firms. The direction of inter-asset biases is 
similar for widely-held companies. This conclusion is robust to different possible 
assumptions about the marginal tax rate of shareholders and rate of share turnover. 
Under possible cases examined in this chapter, inter-asset biases for widely-held 
companies appear to be much smaller than those for unincorporated enterprises.
Under our central case assumptions of Table 3.4 costs of capital for forms of 
investment other than R&D varied between 2.7 and 5.0 per cent for unincorporated 
enterprises but between 4.1 per cent and 4.7 per cent for companies. There can be 
quite large differences in costs of capital for unincorporated enterprises and widely- 
held companies in the case of some assets. For example, in the case of 3-year 
equipment the cost of capital was 2.7 per cent for unincorporated enterprises but 4.1 
per cent for companies under the assumptions of Table 3.4.
Our methodology is extended to consider other possible firms in Appendix 3.1. For 
firms paying unfranked dividends, costs of capital will be independent of deductions 
available at the company level. This means that accelerated depreciation and 
investment allowances will not distort decisions about which forms of investment 
such firms undertake but will introduce biases concerning whether investment is 
undertaken by these or other firms. Some firms are paying less than the maximum 
level of franked dividends. If this is merely to maintain a reservoir in their franking 
account balances so they can pay franked dividends consistently, investment 
incentives would appear to be similar to those for the base case companies analysed in 
the text of this chapter. Some, however, may envisage that the balance in their 
franking account will never constrain their ability to pay franked dividends. In this 
case the constraint on the maximum level of franked dividends which can be paid will 
be slack in all periods. In this case full imputation will not claw back the benefits of 
tax preferences available at the company level. For such firms, inter-asset distortions 
may tend to be greater than for unincorporated enterprises.
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Appendix 3.1 Optimal Investment Decisions and the Cost of 
Capital
Suppose that a company maximises V0 as given in equation (2.5) subject to the 
equality constraints given in equations (2.6), (2.7), (2.8) and (3.1), inequality 
constraint (2.9) and the constraints that franked dividends, unfranked dividends and 
new equity issues be nonnegative in each period. The Lagrangian is
£ = it=i
— ^ —  d !  + 1—^  D“ -V tN
(1 —x,)(l —c,) ' 1 - c t
\
+ x\
n a + i )
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The first-order conditions are given by
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(3.14)
To derive expressions for the cost of capital it is necessary to make further 
assumptions about which nonnegativity constraints are slack.
(i) Companies Where Nonnegativity Constraints on New Equity Issues and Payments 
o f Franked Dividends are Slack
In the case analysed in the body of the text of this chapter, it is assumed that firms are 
willing to issue new equity and pay franked dividends in all periods and so the 
nonnegativity constraints on both VtN and D{ will be slack. As discussed in chapter 
2, this would appear to be the normal case in the absence of changes in tax rates if 
firms wish to undertake more investment than can be financed merely by retaining 
unbankable earnings. If x + c(l -  x) > m , it will be optimal for firms to pay the 
maximum level of franked dividends and to raise any equity over and above retained 
unbankable earnings by issuing new equity. If the nonnegativity constraints on both 
VtN and D{ are slack, V7
A4, = A?, = 0, V/ (3.15)
Equations (3.14) and (3.15) imply
A!, = 1, V/ (3.16)
This is intuitive. measures the shadow value at time t of an additional dollar of 
corporate cash flow. A dollar of additional cash flow saves shareholders a dollar.
Equations (3.12), (3.15) and (3.16) imply
T , + c , ( l - T , ) - m ,  _ X7 | t J
(1-T,)(1 —C,) ' l + f tl (1 + <htl )(l + <h+2)
(3.17)
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The X] ,X]+],... terms must all be nonnegative. A necessary but not sufficient 
condition for firms to find it optimal to pay franked dividends and issue new equity in 
each period is x, + ct( \ - T t) > m t.
Equations (3.10), (3.16) and (3.17) imply
2 _  m,-c ,
T , ( l - C , )
Equations (3.11), (3.16) and (3.18) imply
I ' - f t  ;
where
/  \  
mnu ~ cnu
« :  =  ! ■
• “ ft.





Finally, by substituting equations (3.16), (3.18) and (3.19) into equation (3.9) we find
1
'-ft*. (l +
\ - ^ k -  a; 
' - f t
- ( l - 8 ) —
ft
1 _  m t + 1 C l + \ K  _  Q l  
1 « Kt+1
! - c /+1
+
fy*<A ,7I,+1 
1  —  f r + l
(3.21)
This is the Australian full imputation equivalent of an expression derived in King 
(1974a). Equation (3.21) provides the required value of the marginal product per 
dollar of capital outlay, p t^ F' (Kt)l  qn in terms of various exogenous parameters.
The intuition behind (3.21) will be discussed in the slightly simpler case of investment 
by an unincorporated enterprise shortly.
In the special case analysed in the body of the text, changes in r, tt, i, m, c, b, k and Z 
are ignored and it is assumed that these variables remain constant through time. It is 
also assumed that p and q both increase at the general rate of inflation, 71, so 
pt = p{ 1 + 7iy and q, = q{ 1 + 7t)'. This allows an expression to be derived which has 
the same general form as standard Hall-Jorgenson cost of capital expressions but 
which takes account of Australian taxes on both companies and their shareholders. 
Under these assumptions the real pre-tax rate of return on a marginal investment or 
the cost of capital would be
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pF' ( l - c - ( m - c ) ( k  + Z ) ) ( § - n  + b(\ + n)) + bacn
p = ------- 5 = ---------------------------------------------------------------- 5
q ( l - m ) ( l  + 7i)
(3.22)
where <i> =
i ( \ - m )  -ac7 i 
1 — c
and z=I tM
u=0 (1 + ()))U
(3.23)
Z is the present value of depreciation deductions discounted at the rate <|>. Provided 
m ^ c ,  Z  = Q * 1 (1 - c ) / (m- c ) .
(//) Unincorporated Enterprises
To interpret (3.21) further, it is also useful to derive the cost o f capital expression if  a 
firm is unincorporated. In that case the value of the firm would be
f  t \
(1 - m l)piF(Kl_l) - q iI l +hlqlKl - ( !  + *,(1-mt))bt_xq,_xKt_x +ml{klq,Il +
5 =  1
(3.24)
Maximise (3.24) subject to (2.8). Denote the associated Lagrangian by L. Taking 
dL / dKt and dL / dlt and substituting yields
(1 -  m, = fr + k , (1 -  m<t|))(l -  mik,-  fl?) -  (1 -  S ) ^ ( l  -  mMkM -  n,2„ ) (3.25)
where Qf = Y mt+u ,tU------  (3.26)
I * J  I t W /  v v  '
M=0 rKi+id-^))
s=/+l
Equation (3.25) is perhaps slightly simpler to interpret than (3.21) although both have 
similar interpretations. The left-hand side of (3.25) is the after-tax revenue received in 
period t+1 per dollar of capital outlay in period t. The cost of acquiring a dollar of 
capital goods to a taxpayer is the dollar less the present value of capital write offs 
(1 -  mtk t -  ). If the asset were worthless at the end of the year, the revenue required
to meet the opportunity cost of capital would be (l + z,+1(l -  m,+1))( 1 -  mtkt -  Q f) . The
remainder of the right-hand side measures the value at the end of the year of the 
depreciated capital. If the dollar of capital had not been acquired in year t, the 
shareholder would have to spend an additional (l - b ) q t+] / qt in year t+ 1 for the firm's
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capital stock to be as high as when the dollar of capital is acquired in year t. This
would have had an after-tax cost of (l - b ) ^ ±L(l - m t+]kM - Q 2+1).
<7,
In the special case examined in the text of chapter 3 where r, n, i, m, k and Z remain 
constant through time and where p t = p{ 1 + 7t)' and qt =q( 1 + 7t)', the cost of capital 
for an unincorporated enterprise is
pF ' (l -  m(k + Z))(/(l — m) — n + 5(1 + 7t))
p —------- Ö = --------------------------------------------------- o (3.27)
q ( l - m ) ( l  + 7t)
where Z is the present value of depreciation deductions discounted at the opportunity 
cost of capital, ie.,
z = i
«=o(l + z(l — m))u
(3.28)
From (3.21) and (3.25) it is clear that changes in capital write-off provisions can have 
an important effect on investment decisions. The Tables in Chapter 3 consider the 
effects on the cost of capital of unchanging capital write-off provisions and abstract 
from this issue.
(iii) Companies Paying Unfranked Dividends in Each Period
Some companies pay unfranked dividends. Consider the case of a firm paying 
unfranked dividends in all periods.
As was discussed in chapter 2, it will generally be desirable for firms to pay franked 
dividends before unfranked dividends. Thus, if a firm is paying unfranked dividends 
in all periods, V7
X\ = X] = 0, (3.29)
Substituting yields, X\ = A,2, = 0, and A.2 = qt{ \ - m ,) l  (1 -c ,), \/t.
The fact that A2 = 0, V/ means that tax paid by the company does not affect the value 
of the firm to shareholders. This means that the cost of capital will not depend on 
depreciation provisions or tax incentives for investment. Further substitution yields
Pr+f ' (K)
<h V
( l - m ,) ( l - c /+i) "
( l - c , ) ( l - w ,+1) >
(3.30)
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If b, i and (j) remain constant through time and that p and q grow at a constant rate of n 
per annum, a parallel expression to equation (3.22) can be developed for firms paying 
unfranked dividends. For these firms, the cost of capital would be
p = p F ' ( K , ) _ 5 = W - b )  + b i - n  (3.31)
q 1 + 71
If b = 0, p = r ', the real after-tax interest rate. This means that the return from a 
marginal investment is effectively exempt. In terms of Table 3.3 this situation would 
be described as 'Nil'. If b = 1, p = r and nominal economic income is effectively 
taxed. This means that for such firms debt can have a very powerful effect in 
reducing incentives to invest. This is the 'mirror image' of our conclusion in chapter 2 
that if the ratio of debt to capital stock is not fixed, these firms face strong incentives 
to repay debt ahead of paying unfranked dividends.
Our discussion of this case is open to criticisms that have been levelled at new view 
models of a classical company tax system. We have equity trapped in a company. A 
dollar of capital in a company is worth less than a dollar. Not only do regulations 
have to make share repurchase unattractive (which they may do in Australia), there 
needs to be some impediment to companies rewarding their shareholders by buying 
shares in other firms. Moreover, given our analysis in chapter 2 showing that a 
company can reduce the present value of taxes on unfranked dividends by retaining 
profits and lending the proceeds, our assumption of a fixed debt/capital ratio clearly 
has powerful effects on our results. An alternative approach for modelling this case 
would be to assume as in Poterba and Summers (1985) that dividends provide 
signalling or agency benefits. In the absence of such a model it may be difficult to 
provide a plausible reason for why firms pay unfranked dividends.
There is also the important question of investment incentives facing firms which are 
issuing new equity while expecting to pay unfranked dividends in the future. Here the 
analysis would appear to be very similar to that of Sinn (1991 b) who analyses 
investment incentives facing firms in three different stages under a classical company 
tax system. In the first stage firms issue new equity and pay no dividends, in the 
second firms retain earnings but pay no dividends and in the third stage firms pay 
dividends and issue no new equity. Sinn shows that a classical company tax system 
can have very powerful effects in discouraging investment in initial stages. A similar 
result is derived in a simpler two period model in Edwards and Keen (1984).
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(iv) Firms Paying Less than the Maximum Level o f Franked Dividends:
Some firms are paying less than the maximum possible level of franked dividends in 
each period. Assuming that this is not merely a matter of firms wishing to maintain a 
positive franking account balance to ensure that they can maintain a policy of 
constantly paying franked dividends, the constraint on the maximum level of franked 
dividends that can be paid will be slack. Here two possible subcases can be 
considered. In the first, it is assumed that firms wish to undertake less equity 
investment in each period than would be financed if the firm retained all unbankable 
and bankable earnings. In this case firms will pay some franked dividends in each 
period and V/
A.4. = Xl =  0 (3.32)
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A second subcase is where firms wish to undertake more equity investment in each 
period than could be financed by retaining all unbankable and bankable earnings. In 
this case, \/t
X6t =X]=0  (3.35)
Straightforward substitutions into the first-order conditions imply
(1 -  v . )  P ju E iM  = ( i + +()(i -  x,*, -  o p +*, (iMa  -  t„, ) -  )
q‘ (3.36)
_£aL(i_5)(i _ Xwt M_ n ^ )
9,
where Q? = X (3-37)
“■° no+ + , )
i=/+l
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If tax rates remain constant through time (3.33) simplifies to
(1 _  t) EmEl (h> = (1 + i ) ( 1  _ xki-  q  (iM(1 -  x) -  + )
9,
_ ^ ! ± L ( i - 5 ) ( i - xA(ti- a ^ )
9,
which is equivalent to (3.36) in the case where tax rates remain constant. If, in 
addition it is assumed that r, n, i, (j), k and Z remain constant through time and all 
prices increase at the rate 7i for firms paying less than the maximum level of franked 
dividends
pF ' 5 = [1 —t(£ + Z)][<)) —7i + 5 (l + 7i)] + fr[/(l —t) —(j>] 5
9 (l + 7t)(l-T)
(3.38)
(v) Weighted-Average Costs o f  Capital Under Current Tax Provisions: Table A3.1.1 
below extends Table 3.4 to allow for costs of capital for firms paying unfranked 
dividends and less than the maximum level of franked dividends as well as our base- 
case firms. Other assumptions are as in Table 3.4 including weightings of 0.6, 0.1 and 
0.3 for real gains, real losses but nominal gains, and nominal losses respectively. It is 
assumed that m is 33 per cent. The same tax rate is used to allow costs of capital to be 
compared across our three different types of company as simply as possible but it 
should be noted that this last assumption is inconsistent with firms paying less than 
the maximum level of franked dividends pursuing an optimal financial policy.
Table A3.3.1 1997/98 Weighted Average Costs of Capital
m = 0.33, r = 0.05, n = 0.02, a = 0.2







Unincorp Ents 2.7 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.4 5.0 2.7 2.7 4.1
Companies
Base Case 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.7 2.8 3.7 4.5




3.0 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.2 6.4 -4.6 0.4 5.3
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For companies paying unfranked dividends in all periods, the cost of capital is 4.4 per 
cent in all cases. It is independent of depreciation provisions or tax incentives for 
investment. The benefits of such measures to companies are completely clawed back 
by additional taxes on shareholders.
Now consider firms paying less than the maximum level of franked dividends in each 
period which treat as slack the constraint limiting the maximum level of franked 
dividends in each period. For these firms, inter-asset biases tend to be somewhat 
larger than for unincorporated enterprises. This reflects the fact that taxable income is 
being taxed at the rate of x + c(\ -  x) rather than at the lower rate m.
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Appendix 3.2: Comparison with Sieper's Cost of Capital 
Expression
This appendix reworks cost of capital expressions in continuous time to allow a 
comparison with the expression derived in Sieper (1995). It provides numerical 
estimates showing how the two expressions agree in the polar cases of no share 
turnover or shares turning over infinitely fast, but disagree in other cases.
In his study Sieper provides a major step forward on other Australian literature by 
providing a formal model of the effects of full imputation on investment decisions 
taking account of detailed provisions of Australia's company tax provisions. He also 
goes beyond this thesis in considering deferred-income projects (projects which start 
to produce revenue T years after the initial investment). However, a simplification 
Sieper has made has led to inconsistencies which biases his estimates of costs of 
capital. Our formulation avoids these inconsistencies.
Sieper's analysis of the cost of capital is heterodox in explicitly modelling a 
realisation-basis capital gains tax. However, as in King (1977) and Appendix 2.1 
Sieper assumes a constant rate of share turnover. Appendix 2.1 has shown that under 
this assumption it is consistent to treat a realisation-basis capital gains tax as though it 
were a tax on accrual (albeit at less than the statutory rate to allow for the benefits of 
tax deferral). This means that our measures of the cost of capital will be internally 
consistent.
The inconsistency in Sieper's approach stems from two assumptions. First, he 
assumes (p. A3-xiv) that share prices follow the value of a firm's assets (i.e., the sum 
of its physical capital which is assumed to depreciate at an exogenous rate, 8, and 
retained earnings). Second, he assumes that the initial value of a company in which a 
dollar of capital is contributed will be a dollar (p. A3-iii). Together these assumptions 
imply that the value of a firm will be the sum of its physical capital (measured in 
dollars) and its retained earnings. In particular, this means that the value of a firm will 
be independent of its stream of future tax deductions. By contrast our model allows 
the value of a firm to be set endogenously.
Sieper analyses the cost of capital for deferred-income projects. If our analysis were 
compatible with Sieper's, our results should be a special case of his as the period until 
revenue comes on stream tends to zero. In his Appendix 3, Sieper derives the 
following expression for the cost of capital in this case:
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~ (r + 5*) (r(l -  m) + 5} mra( 8 * -8 ) _
p —-------------------------------- 1--------------------------------------------- o (3..
r(l -  m) + 6 * (r(l — m) + a) (r(l — m) + 5*}
where 5* is the exponential rate of depreciation allowed for tax purposes. Other 
notation is consistent with that in this chapter except that Sieper's analysis is set in 
continuous time so, for example, r is the continuously compounding rate of interest.
Sieper's analysis differs from ours in the following key ways:
• It works in continuous rather than discrete time;
• It ignores inflation;
• It explicitly allows for a realisation-basis capital gains tax;
• It assumes that there is no investment allowance and treats tax depreciation as 
being at a constant exponential rate.
The first of these differences is trivial. As discussed in chapter 2 in the absence of 
inflation there would be no bias against corporate borrowing. For simplicity ignoring 
borrowing, the continuous-time equivalents of equations (2.6) and (2.7) are
D{ + D?=plF (K ,) -q , I l - T l +VlN (3.40)
and T , = x { p , F ( K , ) - k , q , I , - [  ASJ_,q,I,ds} (3.41)
Together these imply
D{ + D“ = (1 -  x)p,F(K, ) -  q,I, (1 -xk ,)  + x|;„ A SJ.,q,Isds + V* (3.42)
Consider the case discussed in the text of this chapter where x + c(l -  x) > m and 
nonnegativity constraints on new issues and franked dividends are assumed to be 
slack. In this case firms pay the maximum possible level of franked dividends (ie.,
D(  = 7 ] ( 1 - x ) / x ) and no unfranked dividends. This is Sieper's assumption. It 
follows that
V," A (3.43)
Substituting this into the continuous-time equivalent of (2.5) yields
f  1 _  m  ^ (  \vo=i: ) +  <?,/,\- \ + ?L£(k + z)1 — C )  V 1- C ¥ dt
+




where the last term is the present value of tax deductions on past investments which is 
pre-determined for the firm at time 0.
The firm chooses to maximise (3.44) subject to the constraint
K, = I t -6 K t (3.45)
where K, = dKt / dt.
The Hamiltonian for the problem is
H =
r x_ m \  r  -  ~
1 — c
p,F{K,)e«+q,I,  -1 + - ---- (k,+Z,) e *  + -  SK,)
V 1 - C
and for the optimal trajectory
-<1, 1+ . ( k t +Zt ) e + M O - 0
Ol, V  1 -  C J
(3.46)
— r)H (1 m \
H ‘) = —  = -   ----- p , F \ K ' ) e - « - H t )5
oKt \ \ - c  J
(3.47)
K, = -  = / , -  8K,
'  ex  '  ' (3.48)
Suppose as in section 3.2. that there is a constant continuous rate of growth of both p 
and q (ie., pt = p0enl and qt = q0enl) and that k and Z remain constant through time. 
Solving (3.46) for X, differentiating and substituting into (3.47) yields
PqF'OC,) s [l - c  -(m -c)(A : + Z)](>|i + 8) g ( 3 m
q0 1 ~m
which is the continuous-time equivalent of (3.2) in the absence of inflation.
Following the methodology of King (1977) but working in continuous time, the 
accrual equivalent rate of tax, c, given that shares turn over at the rate a is
c = mrae~“e~r(i~m)ldt = ----- — -----  (3.50)
Jo a + r ( \ - m )
Note that as a 0, c -> 0 and as a -» oo, c -> m. Finally, for consistency with 
Sieper we set 7i = 0, ({) = r(l -  m) / (1 -  c), k = 0 and Z = 8* / ( r ( l - /w) / ( l -c )  + 8*).
126
Thus, - 5 (3.51)
1 — c — (m -  c)8
P =
1 -  m 
1 -  c
+  8 *
1 -  m
'  ' \ A
V 1 -  C
+ 8
Note that both formulations for the cost of capital, equations (3.39) and (3.51), are 
equivalent in the limiting cases:
a 0=>c = 0=>p =
(r + 8 *)(r(l-m ) + 5) 
r(l -  m) + 8 *
and a - > o o r = > c - > m = > p - > r .
In other cases the expressions will differ. Table A3.2.1 provides numerical estimates 
of costs of capital for r = 10% and m = 33% for five possible assets which Sieper 
analyses. These are items of equipment with the following assumed effective lives, 
rates of true economic depreciation and rates of tax depreciation:
• effective life = 3 years, 5 = 0.5, 5* —> oo;
• effective life = 5 years, 5 = 0.3, 8* = 0.6;
• effective life = 10 years, 5 = 0.15, 8* = 0.3;
• effective life = 20 years, 8 = 0.075, 8* = 0.2;










(years) Sieper Benge Sieper Benge Sieper Benge
3 6.70 6.70 8.11 7.80 8.68 8.35
5 8.52 8.52 9.15 9.03 9.40 9.28
10 8.65 8.65 9.23 9.13 9.46 9.35
20 8.46 8.46 9.12 9.01 9.38 9.27
30 9.01 9.01 9.43 9.38 9.60 9.55
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As a —> co, costs of capital for both Sieper and Benge converge to r = 10.0%. 
However, costs of capital can differ by noticeably different amounts when 0 < a < co. 
This is because of internal inconsistencies in Sieper's assumptions about firm 
valuation.
This is most easily illustrated with a simple example. Sieper assumes that a project 
involves a single outlay at time 0. Consider the case where the asset does not 
depreciate so 5 = 0 but where the rate of depreciation allowed for tax purposes,
5* >  0 .
Sieper assumes that if after-tax profits are greater than the level of franked dividends a 
firm can pay, the firm builds up financial assets which are assumed to be interest 
bearing bonds. We will denote the value of such bonds at time t to be Ar
In this case the firm's pre-tax revenue stream at time t will be
R, = p + rAj
Company tax will be
Tt = x[p + r4  -  5*e“5’'] 
After-tax franked dividends will be
(3.52)
(3.53)
D{ =(l-T)(p + r 4 - 5 * e 's‘')  (3.54)
The firm's retained earnings will be
A, =RI - T , - D {  = 6 *e“5-' (3.55)
Imposing the boundary condition that the firm starts off with no financial assets 
implies
A, = 1-e"8"' (3.56)
Note that as t -» °o, At —» 1 and Dj  —> (1 — x)(p + r) so after-tax franked dividends 
-» (1 -  w)(p + r) . This implies that as t -> oo, the value of the company 
—> (1 -  m)(p + r) / r(\ -  m) = \ + p / r . Note that this must be less than 2 if  p e r .
Sieper finds that p < r if 8* > 6. In our example, 8* > 0 and 8 = 0 so 5* > 5.
However, he assumes that the value of the firm in this case is the sum of its physical 
capital, 1, and its financial assets. Thus, according to Sieper
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Vt = 2 - e-8  *t
This means that as t -> oo, Sieper assumes that Vt 2 > 1 + p / r . This is inconsistent.
Sieper's assumption that a dollar of retentions adds a dollar to the value of a firm is 
true in one sense. As retained earnings approach a dollar, the value of these retained 
earnings will tend to a dollar. The value of such a firm would be expected to be a 
dollar higher than an identical firm with a dollar less of retained earnings. A dollar of 
retained earnings adds a dollar to the value of a firm relative to the counterfactual of a 
firm being in an identical position without the retained earnings.
The inconsistency in Sieper's approach arises because this does not mean that the 
value of such a firm rises through time in line with its retained earnings. If a 
nondepreciating asset qualifies for tax depreciation, this will lower the cost of capital 
below r to some level, say, p*. An asset costing a dollar and generating a pre-tax rate 
of return p* < r is marginal only because of its stream of future depreciation 
deductions. As time passes and future depreciation deductions become negligible, the 
asset becomes identical to a perpetuity paying p* per annum which will be valued at 
p *lr. Thus, as depreciation deductions are being claimed the firm's value will tend to 
grow by a smaller amount than the level of earnings it is retaining.
In order for the formation of a company which costs a dollar to be a zero net present 
value investment, the present value of the after-tax dividend stream plus revenue from 
share sales to an initial investor must equal a dollar. Thus,
f 1 — m
^ 1 - T
D{ +a[(l-m)V, +m] e-tfl+r(,-m)1'<* (3.57)
Substituting yields
1 = G(a ,p,r ,m,6*) + a(\ -  Vte~[a+r^ l~m)]l dt (3.58)
where (l-m )(p  + r) (1-m )(p + 5*)
a + r ( \ - m ) a+&*+r(\-m)
(3.59)
The difference between Sieper's and our approach revolves around differences in Vt in 
(3.58). If Vt did follow the path assumed by Sieper, Vt = 2 -  e~3*'. In this case the 
present value of cash flows from the project (ie., the right-hand side of (3.57)) 
becomes
PV = G( ) +
2a(\-m)  
a + r(l — m)




In our approach the value o f  the firm s is endogenous and its is assum ed that
1 -  m
(1-T)(1-C)
D{e-*tu-')du
w here c is given by (3.50) and (j> = r(\ -  m) / (\ -  c ) . In this case the present value o f  
the cash flows from the project becom es
P V  =  G (  ) I a P - M i U  + P M
a + r(\ - in)
1 — m  
1 - c
r  + 6*
4> -t- 5
a ( \ - m )
a + r ( \ - m )  + 8*
(3.60 b)
Table 3.2.1 presents values o f  the present values o f  future cash flows from the 
projects under Sieper's and our assum ptions. The cost o f  capital is calculated using 
(3.39) under Sieper's assum ptions and using (3.51) under ours. In each case it is 
assum ed that r = 0.1 and m -  0.33.
Table 3.2.2 Present Values of Future Cash Flows
5* = 0.00 5* = 0.01 6* = 0.02 5* = 0.05 5* = 0.10 6* = 0.20
Benge
a = 0.00 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
a = 0.05 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
a = 0.10 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
a = 0.20 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
a —> oo 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Sieper
a = 0.00 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
a = 0.05 1.0000 1.0008 1.0027 1.0103 1.0223 1.0382
a = 0.10 1.0000 1.0006 1.0019 1.0078 1.0178 1.0324
ci = 0.20 1.0000 1.0003 1.0010 1.0042 1.0101 1.0199
fl —> oo 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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Our measure of the cost of capital is consistent because the present value of the after­
tax cash flows from a marginal project costing a dollar equals a dollar whereas 
Sieper's measure of the cost of capital is inconsistent.
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CHAPTER 4: FINANCING AND INVESTMENT BIASES SINCE
1984/85
4.1 Introduction
Financial and investment biases for widely-held Australian companies were 
investigated in chapters 2 and 3. The analysis took account of Australia's full 
imputation company tax system and its capital gains tax provisions.
In chapter 2, corporate financial policy biases were examined under 1997/98 tax 
settings under a variety of different possible assumptions about the marginal tax rate 
of shareholders, m, the rate of turnover of shares, a, and inflation, n. It was noted that 
under reasonable assumptions there appear to be strong incentives for firms aiming to 
maximise the wealth of their shareholders to ensure that frankable earnings are fully 
distributed (or, equivalently, fne maximum possible level of franked bonus shares are 
issued). Firms should pay the maximum level of franked dividends, replacing any 
capital by using new equity issues or (less favourably) debt. There are also incentives 
for firms to avoid paying unfranked dividends. By reducing unfranked dividends and 
reducing new equity issues or (more favourably) debt, a company can increase 
shareholder wealth. Finally, if there is a prospect of real gains accruing, there is a tax 
bias in favour of firms issuing new equity rather than debt.
In practice debt/equity ratios have not declined markedly since the full imputation 
reform and the model was modified in chapter 3 by assuming that debt was an 
exogenous proportion of capital stock. Investment biases were examined in that 
chapter under 1997/98 tax settings. In the text of the chapter the case that was 
discussed was of widely-held companies which were paying the maximum level of 
franked dividends, issuing new equity and paying no unfranked dividends in each 
period. Given the incentives that had been identified for the full distribution of 
frankable earnings, this would normally appear optimal for firms which wish to 
undertake more equity investment than can be achieved merely by retaining 
unfrankable earnings.
There appear to be investment biases which encourage both widely-held companies 
and unincorporated enterprises to invest in plant and equipment ahead of both trading 
stock and structures at least at recent low rates of inflation. There are normally tax 
biases favouring unincorporated investment relative to investment by widely-held 
companies because of the way the taxation of unfranked dividends and capital gains
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claws back tax preferences available at the company level. At times, however, 
corporate investment may be tax preferred. This may happen as a result of tax 
preferences which are available to companies only, such as the 125 per cent deduction 
for research and development, provided the rates of share turnover are sufficiently 
slow. It can also happen as a result of the inflation-indexed capital gains tax making 
the cost of capital for heavily-taxed forms of investment lower when undertaken by 
companies than when undertaken by unincorporated enterprises. For example, the 
cost of capital for investment in trading stock can be lower for companies than for 
unincorporated enterprises.
Over the period since 1987/88 when the full imputation reform was introduced there 
have been falls in rates of inflation and a number of changes to tax rates. These may 
have affected both financial policy biases and costs of capital. Costs of capital may 
have also been affected by a number of reforms to the tax bases including changes in 
rates of depreciation and a temporary investment allowance. Moreover, the full 
imputation reform itself may have had important effects on financial policy biases and 
costs of capital. As was discussed in chapter 1, the full imputation reform was aimed, 
inter alia, at reducing tax distortions to corporate financial policy and to the form of 
business through which investment takes place. This chapter extends the analysis of 
chapters 2 and 3 to investigate biases that arose under the former classical company 
tax system and to examine how these biases have been affected by the full imputation 
reform, other tax changes and changes in the rate of inflation.
An important issue when extending the analysis back to consider the classical 
company tax system is how best to model such a tax system. As was outlined in 
chapter 1 proponents of the new view and proponents of the traditional view of 
dividends differ on this issue. Proponents of the new view have noted that traditional 
view models assume that new equity is the marginal source of equity finance. At least 
in the United States new equity provides a very minor proportion of the capital of 
firms. As Jorgenson (1993,/?. 33) notes, the King-Fullerton methodology is based on 
the actual distribution of equity finance from new issues and retentions. This turns 
out to be more or less equivalent to adopting the new view because of the way the 
retentions dominate new equity issues as a source of finance. The suggestion of Sinn 
(1991a) that firms choose between new equity issues and retentions to minimise the 
cost of equity finance was discussed in chapter 1. This is effectively the approach that 
has been adopted in this thesis when analysing the effects of full imputation. When 
analysing a classical company tax system, this is also equivalent to the new view if
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the accrual-equivalent rate of capital gains tax, c, is assumed to be less than the 
marginal tax rate of shareholders, m}
Proponents of the traditional view have, however, pointed out that new view models 
typically assume that dividends are the only way of rewarding shareholders. In 
practice there may be a number of ways for firms to reward their shareholders, 
including share repurchase or by the firm undertaking corporate acquisitions. These 
result in shareholders being rewarded with more lightly-taxed capital gains. In the 
United States there has been an increasing trend for firms to reward their shareholders 
in these more lightly-taxed ways (see Bagwell and Shoven, 1989). Some of these 
forms of rewarding shareholders may have been more difficult in Australia when 
Australia had a classical company tax system. At that time, firms were prohibited 
from repurchasing their own shares or shares in related companies although 
companies could still have rewarded their shareholders with capital gains by buying 
shares in unrelated companies.
While new view models tend to assume that dividends are the only way in which 
companies reward their shareholders, identical cost of capital expressions can be 
derived under other assumptions as well. As Sinn (199la) notes, if equity is financed 
at the margin by issuing new shares and shareholders are rewarded by share 
repurchases (or equivalently corporate acquisitions), costs of capital would be the 
same as if, as in the new view, retentions are the marginal source of finance and 
shareholders are rewarded with dividends.
Whether the new view or the traditional view of dividends is the better way of 
modelling a classical company tax system is yet to be resolved. Gerardi, Graetz and 
Rosen (1990) and Zodrow (1992) make the assessment that the majority of empirical 
studies support the traditional view. However, which view yields the better 
explanation of corporate behaviour continues to be controversial.
The approach adopted in chapter 3 where firms are assumed to minimise the cost of 
equity finance sits most naturally with a new view model of a classical company tax 
system. In this chapter we restrict our attention to analysing the effects of Australia's 
former classical company tax system under new view assumptions. It would be of 
interest to extend our analysis by considering traditional view models of a classical
1 With a real capital gains tax it is theoretically possible that c exceeds m even if tax rates remain 
constant through time for the reasons discussed in Appendix 2.1.
134
company tax system as well but this is left for future work. It should be noted that 
modelling the classical company tax system under new view assumptions does not 
mean that the switch to full imputation has left investment incentives unaffected for 
established firms which are able to finance equity investment by the retention of 
profits. These incentives would have been unaffected if retentions had continued to 
be the least-cost form of equity finance. It has been seen, however, that Australia's 
full imputation scheme has made new equity a lower-cost form of equity finance than 
the retention of frankable earnings. This results in the shift to full imputation having 
important effects on investment decisions even if the classical company tax system is 
modelled under new-view assumptions.
When examining financial policy biases we find that there is more uncertainty about 
the direction of these biases under Australia's former classical company tax system 
than appears to be the case under current tax provisions. In chapter 2 it was noted that 
incentives to pay franked dividends, to refrain from paying unfranked dividends and 
to replace debt with new equity seemed to apply for all possible values of m under 
plausible rates of share turnover. Under the classical company tax system the 
direction of some biases will depend on the assumed rate of m. If m is approximated 
by the average marginal rate of shareholders, we find that the full imputation reform 
appears to have reversed many of the financial policy biases which arose under 
Australia's former classical company tax system. It is not clear, however, that the 
biases are smaller than those which would have arisen if a classical company tax 
system had been retained.
As was discussed in chapter 3, the full imputation reform could have eliminated any 
intersectoral investment biases if (as in New Zealand) capital gains on shares were not 
taxed. In practice, Australia's capital gains tax can produce important intersectoral 
biases especially if depreciation allowances are substantially accelerated or investment 
allowances are available. While it seems likely that in the last few years full 
imputation has provided a smaller bias against corporate investment than would be the 
case if a classical company tax system had been retained, this need not be the case 
especially if depreciation allowances are substantially accelerated or investment 
allowances are available. However, full imputation has a very marked effect on 
reducing inter-asset distortions in the corporate sector relative to a classical company 
tax system. If it is believed that difficulties in measuring economic depreciation mean 
that inter-asset investment distortions are inevitable, an attraction of the Australian 
full imputation reform may be that it helps to minimise these distortions. However, it 
does so for domestically-owned companies only and not for foreign-owned firms or 
unincorporated enterprises.
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. Details on changes in key tax parameters 
since 1984/85 are provided in section 4.2. Financial policy biases which arose under 
the classical company tax system are examined in section 4.3. The question of how 
financial policy biases have changed over the period since 1984/85 is explored in 
section 4.4. An expression for the cost of capital under Australia's former classical 
company tax system is presented in section 4.5 assuming that retained earnings are the 
marginal source of equity finance. In section 4.6 the issue of how the cost of capital 
has changed over the period since 1984/85 is discussed. Finally, section 4.7 
concludes.
4.2 Major Tax Parameters Since 1984/85
In chapters 2 and 3 a variety of different possible values of m were considered. In this 
chapter we consider some different possible values of m when considering financial 
policy biases. However, to constrain the set of possible cases, we will use only mean 
marginal tax rates on domestic resident final shareholders to estimate m when 
considering costs of capital. These estimates are derived from Australian Taxation 
Office and Australian Bureau of Statistics data on the same basis as was outlined for 
1994/95 in section 2.5. For later years it is assumed that the average marginal tax rate 
of shareholders has remained constant at 33 per cent.2 Estimates of economic 
depreciation are as outlined in section 3.4.
The capital gains tax was introduced in 1986/87 in respect of gains on assets acquired 
on or after 20 September 1985. Assets acquired prior to 20 September 1985 were 
'grandfathered' (gains on these assets are not taxable). Grandfathering makes the 
effects of the capital gains tax difficult to analyse because for the first few years only 
a relatively small percentage of shares would have generated taxable gains. We 
abstract from this issue and treat all shareholders as being subject to capital gains tax 
from 1986/87 onwards.
2 A key parameter used in estimating the average marginal tax rate of shareholders is the percentage of 
shares held by superannuation funds and life offices on which income is taxed at the lower rate of 
superannuation funds. A method for estimating this was outlined in section 2.5 but published data only 
goes back to 1989/90. The ABS has kindly provided some additional data which allows estimates to 
be made for 1987/88 and 1988/89 and which yields estimates of 77.8 per cent for 1987/88 and 77.7 per 
cent for 1988/89 compared with 78.0 per cent for 1989/90. The ratio appears to have been very stable 
over the period 1987/88 to 1989/90 and we assume a ratio of 78 per cent in earlier years as well.
Minor differences in this ratio are unlikely to have much effect on our estimates.
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Other key tax changes over this period included:
• the termination of the 18 per cent investment allowance at the end of 1984/85;
• the introduction of the 150 per cent deduction for corporate R&D from the 
beginning of 1985/86;
• the introduction of full imputation together with an increase in the company tax 
rate from 46 per cent to 49 per cent in 1987/88;
• the repeal of 5/3 accelerated depreciation and its replacement by a less-accelerated 
system of depreciation based on the economic lives of assets from 26 May 1988;
• a reduction in the company tax rate to 39 per cent in 1988/89;
• the introduction of a more-accelerated system of depreciation from 26 February 
1992;
• the temporary introduction of a 10 per cent investment allowance for capital 
expenditure incurred after 8 February 1993 and before 1 July 1994;
• a further reduction in the company tax rate to 33 per cent in 1993/94 and then an 
increase in this rate to 36 per cent in 1995/96.
• a scaling back to 125 per cent of the deduction for corporate R&D from 21 August 
1996.
The key tax provisions applying at the end of the years 1984/85 to 1996/97 are 
summarised in Table 4.1. In this chapter we consider financial policy biases and costs 
of capital only up until 1996/97. There have been no changes in relevant tax 
provisions in 1997/98 and so results for 1997/98 would merely replicate those for 
1996/97.
Depreciation rates for plant and equipment with economic lives of 3, 5, 10, 20 and 30 
years are on a diminishing value basis unless indicated by an asterisk (*). Those 
marked with an asterisk are on a straight-line (prime-cost) basis. 'Exp' stands for 
expensing. If an asset has an economic life which lands on a borderline used by the 
Commissioner of Taxation (eg., assets with an economic life of 5 years lie on the 
borderline between those with lives of 3-5 years and those with lives of 5-10 years) it 
is assumed that the faster depreciation rate applies. Deductions allowed for capital 
expenditure on buildings are deductible on a straight-line (prime-cost) basis and for 
clarity are also indicated with an asterisk.
Another factor which is likely to have affected financial policy and investment biases 
is that superannuation funds became taxable only in 1988/89 normally at the rate of 15 
per cent. It was only from that time that they were able to claim imputation credits. It 
is unclear how to allow for this complication without a major alteration of the model 
to allow for different groups of taxpayers being taxed in different ways. It affects
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only one year's results and the complication is ignored . Superannuation funds are 
effectively treated as though they could claim imputation credits in 1987/88 which 
means that in this year figures should be read with particular caution.
Table 4.1 Australian Tax Provisions
84/85 85 /86 86 /87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91 /92 92/93 93 /94 94 /95 9 5 /9 6 96 /97
T 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.36
m 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33
n ( % ) 6.6 8.5 9.3 7.1 7.6 7.7 3.4 1.2 1.9 1.7 4.5 3.1 0.3
Dep.
R ates
3 y r 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 Exp Exp Exp Exp Exp Exp
5 y r 0.333* 0.333* 0.333* 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
10 y r 0.2* 0.2* 0.2* 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
20 y r 0.2* 0.2* 0.2* 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
30 y r 0.2* 0.2* 0.2* 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
B ldgs 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 0.025*
R& D 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.25
k 0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0
Tax
System
Class Class Class Imp Imp Imp Imp Imp Imp Imp Imp Imp Imp




CGT CGT CGT CGT CGT CGT CGT CGT CGT CGT CGT
Inflation rates reported in Table 4.1 are the rate of growth in CPI inflation over the 12 
months to the end of the relevant years.
4.3 The Classical Company Tax System and Financial Policy 
Biases
The financing and investment incentives provided by a classical company tax system 
have been analysed by a number of authors including King (1974a and 1977) and 
Auerbach (1979a). Our formal analysis provides at most a very minor extension. We
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consider incentive effects in a framework which allows for the Australian indexed 
capital gains tax provisions introduced in 1986/87 and which is consistent with that 
used earlier in analysing Australia's full imputation company tax system.
Under a classical company tax system all dividends are taxed. Denoting dividends 
paid in period t by Dt, the firm's net of tax distribution becomes
Em  = (l-m , .,)A +.- c , tl( C - ( l  + <X7t, (4.1)
This replaces (2.2). Equations (2.1), (2.3) and (4.1) jointly imply that the ex-dividend 
value of the firm in period zero will be
1 -  m
K = X l-c,




provided, as in chapter 2, it is assumed that the transversality condition is satisfied.
As in chapter 2, financial policy biases are explained more intuitively if we work in 
terms of the cum-dividend-and-shareholder-tax value of the firm. Using (2.11)
W0 = E0 + V0° = ( l - m 0)D0 + ( l - c 0)(V0 - V " )  + c0( 1 + anQ)V.x (4.3)
Substituting (4.2) into (4.3) yields
»/o = ( l - c „ ) t U S---------- + c0(l + cot0)F,'■» no+w
(4.4)
The firm’s cash-flow constraint is given by
D, = p,F(K ,_t) -  q,I, -T,+ (1 + /, + (4.5)
which replaces (2.6). Taxes continue to be given by (2.7) and the firm's capital stock 
by (2.8).
Initially, as in chapter 2, we focus on the firm's financial policy taking investment 
policy as given. If investment policy is given, the firm's autonomous cash flows, CFt, 
will once more be given by (2.10) and we can rewrite (4.5) as
D, = CF, + B, -(1 + i,(1 -  x, ))B„, + V” (4.6)
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The firm takes CFt as given in each period and chooses levels of dividends, bonds and 
new equity issues in each period. Because of the cash-flow constraint, only two of Dt, 
Bt and VtN can be chosen independently.
When considering financial policy perturbations, as in chapter 2, we will consider the 
effects on the value of the firm at time 0 of a one-off unexpected change in financial 
policy where dividends and new equity issues change by dD0, dD], dD2,... ,  and 
dV0N , dV" , dV2 , respectively.
With a classical company tax system, the change in the shareholder wealth as a result 
of a firm announcing an unexpected change in financial policy in period 0 will be
X-^
dW, = ( \ - c a) t ^ --------------  (4.7)
'■° n u + f )
This follows because V_, is independent of any subsequent change in financial policy. 
Equation (4.7) replaces equation (2.16).
Equation (4.7) allows gains from financial policy perturbations to be analysed with 
time varying tax rates and values of <j>. As in chapter 2, to simplify exposition and 
constrain the number of possible cases to consider, we will focus on the case where 
tax rates, the system of company tax and the value of § are expected to remain 
constant through time.3 In this case (4.7) becomes
dW0 = t
1=0
(1 -m )d P ,-(\-c )d V ,N
0 + 4»)'
(4.8)
Equation (4.8) is the equation used in this chapter to evaluate gains to shareholders 
from financial policy perturbations under a classical company tax system.
3 This allows us to compare the effects of a classical company tax system which is assumed to be 
permanent with the results derived in chapter 2 for a permanent system of full imputation. An 
important interest in this chapter when analysing the classical company tax system is to examine how 
incentives under a classical company tax system and full imputation differ. Treating tax systems as 
permanent seems reasonable in this context. There may, however, be some important financial policy 
biases in the period 1984/85 to 1986/87 that this analysis overlooks because of anticipated changes in 
tax provisions.
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Under the classical company tax system there were three ways in which a company 
could finance investment, namely, retained earnings (i.e., reduced dividends), new 
equity and debt. To provide some intuition for the effects on shareholders of various 
perturbations in corporate financial policy, it is helpful to start (as in chapter 2) by 
examining the costs to shareholders of the firm raising a dollar of finance in each of 
these three possible ways and burning the proceeds.
The cost to shareholders of a firm retaining a dollar and burning the proceeds is the 
after-tax dividend forgone, 1 -  m . This is the same as the cost of retaining and burning 
a dollar of unfrankable earnings under a full imputation scheme discussed in section
2.4. If a dollar o f new equity is issued, new shareholders must receive a flow of 
benefits with a present value of a dollar. If the dollar of new equity is burned, this 
means that the value of existing equity must fall by a dollar which costs existing 
shareholders 1 -  c net of capital gains tax. This is the same as the cost of issuing and 
burning a dollar of new equity under a full imputation system as discussed in section
2.4.
The most complex case is that of debt finance. If a firm borrows a dollar and then 
bums this dollar, the cost will be the interest payments on this debt. Assuming no 
change to retained earnings or new issues in any future period, interest payments will 
rise by i, company tax will fall by ix and dividends will fall by z(l -  x) in each period. 
Shareholders will forgo an after-tax dividend stream of i(l -  x)(l -  m) per period.
This will lower the value of shares by an amount, say v, where v takes account o f both 
the reduction in after-tax dividends and the reduction in the value of shares for the 
purpose of indexing the capital gains tax.
_ /(I -  x )( l- m )  + acnv  
i(l — m)
Solving
i ( l - m ) - a c n
The cost to shareholders of the firm issuing and burning a dollar of debt is the net-of- 
capital-gains-tax capital loss
v(l —c)
* ( l- x ) ( l - r a )
<t>
Table 4.2 records the costs to shareholders of these three primitive forms of finance.
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Table 4.2: Costs of Raising a Dollar of Capital and Burning the Proceeds
Form of Finance Cost
RE 1-/71
NE 1 — c
Debt i(\ -  m)(\ -  x) / <|>
By comparing Table 4.2 with Table 2.2 on page 48, it is clear that a key difference 
between a classical company tax system and full imputation is that the cost of issuing 
and burning a dollar of debt is z(l -  m)( 1 -  x) / <{> under a classical company tax system 
but i ( \ -m ) /  § under full imputation.
There are three types of pairwise perturbations RE/NE, Debt/RE and Debt/NE. The 
effects on shareholder wealth can be derived either by comparing the primitive costs 
of the three forms of finance or, more formally, using equation (4.8).
RE/NE
Suppose that immediately before dividends are paid at the end of period 0 the firm 
announces that, relative to market anticipations, it will issue one dollar less of new 
equity in period 0 and pay one dollar less dividends in that period. Thus,
d V f = dD, = -1
New issues and dividends in other periods and bonds in all periods are left unchanged. 
Changes in the variables appearing in (4.6) are as follows.
Period dD, dB, dV,N H1+
0 -1 0 -1 0
1 0 0 0 0
2 and 0 0 0 0
subsequent
periods
It is straightforward to check that this perturbation satisfies the firm's cash-flow 
constraint, equation (4.6). From (4.8), the change in shareholder wealth is
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dWQ = -(] - m) + (] — c) = m - c (4.9)
This is just the cost of issuing a dollar of new equity and burning it minus the cost of 
retaining a dollar of dividends and burning it. The analysis is formally identical to 
that of a firm retaining a dollar of unfrankable earnings and issuing one dollar less of 
new equity under full imputation. Provided m > c, reducing dividends and new equity 
issues increases shareholder wealth.
Debt/RE
Now suppose that immediately before dividends are paid at the end of period 0 it is 
announced that, relative to market expectations, the firm will increase dividends and 
borrow an additional dollar in that period. This reduces retained earnings and 
increases the stock of debt by a dollar in all subsequent periods. Changes in the 
variables appearing in (4.6) are assumed to be as follows:
Period dDt dB, dV,N
0 1 1 0 0




- z( 1 - t) 1 0 (l + Z(l-x))
This satisfies (4.6) in all periods. The change in shareholder wealth is
dW0=( \ -m) 1 -
* >
(4.10)
This is the cost to shareholders of the firm retaining and burning a dollar minus that of 
the firm borrowing and burning a dollar of debt.
Debt/NE
Finally, consider the case where the firm announces just before the end of period 0 
that, relative to market expectations, it will reduce new equity issues by a dollar and 
borrow an additional dollar in that period. This is assumed to increase the stock of 
debt and reduce the stock of equity by a dollar in each future period. Changes in the 
variables in (4.6) are assumed to be as follows:
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Period dDt dB, dVtN
0 0 1 -1 0




- / ( 1 - t) 1 0 (l + i( l-x ))
The change in the value of the firm will be
d W ' . i - c . *(1-»Q (1- 0  
<!>
(4.11)
This is the cost to shareholders of the firm issuing and burning a dollar of new equity 
minus the cost of it borrowing and burning a dollar. Table 4.3 summarises these 
results from equations (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11).
Table 4.3 Effects on Shareholder Wealth from One Dollar Perturbations in 






Debt/NE 1 _ z (l-m )(l-x )1 c -------------------
<]>
Key Financial Policy Biases: 1984/85 to 1986/87
In 1984/95 and 1985/86 there was no capital gains tax so <|> = i(l -  m). Average 
marginal tax rates of shareholders (see Table 4.1) were 30 per cent in 1984/85 and 31 
per cent in 1985/86. In the absence of any capital gains tax, the gain in shareholder 
wealth of the three perturbations RE/NE, Debt/RE and Debt/NE are, respectively, m,
T — m and x. Gains to shareholders from these three perturbations are reported in 
Table 4.4 using the average marginal rate of shareholders as the value of m. The only 
difference between figures reported for 1984/85 and 1985/86 is as a result of the 
increase in the assumed value of m from 0.30 in 1984/85 to 0.31 in 1985/86.
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Table 4.4 Effects of Permanent Perturbations in Financial Policy 
r = 0.05, a = 0.2, Tt = 0.093








RE/NE 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300
Debt/RE 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.160
Debt/NE 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460
1985/86
RE/NE 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.310
Debt/RE 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150
Debt/NE 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460
1986/87
RE/NE 0.010 0.310 0.084 0.062
Debt/RE 0.169 0.150 0.272 0.198
Debt/NE 0.179 0.460 0.356 0.260
As there was no capital gains tax in 1984/85 and 1985/86, the gains to shareholders 
from perturbations in financial policy in these two years are independent of whether 
real gains, real losses but nominal gains or nominal losses accrue. By contrast gains 
in 1986/87 gains from these perturbations will depend on the type of expected future 
capital gain. The final column of the table reports weighted average gains assuming 
(as in chapter 3) a 60 per cent weighting for real gains, a 10 per cent weighting for real 
losses but nominal gains, and a 30 per cent weighting for nominal losses.
In the absence of a capital gains tax (i.e., in 1984/85 and 1985/86), gains to 
shareholders from perturbations in financial policy are independent of the values of 
the real interest rate, r, the rate of inflation, n, and the rate of turnover of shares, a. In
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1986/87 it is assumed that r is 5 per cent per annum and a is 20 per cent per annum. 
The best assumption for n is an open question. Throughout this chapter it will be 
assumed that shareholders expect inflation over the past 12 months to continue in the 
future. Thus, in 1986/87 n is assumed to be the rate of increase of the CPI over the 12 
months to the end of that financial year reported in Table 4.1 (viz., 9.3 per cent).
Table 4.4 suggests that if companies were owned solely by shareholders on the 
average marginal rate, under 1984/85 and 1985/86 tax provisions there was a tax bias 
favouring debt over both retained earnings and new equity for companies. For 
example, in 1985/86, the gain from replacing a dollar of retained earnings with a 
dollar of debt forever would have been 15 cents and the gain from replacing a dollar 
of new equity issues with a dollar of debt forever would have been 46 cents. There 
was also a tax bias in favour of retentions relative to new equity. In the absence of a 
capital gains tax, the cost of replacing a dollar of retentions with a dollar of new 
equity is m, which was 31 cents in 1985/86 under the assumptions we have made. As 
noted in chapter 1, concerns about these two biases were part of the reason for 
Australia introducing full imputation.
First consider the bias favouring retentions relative to new equity. The Treasurer, Mr 
Keating (1986) argued 'It [ie., the change to full imputation] will mean entrepreneurs 
and others trying to get new businesses off the ground should find it easier to raise 
equity finance.' The concern that a classical company tax system impedes 
entrepreneurs from getting new businesses started because of the high cost of new 
equity relative to retained earnings is a standard criticism of a classical company tax 
system. Note that in the absence of any capital gains tax, the gain to shareholders 
from replacing a dollar of new equity with a dollar of retentions, m, will be positive 
for any m> 0. Thus, the direction of this bias is not sensitive to assumptions about m.
Much of the bias favouring retentions relative to new equity appears to have been 
removed by the introduction of the capital gains tax. In particular, if real gains are 
expected to accrue, the bias against new equity issues relative to retained earnings 
becomes negligible. This is because this bias depends on the difference between m 
and c and c —>• w as the real after-tax interest rate, r'->  0 as discussed in Appendix 
2.1. In 1986/87 inflation was high (9.3 per cent) and r'=  0.008 was very low for 
shareholders on the average marginal rate.
In Keating (1986) the Treasurer also argued '. . . the new system will greatly reduce 
the existing bias in the tax system favouring debt over equity (this bias came about 
because interest income was taxed once while dividends were taxed twice).' Again, so 
long as we can approximate m by the average marginal tax rate of shareholders, our
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analysis supports the Treasurer's concern about a bias in favour of debt as debt tended 
to be preferred to retentions and new equity issues. It should be noted, however, that 
in the absence of any capital gains tax, the tax bias between debt and retentions has 
nothing to do with the double taxation of dividends. It reflects the difference between 
the company tax rate, x, and the personal tax rate, m, at which interest is taxed.
Exactly the same bias would arise if dividends were exempt.
Table 4.4 suggests that, under the assumptions outlined above, the introduction of the 
capital gains tax in 1986/87 tended to increase the Debt/RE bias but only by a 
relatively minor amount while decreasing the Debt/NE bias. If nominal gains are 
taxed (nominal losses accrue), the gain to shareholders from a firm replacing a dollar 
of retained earnings with a dollar of debt increases substantially from 15 cents to 27.2 
cents. If debt is increased, future dividend payments fall and shares fall in value. The 
cost of this to shareholders is cushioned by the capital gains tax. However, if real 
gains are taxed, with the 9.3 per cent inflation rate there ends up being only a very 
minor increase in the Debt/RE bias. The gain to shareholders from a firm replacing a 
dollar of retentions with a dollar of debt climbs from 15 cents to only 16.9 cents.
There is only a very minor increase in this case because replacing retentions with debt 
lowers the stream of future inflation deductions. Under our assumed weightings there 
is a relatively small increase in the weighted average gain from 15 cents to 19.8 cents.
These results are quite sensitive to the assumed inflation rate. To gain an impression 
of biases which would arise under more recent inflation rates, an inflation rate of 2 per 
cent per annum was assumed. In this case, gains to shareholders from the firm 
replacing a dollar of retentions with a dollar of debt would be 25.1, 15.0 or 29.1 cents 
depending, respectively, on whether real gains, real losses but nominal gains or 
nominal losses accrue. With unchanged weightings, the weighted-average gain would 
increase to 25.3 cents. The larger gain if real gains accrue is mainly because the 
benefits of the inflation-indexation of capital gains have fallen. The minor increase 
when nominal gains accrue arises because of a slightly different value of c.
The Debt/NE bias moves in the opposite direction. The explanation is as follows. In 
the absence of any capital gains tax, increasing debt by a dollar costs shareholders a 
stream of after-tax dividend payments of z(l -  x)(l -  m) per annum which has a 
present value of 1 -  x. The benefit is that the reduction of new equity issues by a 
dollar increases the value of old equity by a dollar. The overall capital gain is x = 46 
cents. If nominal gains are taxed, shareholders still benefit from a capital gain of x but 
this provides a net-of-tax capital gains of x(l - c )  = 35.6 cents. Thus, the taxation of 
nominal gains tends to reduce the benefit of issuing debt relative to new equity. If
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instead real gains are taxed (real gains accrue), there is an additional cost in switching 
from new equity issues to debt. This is because of the loss of a stream of inflation 
deductions.
In Table 4.4 the overall weighted average gain to shareholders from replacing a dollar 
of new equity falls from 46.0 cents to 26.0 cents as a result of the introduction of the 
capital gains tax in 1986/87. This bias is also sensitive to inflation and increases as 
the inflation rate falls. If the assumed rate of inflation were 2 per cent per annum 
rather than 9.3 per cent, the gain to shareholders from a firm replacing a dollar of new 
equity with a dollar of debt would be 31.7 cents.
Financial policy perturbations has been analysed assuming that all shareholders are 
taxed at the average marginal rate. In practice in the years 1984/85 to 1986/87 
shareholders were taxed at varying marginal rates which varied from 0 per cent 
(superannuation funds) to 61, 61 and 58.2 per cent in 1984/85, 1985/86 and 1986/87 
respectively (the top marginal tax rates inclusive of the Medicare Levy). To put some 
bounds on financial policy biases, Table 4.5 examines the effects of perturbations if 
companies could solely be owned by nontaxpayers and if companies could solely be 
owned by those on the top marginal rate.
In 1986/87 there are no changes in financial policy biases relative to the previous two 
years if m = 0. Shareholders are nontaxpayers and are unaffected by the introduction 
of the capital gains tax.
The case where m is approximated by the top personal marginal tax rate is intriguing. 
If m = 0.582 and real gains accrue, the gain to shareholders from a firm issuing a 
dollar less new equity and retaining an additional dollar (RE/NE) is negative. This is 
because with the high rate of inflation in this year the real after-tax interest rate, 
r'= -0.029 < 0 and c = 0.660 > m . Appendix 2.1 explained how c can exceed m if the 
real after-tax interest rate is negative. This means that with a high enough weighting 
being given to real gains accruing, it is possible for new equity to be preferred to 
retentions if m is assumed to be the top personal marginal tax rate.
Perhaps the most intriguing result is the very large negative numbers in the final two 
rows of Table 4.5 when real gains accrue. These are not typographical errors. For 
example, the cost to shareholders from reducing new equity issues and increasing debt 
by a dollar is $39.08 if real gains are expected to accrue. The reason for this extreme 
result is that the very high rate of inflation in 1986/87 together with the high top 
marginal tax rate makes (() = [/(1 - m ) -  cn] / (1 -  c) very close to zero. Indeed, if n 
were 9.4 rather than 9.3 per cent per annum, § would be negative. As <\> —» 0+, the cost
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to shareholders of a firm reducing new equity issues or retentions and increasing debt 
by a dollar —> oo. To see why, it is helpful to consider the opposite of experiment 
where a firm issues a dollar of new equity and lends the proceeds so net debt falls by a 
dollar. If z'(l -  m) = cn, a shareholder can borrow a dollar to purchase the dollar of 
new equity meeting the after-tax cost of interest with the stream of inflation 
deductions. Accordingly the net after-tax cost of funds is zero and the present value 
of the future dividend stream becomes infinite.
Table 4.5 Effects of Permanent Perturbations in Financial Policy as Function of 
Marginal Tax Rate of Shareholders r = 0.05, a = 0.2, n = 0.093
m =  0 Top Marginal Tax Ratea b
RG RLNG NL Wtd.
Avg.




RE/NE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610
Debt/RE 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460 -0.150 -0.150 -0.150 -0.150
Debt/NE 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460
1986/8 7b
RE/NE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.078 0.582 0.110 0.044
Debt/RE 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460 -38.999 -0.122 0.133 -23.372
Debt/NE 0.460 0.460 0.460 0.460 -39.077 0.460 0.243 -23.328
a The top marginal tax rate in 1984/85 and 1985/86 was 0.61. b The top marginal tax rate in 1986/87
was 0.582.
To summarise, provided m can be approximated by the average marginal tax rate of 
shareholders there are a number of general conclusions that can be made. There were 
tax biases favouring retentions relative to new equity and debt relative to both 
retentions and new equity prior to Australia's full imputation reform. Concerns about 
these were part of the reason for the reform. By itself, Australia's capital gains tax 
tended to reduce the tax bias favouring retentions relative to new equity which may 
have resulted in new and existing firms being taxed more neutrally. It is more 
difficult to assess the effects of the capital gains tax on debt/equity biases. Provided 
once more that m can be approximated by the average marginal tax rate of
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shareholders, the capital gains tax tended to increase the tax bias favouring debt 
relative to retentions but reduced the bias favouring debt relative to new issues.
These results are very sensitive to the assumed rate of m which suggests that there 
must be considerable uncertainty about financial policy biases which may have arisen 
at that time.4 If m were approximated by the top marginal rate in 1986/87 and real 
gains were deemed certain to accrue, we have seen that new equity would be preferred 
to retentions. More generally, the combination of high rates of inflation and high 
marginal tax rates can lead to some extreme financial policy biases. These arise 
because of the indexation of capital gains but not of other forms of income. For 
example, there could have created an extreme pro-equity bias in firms where there was 
a significant prospect of real gains accruing.
4.4 Changes in Financial Policy Biases: 1984/85 to 1996/97
This section combines the analysis of chapter 2 and section 4.3 to analyse how 
financial policy biases are likely to have changed over time and, in particular, how 
they are likely to have been affected by the introduction of Australia's full imputation 
scheme. It is assumed throughout this section that m can be approximated by the 
average marginal tax rate of shareholders as given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.6 presents estimates of how the permanent perturbations in financial policy 
examined in Chapter 2 and section 4.3 affect shareholder wealth. In deriving these 
estimates it is assumed that 20 per cent of shares turn over each year, and that the real 
interest rate is 5 per cent per annum. The company tax rate, x, and the inflation rate,
7i, are as given in Table 4.1. As previously, we provide a weighted average of gains 
assuming fairly arbitrary weightings of 0.6, 0.1 and 0.3 for real gains, real losses but 
nominal gains, and nominal losses respectively. This could be criticised on the 
grounds that in times of higher inflation, real losses but nominal gains are more likely 
to accrue but any attempt to take account of this seems similarly arbitrary.
4 This contrasts with conclusions about financial policy biases under full imputation discussed in 
chapter 2. There we saw that under current tax rates and levels o f inflation which have occurred in 
recent years, incentives to replace RUE with debt or new equity, incentives to replace debt with new 
equity and incentives to pay franked dividends arise not only if m is approximated by the average 
marginal tax rate of final shareholders but also if it is approximated by the tax rate of superannuation 
funds or the top personal marginal tax rate.
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The first row of Table 4.6 entitled RUE/NE shows the gain in cents of permanently 
replacing a dollar of new equity with a dollar of unfrankable earnings. Likewise, the 
second row entitled RUE/Debt measures the gain from permanently replacing a dollar 
of debt with a dollar of unfrankable earnings and so forth. The Table records five of 
the six perturbations considered in chapter 2. We omit the gain from replacing RFE 
with RUE as this switch is merely a matter of accounting and, in any case, firms 
paying dividends are compelled to pay them franked if they have positive franking 
account balances. The numbers are calculated using equations (2.16), (2.18), (2.19), 
(2.20), (2.21), (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11).
Table 4.6 Effects of Permanent Perturbations in Financial Policy for Companies 
Owned by Shareholders on the Average Marginal Rate* 
a = 0.2, r = 0.05, m, % Varying
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
F ull Im p
R U E /N E 0.061 0.066 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.066 0.067 0.067
R U E /D ebt 0.183 0.241 0.214 0.148 0.100 0.118 0.113 0.178 0.152 0.078
N E /R F E 0.621 0.349 0.371 0.377 0.377 0.377 0.276 0.264 0.310 0.310
N E /D eb t 0.122 0.175 0.150 0.084 0.036 0.053 0.049 0.112 0.085 0.011
D ebt/R F E 0.499 0.175 0.221 0.293 0.341 0.324 0.227 0.152 0.225 0.299
C lassica l
R E /N E 0.300 0.310 0.062 0.061 0.066 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.066 0.067 0.067
D ebt/R E 0.160 0.150 0.198 0.255 0.107 0.135 0.179 0.208 0.197 0.152 0.102 0.144 0.191
D ebt/N E 0.460 0.460 0.260 0.315 0.173 0.198 0.243 0.272 0.262 0.216 0.168 0.211 0.258
*A key assumption is that when frankable earnings are retained the company does not issue franked
bonus shares.
It is assumed as in chapter 2 that if franked earnings are retained, franked bonus 
shares are not issued. This assumption will be varied later in this section. In order to 
compare financial policy biases arising under full imputation with those which would 
have arisen had a classical company tax system been retained, the classical company 
tax system series is extended beyond 1986/87.
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In all years since the introduction of full imputation, the greatest gain to shareholders 
appears to be from firms to paying franked dividends and issuing new equity instead. 
The second largest gain in all but two years is the from firms paying franked 
dividends and issuing debt instead. As has been discussed previously, dividend 
payout rates increased significantly after the full imputation reform probably because 
of these incentives. Throughout the period there have been incentives for firms to 
reduce debt and issue new equity instead although this incentive is very small in 
1996/97 because of the low inflation rate in this year. For firms paying unfranked 
dividends, there are also incentives to retain unfrankable earnings to reduce debt.
These have been highest in periods of higher inflation such as 1987/88 to 1990/91 and 
1994/96 and 1995/96. These biases contrast with those favouring corporate debt in 
1984/85 to 1986/87 when the classical company tax system was in place. As has been 
discussed previously, there is little evidence of a significant fall in debt/equity ratios 
following the full imputation reform. Part of the reason may be that some firms 
which have increased dividend payments as a result of incentives to pay franked 
dividends have (possibly because of transactions costs associated with issuing new 
equity) issued additional debt. Finally, there are incentives for firms to retain 
unfrankable earnings (refrain from paying unfranked dividends) ahead of issuing new 
equity.
As one of the objectives of the full imputation reform was to reduce financial policy 
biases, it is of interest to examine how these biases compare with those which would 
have arisen if a classical company tax system had been retained. The extension of the 
series for a classical company tax system to 1987/88 and subsequent years allows 
biases to be compared. It is assumed that if a classical company tax system were 
retained that inflation rates and tax rates would have been the same as under full 
imputation.
It is somewhat difficult to compare financial biases under full imputation with those 
which would have arisen under a classical company tax system. This is because there 
are two different forms of retained earnings with different tax consequences under full 
imputation but only a single form of retained earnings under a classical company tax 
system. Five pairs of perturbations are examined under full imputation but only three 
pairs under a classical company tax system. To make comparisons, it is helpful to 
distinguish three types of possible companies under full imputation. First, some firms 
(possibly including firms attempting to create a reservoir of franking credits) pay less 
than the maximum level of franked dividends. For them, at the margin, financial 
policy can be adjusted by altering NE, debt or RFE. Biases involving RUE are 
irrelevant. Second, some firms pay unfranked dividends. For them, at the margin,
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financial policy can be adjusted by altering NE, debt or RUE. Biases involving RFE 
are irrelevant. Thirdly, some firms may be paying the maximum level of franked 
dividends and no unfranked dividends. For them there will be an asymmetry in costs 
of adjusting retained earnings. Increasing retained earnings means retaining frankable 
earnings while decreasing retained earnings means retaining less unfrankable 
earnings. For them, all five biases will be relevant.
In 1996/97 the most powerful financial policy biases under full imputation are to 
ensure that franked dividends are distributed. This bias will be relevant for the 
majority of firms which are not paying unfranked dividends. The gains from reducing 
RFE and boosting new equity or debt by a dollar (31.0 or 29.9 cents respectively) are 
large relative to any of the financial policy biases which would have arisen under a 
classical company tax system. Apart from this gains under full imputation seem 
relatively small in 1996/97 and other years when inflation rates were low (e.g.,
1991/92 to 1993/94). Whether full imputation has reduced the cost of financial policy 
biases or not seems to be very dependent on the costs associated with incentives to 
pay franked dividends. The most obvious potential cost is that this may lead firms to 
pay excessive levels of franked dividends and to incur unnecessary transactions costs 
in gaining replacement capital.
As was discussed in chapter 1, concerns about this potential bias led to the bonus 
share provision whereby firms can stream franking credits to shareholders by issuing 
franked bonus shares in lieu of dividends. This allows firms to pass franking credits 
to shareholders while retaining earnings. If the bonus share provision is adopted when 
firms retain frankable earnings, there is no bias between retained frankable earnings 
and new equity. Gains to shareholders from financial policy perturbations would be 
as shown in Table 4.7.
In Table 4.7 figures are identical to those in Table 4.6 with the exception of the third, 
fourth and fifth rows. The biases favouring the retention of unfrankable earnings 
identified in Table 4.6 remain but any biases favouring the distribution of frankable 
earnings are much reduced. If when firms retained frankable earnings, they passed 
imputation credits to shareholders by issuing franked bonus shares, Table 4.7 would 
appear to suggest that full imputation had gone some way to reducing financial policy 
biases especially at low rates of inflation.
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Table 4.7 Effects of Permanent Perturbations in Financial Policy for Companies 
Owned by Shareholders on the Average Marginal Rate Making Use of Bonus
Share Provision
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
F ull Im p
R U E /N E 0.061 0.066 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.066 0.067 0.067
R U E /D ebt 0.183 0.241 0.214 0.148 0.100 0.118 0.113 0.178 0.152 0.078
N E /R F E * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N E /D ebt 0.122 0.175 0.150 0.084 0.036 0.053 0.049 0.112 0.085 0.011
R F E V D e b t 0.122 0.175 0.150 0.084 0.036 0.053 0.049 0.112 0.085 0.011
C lassica l
R E /N E 0.300 0.310 0.062 0.061 0.066 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.066 0.067 0.067
D ebt/R E 0.160 0.150 0.198 0.255 0.107 0.135 0.179 0.208 0.197 0.152 0.102 0.144 0.191
D ebt/N E 0.460 0.460 0.260 0.315 0.173 0.198 0.243 0.272 0.262 0.216 0.168 0.211 0.258
* A key assumption is that whenever a firm retains frankable earnings it issues franked bonus shares.
There appear to be no publicly available statistics on the extent to which firms make 
use of the bonus share provision. However, a casual reading of company reports 
suggests that this provision is used very infrequently. Moreover, this does not appear 
to be because firms are all paying out the maximum level of franked dividends 
making the provision redundant. Evidence was provided in section 2.7 that 
imputation credits being claimed by individual shareholders were too low for all 
companies to be issuing the maximum possible level of franked dividends or franked 
bonus shares. The reason why this provision is not more widely used appears to be a 
puzzle. One possible reason is that shareholders may be as clear-sighted as our model 
assumes. Some higher-marginal-tax rate shareholders (on tax rates above the 
company tax rate) may object to issues of franked bonus shares because they result in 
the shareholders being required to pay additional tax immediately without receiving 
any dividends. The benefit of these bonus shares in reducing capital gains taxes when 
shares are sold may not be widely understood. In addition, corporate managers who 
gain much of their remuneration through stock options may have weak incentives to 
promote issues of bonus shares.
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The intention behind the bonus share provision was to allow companies to pass 
franking credits to shareholders without paying dividends to minimise incentives for 
excessive distribution. If this provision worked well, the figures in Table 4.7 would 
suggest that the full imputation reform was likely to have reduced financial policy 
biases especially at low rates of inflation. Given that bonus shares appear to be issued 
very infrequently it seems impossible to be confident that the full imputation reform 
has reduced financial policy biases. However, more work is required in attempting to 
ascertain the likely efficiency costs of firms paying excessive levels of dividends 
before very much can be said about this issue.
4.5 The Classical Company Tax System and The Cost of Capital
Appendix 4.1 derives a formal expression for the cost of capital under Australia's 
former classical company tax system. As in chapter 3 it is assumed that firms have a 
fixed ratio of debt to capital stock. It is also assumed that the firm is paying dividends 
in all periods so marginal equity investment is financed by the retention of profits. 
This is a new-view or trapped-equity model of the corporation.
Even if a new view model was relevant for most firms under Australia's former 
classical company tax system which were able to finance investment by retaining 
profits, it will not be relevant for new firms which raise equity finance by issuing new 
equity. Thus, our model in which firms finance marginal equity investment by the 
retention of profits is likely to have been applicable to at most a subset of firms.
Assuming a constant rate of inflation of all prices, a constant nominal interest rate, 
constant rates of k and Z, and a constant ratio of debt to capital stock, b, Appendix 4.1 
shows that the cost of capital for a firm paying dividends in the year in which 
investment takes place and in all future years becomes
pF'  ( l -T(£  + Z))(<|>-7r + 8(l + 7c)) + 6(i(l-T)-<|>)
q (l + 7 i)(l-x )
(4.12)
This is the expression for the cost of capital derived in Appendix 3.1 for firms under 
full imputation which do not pay the maximum level of franked dividends where the 
constraint on the maximum level of franked dividends that can be paid is assumed to 
be slack. The reason that cost of capital expressions are the same is that in both cases 
marginal equity investment is financed by the retention of profits. Under a classical 
company tax system, the opportunity cost of a dollar of equity investment to 
shareholders is 1 - m  and shareholders get the fraction 1 - m  of the net-of-company 
tax proceeds. Under full imputation in this case, the opportunity cost of a dollar of
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equity investment i s ( l - m ) / ( l - x )  and shareholders get the fraction (1 — m ) / (1 — t ) 
of the net-of-company tax proceeds. As dividend taxes have the same proportionate 
effect on the benefits and opportunity cost of an investment, they do not affect 
investment decisions. This insight goes back to King (1974a and b).
If the cost of capital were unchanged as a result of the full imputation reform, the 
reform would appear to have some unattractive features. The reform would have 
reduced the cost of issuing new equity which would have reduced the bias against new 
and rapidly-expanding companies. However, it would have reduced the government's 
tax collections by providing a lump-sum gain to shareholders without affecting 
investment incentives for mature dividend-paying firms. As replacement taxes will 
almost inevitably impose deadweight losses, this is likely to be inefficient. Any 
investment efficiency gains from the full imputation reform would be limited to 
reducing investment biases for new and rapidly-expanding firms which are unable to 
finance marginal investment by the retention of profits. At the same time as discussed 
in section 2.5, the large bulk of shares owned by individuals appear to be held by 
those on higher incomes and higher marginal tax rates. It would also appear difficult 
to defend a lump-sum reduction in tax on shareholders on equity grounds.
The intention behind Australia's full imputation refonn was to go further than merely 
giving dividend relief and to provide incentives for full distribution of frankable 
earnings. If, as we have argued, full distribution is still optimal from the point of the 
large majority of domestic final shareholders, the reform can have important effects in 
compressing biases between different forms of investment that companies can 
undertake as was analysed in chapter 3. This suggests that it is important that the 
financial bias we have identified favouring the distribution of frankable earnings (or, 
equivalently, franked bonus shares) not be eliminated.
It is helpful to consider the cost of capital for widely-held companies under the three 
idealised depreciation regimes considered in section 3.2. In each of these regimes 
(expensing, nominal economic depreciation, and real economic depreciation) it is 
assumed that there is no investment allowance so k = 0. The values of k+Z are as 
given in Table 3.1. Substituting these into (4.12) yields the cost of capital expressions 
provided in Table 4.8. To provide some brief intuition for these expressions, assume 
that there is no inflation.
With expensing, income on a marginal investment is effectively untaxed at the 
company level just as such an investment was at the personal level when undertaken 
by an unincorporated enterprise. If the investment is fully equity financed (ie., b = 0), 
the first expression in Table 4.8 becomes p = r(l -  m) / (1 -  c) . This is because the
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only layer of tax on retention-financed investment is as a result of the capital gains 
tax. In equilibrium the after-tax return on corporate investment, p(l -  c) must equal 
the opportunity cost of investment, r( 1 -  m). Suppose instead that b -  1 -  x . This 
avoids the need for any equity finance. Each dollar of capital expenditure reduces a 
firm's tax liability by x requiring further finance of 1 -  x which is met solely by debt. 
If investment is fully debt financed, a marginal investment needs to just cover the 
after-tax cost of interest, r( 1 -  x). As investment income is effectively untaxed at the 
company level, the cost of capital is equal to the after-tax interest rate, p = r ( l - x ) .
Table 4.8 Cost of Capital with Classical Company Tax System
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In the absence of inflation the cost of capital would clearly be the same whether 
nominal or real economic depreciation were deductible as there would be no 
difference between the depreciation schemes in this case. If investment is fully equity 
financed, p = r ( l - r a ) / ( l - x ) ( l - c ) .  In this case corporate investment is being 
double taxed first at the company level and second as a result of the capital gains tax. 
The after-tax return on corporate investment p ( l - x ) ( l - c )  is equal to the 
opportunity-cost of investment, r(l -  m). If instead investment is fully debt financed, 
p = r because income would be taxed on the same basis as interest is deducted.
4.6 Changes in The Cost of Capital Between 1984/85 and 1996/97
This section provides estimates of costs of capital in Australia over the period 1984/85 
to 1996/97. Estimates are presented for three possible cases. The first is the case 
discussed in the text of chapter 3 which will be referred to as the 'base case' where
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from 1987/88 onwards companies pay franked dividends, issue new equity and pay no 
unfranked dividends. The second is where from 1987/88 companies pay unfranked 
dividends in all periods. As discussed in Appendix 3.1 this implies costs of capital 
will be the same for all possible investments. Finally, we consider the classical 
company tax system. This last case shows how costs of capital would have changed if 
other tax changes had taken place but Australia's classical company tax system had 
been retained. As noted earlier, it would also be relevant in some case under full 
imputation if there are firms for which the constraint on the maximum level of franked 
dividends that can be paid is not binding.
Incentives to invest will have changed through time for a number of reasons. These 
include changes to tax rates and inflation rates as well as more general reforms to the 
tax base. To isolate the effects of the more general reforms to the tax base it is helpful 
to start by considering how costs of capital would have changed through time if tax 
rates on shareholders and inflation had remain constant. Table 4.9 provides estimates 
of the cost of capital assuming m remains constant at 33 cents in the dollar and that r 
and 7i remain constant at rates of 5.0 and 2.0 per cent per annum respectively. It is 
also assumed that b = 0.4 and 20 per cent of shares are sold each year. Given that tax 
rules have not changed between 1996/97 and 1997/98, this makes estimates of costs of 
capital in 1996/97 identical to those presented for 1997/98 in Table A3.3.1 in 
Appendix 3.1 so, for simplicity, 1997/98 costs of capital are omitted. For companies, 
the cost of capital will depend on whether real gains, real losses but nominal gains or 
nominal losses are expected to accrue. As in section 4.4 the three possible cases are 
combined by assuming weightings of 0.6, 0.1 and 0.3 respectively.
For unincorporated enterprises, under these settings there would have been a 
significant rise in the cost of capital for all types of equipment in 1985/86 because of 
the termination of the 18 per cent investment allowance. There would have been a 
more minor rise for most types of equipment in 1987/88 because of the termination of 
5/3 accelerated depreciation. In the same year the cost of capital for buildings would 
have risen as a result of the reduction in the rate of deductible allowance. The cost of 
capital for all types of equipment would have fallen in 1991/92 because of the more- 
accelerated depreciation provisions announced in the 'One Nation' Statement. There 
would have been a further temporary fall in 1992/93 and 1993/94 because of the 
temporary investment allowance. Over the period the cost of capital for trading stock 
would have remained constant at 5.0 per cent (ie., the assumed real interest rate) 
because the full nominal economic income from trading stock is taxable. The cost of 
capital for unincorporated R&D would have remained constant at the real after-tax
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interest rate of 2.7 per cent because for unincorporated enterprises such expenditure 
can be expensed.
Table 4.9 Costs of Capital, r = 0.05, a -  0.2, m = 0.33, n = 0.02, b = 0.4
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
UEs
3-YrEqpt 0.0 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 2.7 0.1 0.1 2.7 2.7 2.7
5-Yr Eqpt 1.2 4.1 4.1 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 3.9 2.3 2.3 3.9 3.9 3.9
10-Yr Eqpt 2.3 3.8 3.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.9 3.0 3.0 3.9 3.9 3.9
20-Yr Eqpt 2.4 3.3 3.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 3.7 3.2 3.2 3.7 3.7 3.7
30-Yr Eqpt 2.5 3.2 3.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.4
Trdg Stock 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
3-Yr R&D 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
1O-YrR&D 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Buildings 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Comps: 
Base Case
3-Yr Eqpt 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.6 4.1 4.1 4.1
5-Yr Eqpt 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.4
10-Yr Eqpt 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4
20-Yr Eqpt 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4
30-Yr Eqpt 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3
Trdg Stock 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7
3-Yr R&D 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.8
10-Yr R&D 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.7
Buildings 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Comps: UDs
All 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
Comps:
Classical
3-Yr Eqpt -2.6 5.4 6.6 6.8 6.0 6.0 6.0 2.9 -0.6 0.5 3.2 3.0 3.0
5-Yr Eqpt -0.4 4.5 5.5 6.8 6.0 6.0 6.0 4.8 2.7 3.1 4.7 4.8 4.8
10-Yr Eqpt 1.3 4.0 4.9 6.7 5.9 5.9 5.9 4.9 3.7 3.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
20-Yr Eqpt 1.6 3.1 3.9 6.5 5.8 5.8 5.8 4.5 3.8 3.9 4.5 4.5 4.5
30-Yr Eqpt 1.7 2.9 3.6 6.4 5.7 5.7 5.7 4.2 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.2 4.2
Trdg Stock 6.2 6.0 7.4 7.8 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.1 6.1 6.4 6.4
3-Yr R&D 2.1 -20.4 -20.6 -23.8 -14.4 -14.4 -14.4 -14.4 -14.4 -10.1 -10.1 -12.1 -4.6
10-Yr R&D 2.1 -5.5 -5.7 -7.0 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -1.5 -1.5 -2.3 0.4
Buildings 4.0 3.9 5.0 6.0 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3
For companies in 1984/85 (taxed under the classical company tax system) it is 
interesting to note that the cost of capital for forms of investment other than trading 
stock and buildings would have been lower than for unincorporated enterprises 
despite the company tax rate being greater than the assumed marginal tax rate of 
shareholders. At first sight this might seem counterintuitive. There are two reasons.
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First, companies were partly debt financed. Second, the combined effect of the 18 per 
cent investment allowance and 5/3 accelerated depreciation was, under these 
assumptions, to make k + Z > 1 for all forms of equipment investment. For R&D 
capital expenditure could be expensed so k + Z = 1.
Suppose k + Z = 1 and corporate investment is fully equity financed (b = 0). In 
1984/85 there was no capital gains tax. Substituting b - c -  0, into the cost of capital 
expression in Table 4.7 for the case of expensing, the cost of capital becomes 
p = r(l -  m) -  mn / (1 + tu) . This is the same expression as the cost of capital for an 
unincorporated enterprise when k + Z = 1 (i.e., with expensing) recorded in Table 3.1. 
In both cases for a marginal investment the value of the deduction is equal to the 
present value of future taxes so a marginal investment is effectively untaxed. In this 
case, the cost of capital equals shareholders' real after-tax interest rate, 
p = r'= r(l -m)  -  mn / (1 + n) = 2.7%.
Now suppose, however, that b = 1 -  x. Substituting this into the expression in Table 
4.7, the cost of capital for corporate investment becomes p = r( \ -  x) -  xn / (1 + n) or 
1.8%. The after-tax interest rate for a company is less than the real opportunity cost 
of funds to shareholders if m < x and there is no capital gains tax. This means that the 
cost of capital for corporate debt-financed investment is less than that for equity 
financed investment. As b increases from 0 to 0.54, the cost of capital for corporate 
investment falls from 2.7 to 1.8 per cent. For R&D in 1984/85 capital expenditure 
could be expensed. The estimated cost of capital for corporate R&D is 2.1 per cent 
under the assumption that b = 0.4. Thus, partial debt financing is one reason why the 
cost of capital could be lower for corporate enterprises than for unincorporated 
enterprises in 1984/85.
The second reason is the present value of capital deductions. As was noted earlier, in 
1984/85 k + Z> 1 for all forms of equipment investment. Even if corporate 
investment were fully equity financed, the cost of capital would be lower for 
companies than unincorporated enterprises in this case because the present value of 
tax collections on a marginal investment is negative. The pre-tax rate of return for 
these investments will be less than post-tax rates of return by an amount which would 
increase with the statutory rate at which income is taxed. Investment in companies 
was taxed at the statutory rate of 46 per cent whereas investment in unincorporated 
enterprises on our assumptions was taxed at 33 per cent. The higher company tax rate 
tends to reduce the cost of capital for companies relative to unincorporated
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enterprises.5 The combined effect of k + Z being greater than 1 and corporate 
investment being assumed to be partly debt financed means that costs of capital for 
many forms investment are estimated to be significantly lower for companies than for 
unincorporated enterprises in 1984/85.
For trading stock nominal economic income is fully taxed under our assumptions. 
From Table 3.1 this means that the cost of capital for an unincorporated enterprise 
will be r. Table 4.8 shows that this would also be the cost of capital for corporate 
investment under a classical company tax system if b = 1. If on the other hand b = 0, 
the cost of capital for companies would be p = r(l -  m) / (1 -  x). This exceeds r if, as 
is assumed to be the case in 1984/85, m < x . The higher cost of capital for corporate 
than unincorporated investment in trading stock in 1984/85 arises because it is 
assumed that m < x and b < 1.
Now consider changes in corporate costs of capital over the period under these 
settings. Many changes reflect alterations in the tax base which were described for 
unincorporated enterprises. In 1985/86 the cost of capital for investment in corporate 
equipment rises markedly because of the termination of the investment allowance. 
Changes in corporate costs of capital tend to be even larger than for unincorporated 
costs of capital because of the higher company tax rate. The cost of capital for 
corporate R&D fell dramatically in this year especially for short-lived investment 
because of the 150 per cent deduction. Increases in the cost of capital in 1986/87 for 
most forms of investment were a consequence of the introduction of the capital gains 
tax.
In 1987/88 when full imputation was introduced, the effect on costs of capital depend 
on the type of company being analysed. For base case companies (paying the 
maximum level of franked dividends and no unfranked dividends), Table 4.9 records 
falls in costs of capital for all forms of investment other than R&D. This is despite 
lower capital allowances for buildings and the termination of 5/3 accelerated 
depreciation. For base case companies, the most noticeable changes in later years are
5 It is worth noting that under a traditional view model of a classical company tax system, these effects 
would be magnified. The extreme case is when the company is assumed to pay 100 per cent of its 
after-tax profits as dividends in each period. In this case under a traditional view model, corporate 
profits would be taxed at the rate t+w(1-t) which would be 63.8 per cent assuming m is 0.33. This 
case would be equivalent to a new-view model in which c is zero and the rate of company tax is 63.8 
per cent.
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to equipment as a result of the introduction of more accelerated depreciation 
provisions in 1991/92 and the temporary investment allowance in 1992/93 and to 
R&D in 1996/97 as a result of the scaling back of the deduction for corporate R&D 
from 150 to 125 per cent. However, changes in costs of capital for corporate R&D in 
1996/97 appear small compared to those that took place in 1987/88. For example, for 
3-year R&D the cost of capital rose from -20.6% to 1.5% in 1987/88 but from 1.5% to 
only 2.8% in 1996/97. This suggests that full imputation may have had a much bigger 
effect on incentives for widely-held companies to invest in R&D than the much more 
controversial scaling back of the rate of deduction.
For companies paying unfranked dividends in all periods costs of capital for all types 
of equipment would have changed with the introduction of full imputation and 
remained constant at 4.4 per cent in subsequent years under these settings.
These estimates are sensitive to assumed values of b. As discussed in section 4.4 both 
base case companies and companies paying unfranked dividends have tax incentives 
to reduce debt. For base case companies, dp / db = acn / (1 -  m)(l + tc) . If real gains 
accrue, c = 0.299 under the assumption of Table 4.8 which means that if b were 0.0 
rather than 0.4, costs of capital would fall by approximately 0.2 percentage points 
(assuming a 0.6 weighting for real gains). For firms paying unfranked dividends 
dpi db = (i -  (J>) / (1 + 7i). Under our assumptions on weightings, costs of capital 
would fall by approximately 0.4 percentage points if b were 0.0. Under the classical 
company tax system costs would have risen by amounts which depend on t. The 
maximum effect is in 1987/88 when the company tax rate was highest and costs of 
capital would have risen by 1.8 percentage points.
Table 4.10 explores the effects of allowing m and 7i to vary through time as recorded 
in Table 4.1. Important influences on costs of capital because of changes in the 
income tax base have been discussed above and include the elimination of the 18 per 
cent investment allowance in 1984/85, the introduction of the 150 per cent deduction 
for corporate R&D in 1985/86, the introduction of the capital gains tax which affects 
corporate costs of capital in 1986/87, termination of 5/3 accelerated depreciation and 
the introduction of full imputation in 1987/88, the introduction of more accelerated 
depreciation provisions in 1991/92 and the temporary investment allowance in 
1992/93 and 1993/94. The effects of these changes are qualitatively the same as was 
discussed when explaining Table 4.9.
At the same time inflation rose from 6.6 per cent in 1984/85 to 9.3 per cent in 1986/87 
and has since fallen to 0.3 per cent. This fall in inflation has tended to increase costs 
of capital over time for assets other than trading stock (especially for longer-lived
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assets and R&D). Increases in the assumed rate of m tend to reduce costs of capital 
except for unincorporated R&D and to increase the spread of costs of capital.
Table 4.10 Costs of Capital: r = 0.05, a =0.2, b = 0.4, m and n Varying
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
UEs
3-Yr Eqpt 0.4 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.5 3.1 0.3 0.4 1.9 2.4 3.3
5-YrEqpt 1.2 3.3 3.2 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.1 2.4 2.4 3.5 3.7 4.2
10-Yr Eqpt 1.8 2.7 2.6 3.9 3.5 3.6 4.4 4.1 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.7 4.2
20-Yr Eqpt 1.8 1.9 1.7 3.5 2.9 3.1 4.2 3.9 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.4 4.1
30-Yr Eqpt 1.7 1.7 1.5 3.2 2.6 2.8 4.1 3.7 3.1 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.9
Trdg Stock 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
3-Yr R&D 1.6 1.0 0.8 1.6 0.8 1.1 2.4 3.1 2.8 2.9 1.9 2.4 3.3
10-YrR&D 1.6 1.0 0.8 1.6 0.8 1.1 2.4 3.1 2.8 2.9 1.9 2.4 3.3
Buildings 2.7 2.0 1.8 2.9 2.0 2.4 3.8 4.4 4.2 4.2 3.3 3.8 4.6
Comps: 
Base Case
3-Yr Eqpt 3.9 3.5 3.7 4.4 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.5
5-Yr Eqpt 3.9 3.4 3.6 4.4 4.6 4.1 4.2 3.9 4.2 4.8
10-Yr Eqpt 3.8 3.4 3.5 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.3 3.9 4.2 4.8
20-Yr Eqpt 3.7 3.3 3.4 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.4 3.9 4.2 4.7
30-Yr Eqpt 3.7 3.2 3.4 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.3 3.8 4.1 4.7
Trdg Stock 4.1 3.7 3.8 4.5 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.3 4.5 5.0
3-Yr R&D 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.4 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.2 3.2
10-Yr R&D 2.5 1.9 2.2 3.1 3.5 3.3 3.3 2.7 3.0 4.1
Buildings 3.6 3.1 3.3 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.6 3.9 4.3 4.9
Comps: UDs
All 3.6 3.1 3.3 4.2 4.6 4.4 4.4 3.9 4.1 4.7
Comps:
Classical
3-Yr Eqpt -2.1 5.7 6.7 7.3 5.4 5.7 6.0 3.2 -0.6 0.6 2.4 2.7 3.6
5-Yr Eqpt -0.6 4.0 4.7 6.9 5.1 5.4 5.9 5.0 2.7 3.1 4.3 4.6 5.1
10-Yr Eqpt 0.7 2.8 3.4 6.1 4.6 4.9 5.8 5.1 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.6 5.1
20-Yr Eqpt 0.5 1.3 1.7 5.2 3.9 4.2 5.5 4.8 3.9 4.0 3.9 4.2 4.9
30-Yr Eqpt 0.5 0.8 1.1 4.7 3.6 3.8 5.4 4.4 3.7 3.9 3.5 3.9 4.7
Trdg Stock 7.0 7.1 8.4 9.0 6.6 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.7 6.1 6.1 6.4 6.3
3-Yr R&D 0.3 -22.1 -22.5 -25.3 -15.7 -15.8 -14.7 -14.2 -14.4 -10.0 -10.7 -12.4 -4.0
lO-YrR&D 0.3 -7.2 -7.6 -8.5 -4.6 -4.6 -3.5 -3.0 -3.2 -1.4 -2.1 -2.6 0.9
Buildings 2.4 1.5 2.1 3.8 2.9 3.2 5.0 5.8 5.5 5.3 4.3 4.9 5.8
Figure 4.1 examines how the cost of capital for unincorporated enterprises has 
changed over time. Six types of investment are considered: 5-year, 10-year, 20-year 
and 30-year equipment, trading stock and buildings.
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Figure 4.1 Costs of Capital: Unincorporated Enterprises 
r = 0.05, m and 71 Varying
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
S- 5-Yr Eqpt —I— 10-Yr Eqpt S- 20-Yr Eqpt
S- 30-Yr Eqpt - X -  Trading Stock Buildings
For buildings there was a minor increase in the cost of capital in 1987/88 as a 
consequence of the reduction in allowed deductions. This was almost reversed in the 
following year by increases in m and the assumed inflation rate. Over the next few 
years the cost of capital for buildings rose as a consequence of reductions in inflation. 
The reduction of the cost of capital in 1994/95 and 1995/96 was the consequence of 
higher inflation. For equipment the major changes are attributable to the changes in 
capital write-off provisions which we have discussed and especially over the period 
from 1988/89 to 1990/91 the reduction in inflation. Over the period, there has been 
some rise in costs of capital for both equipment and buildings and some narrowing in 
differences in costs of capital. Inter-asset investment biases for unincorporated 
enterprises appear smaller than those at the beginning of the period although they are 
probably larger than was the case in 1990/91.
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Reductions in inflation are an important part of the reason for reductions in inter-asset 
biases. To isolate the effect of changes in the tax base, Figure 4.2 presents estimates 
of costs of capital for unincorporated enterprises assuming a constant marginal tax 
rate of 33 per cent and constant inflation of 2 per cent per annum.
Figure 4.2 Costs of Capital: Unincorporated Enterprises 
r = 0.05, m = 0 .33,7i = 0.02
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
S-  5-Yr Eqpt 10-Yr Eqpt - X -  20-Yr Eqpt
-E3- 30-Yr Eqpt - X -  Trading Stock -A t Buildings
Under these assumptions inter-asset biases would appear to have been minimised in 
the period 1987/88 to 1990/91 after 5/3 depreciation had been abolished and before 
the introduction of the more accelerated system of depreciation in February 1992. 
Figure 4.2 makes clear that the reductions in the spread of unincorporated costs of 
capital over the period 1988/89 to 1990/91 and over the period 1994/95 to 1996/97 are 
attributable to reductions in inflation and (for the first period) reductions in the 
assumed rate of m .
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Figure 4.3 presents data on costs of capital for different types of corporate investment 
assuming that from the introduction of full imputation the companies have been base 
case companies.
Figure 4.3 Costs of Capital: Companies (Base Case) 
r = 0.05, w, 7i Varying, a = 0.2, b = 0.4
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
Sr- 5-Yr Eqpt —K- 10-Yr Eqpt S -  20-Yr Eqpt
—B -  30-Yr Eqpt Sr- Trading Stock Buildings
The most striking feature of this diagram is the very marked compression in costs of 
capital from 1987/88 onwards. Inter-asset biases are much reduced by the 
introduction of full imputation. Changes in costs of capital since 1987/88 are 
qualitatively similar to those that arose for unincorporated enterprises. Inter-asset 
biases were largest in 1992/93 and 1993/94 when the 10 per cent investment 
allowance was available.
An important reason why full imputation has reduced the spread of corporate costs of 
capital is the way in which the capital gains tax can claw back the benefits of tax 
preferences available at the company level as was analysed in chapter 3. To isolate 
this effect, Figure 4.4 examines how costs of capital would have changed if there had
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been no capital gains tax ( a  = 0.0). There would have been a reduction in the spread 
of costs of capital in this case as well although it appears far less dramatic than in 
Figure 4.3 ( a  = 0.2). In this case the reason for the reduction in the spread of costs of 
capital in 1987/88 is because corporate income ends up being taxed at the average 
marginal tax rate of shareholders rather than the higher company tax rate. From 
1987/88 onwards, this graph is identical to Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.4 Costs of Capital: Companies (Base Case) 
r = 0.05, m, n Varying, a = 0.0, b = 0.4
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
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Reforms to the tax base, and reductions in inflation and the company tax rate would 
have led to some reduction in inter-asset biases even if a classical company tax system 
had been retained. Figure 4.5 analyses costs of capital under this assumption. The 
large reduction in inter-asset biases in 1988/89 is largely due to the fall in the 
company tax rate from 49 per cent to 39 per cent. Reductions between 1988/89 and 
1990/91 are mainly due to reduced inflation. While there would have been some 
reduction in inter-asset biases even under a classical company tax system over the
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period, the reduction would have been much smaller than under full imputation. In 
1996/97 under full imputation costs of capital for these assets are estimated to have 
been in the range 4.5 to 5.0 per cent whereas under a classical company tax system 
costs of capital would have been in the range 3.6 to 6.3 per cent. The full imputation 
scheme appears to have a very important part of the reason why inter-asset biases for 
companies have been reduced.
Figure 4.5 Costs of Capital: Companies (Classical) 
r = 0.05, a m ,  re Varying, a = 0.2, b = 0.4
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
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Figures 4.6 and 4.7 analyse data in a way which allows intersectoral biases to be 
examined. Figure 4.6 shows differences between costs of capital for 5-year, 10-year, 
20-year and 30-year equipment, trading stock and buildings for unincorporated 
enterprises and for base-case companies. In the absence of any capital gains tax, there 
would be no differences between corporate and unincorporated costs of capital. 
However, in practice there can be large differences caused by the way in which the 
capital gains tax claws back tax preferences from companies but not unincorporated
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enterprises. It is of interest that in 1990/91 the year in which inter-asset biases appear 
smallest, intersectoral biases also appear smallest. This is the combined effect of the 
absence of substantially accelerated depreciation or any investment allowance in this 
year and only a moderate (3.4 per cent) rate of inflation. In 1991/92 these biases 
increased despite a lower inflation rate because of the introduction of a more 
accelerated depreciation regime. The biases increased further in 1992/93 because of 
the introduction of a 10 per cent investment allowance. In 1992/93 and 1993/94 the 
cost of capital for corporate investment in 5-year equipment exceeded that for 
unincorporated investment by approximately 1.7 percentage points. With the 
termination of the investment allowance in 1994/95 intersectoral biases became much 
smaller and were all less than one percentage point except for 30-year equipment in 
1994/95.
Figure 4.6 Differences in Costs of Capital:
Corporate (Base Case) - Unincorporated, r = 0.05, a = 0.2, b = 0.4, m , n Varying
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
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One puzzle that emerges from the results is that our model appears incapable of 
explaining the change in the corporate sector's share of fixed capital stock reported in 
Table 1.1. The combined effects of accelerated depreciation, the 18 per cent 
investment allowance, inflation and partial debt finance led to estimated costs of 
capital being lower in 1984/85 for companies than unincorporated enterprises for each 
of the four forms of equipment investment analysed and for buildings. By 1994/95 
the direction of all of these biases was reversed. It seems difficult to explain why the 
corporate sector's share of real net capital stock rose rather than fell over the period. It 
should be noted that this disturbing feature of the model would not be removed by 
assuming a traditional view model of a classical company tax system for the reasons 
given in footnote 5. Such a model would tend to magnify tax biases favouring 
corporate investment in 1984/85.
One possible explanation is that firms place much less emphasis on accelerated 
depreciation provisions and investment allowances than our model suggests. A 
possible reason may be that many projects do not involve a one-off investment but a 
stream of investment over many years. If a firm is being established or being 
expanded to invest in a new area, it may often not be reasonable for it to expect 
current investment allowances or accelerated depreciation provisions will continue 
into the future. Given the frequency with which these provisions have been changed, 
they may have a smaller effect on capital flows between companies and other 
enterprises than our model predicts because firms have little confidence on them 
remaining throughout the life of many projects. In 1984/85 this may have been 
particularly important for the 18 per cent investment allowance which had a legislated 
termination date of 30 June 1985. On the other hand, temporary provisions encourage 
firms to bring forward purchases of capital goods and can potentially have a larger 
effect on investment than permanent provisions. To help explain the data, it is 
necessary to assume that the former effect dominates.
To examine the effects of the full imputation reform Figure 4.7 shows how differences 
between corporate and unincorporated costs of capital would have changed over time 
if a classical company tax had been retained. By comparing Figures 4.6 and 4.7 it is 
clear that full imputation does not necessarily reduce intersectoral biases relative to a 
classical company tax system. In particular, in 1992/93 and 1993/94 intersectoral 
biases for all forms of equipment investment appear to be smaller under a classical 
company tax system than those under full imputation. However, under current tax 
settings intersectoral biases appear to be generally smaller than would have arisen 
under a classical company tax system. In 1996/97 it appears that for none of the six
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forms of investment analysed is it the case that intersectoral biases are larger under 
full imputation than under a classical company tax system.
Figure 4.7 Differences in Costs of Capital 
Corporate (Classical) - Unincorporated, r = 0.05, m, n Varying, a = 0.2
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97
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4.7 Summary and Concluding Comments
This chapter has extended our analysis of financial biases and the cost of capital to 
consider how financial and investment distortions are likely to have changed over 
time and especially the effects of the full imputation reform. There are many 
important qualifications one can raise about our analysis especially our failure to 
analyse the effects of varying marginal tax rates across different suppliers of capital in 
a given year and the fact that important classes of shareholders (foreigners and 
Australian companies) are ignored. However, the question of how changes to the tax 
system have affected financial policy and investment incentives seems an important 
question and our analysis provides at least a step to analysing these issues.
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Treating all shareholders as being taxed at a single marginal rate seems an even 
stronger assumption when analysing Australia's former classical company tax system 
than when analysing full imputation because under the former tax system and under 
the inflation rates occurring at that time the direction of a number of biases seem to 
depend on the assumed value of m. If we approximate m by the average marginal tax 
rate of shareholders, it appears that full imputation has reversed a number of biases 
that arose under Australia's former classical company tax system. However, there 
seems to be little evidence that these biases have fallen as a result of full imputation.
In particular, there is a strong bias favouring the payment of franked dividends which 
may potentially cause firms to make excessive payments of dividends and incur 
unnecessarily high transactions costs if they issue new equity to replace the capital. 
Australia's provision allowing the franking of bonus shares was designed to avoid this 
problem but this provision appears to be little used. Further research is required to 
determine the reasons. Despite some possible costs associated with firms paying 
excessive levels of franked dividends, it is far from clear that this bias should be 
removed. Indeed, this bias is a critical feature of Australia's full imputation 
provisions. Without this feature, the full imputation reform may have involved a 
reduction in tax revenue without having much on reducing investment biases.
Income-tax-base broadening measures such as the termination of investment 
allowances and movements from more-accelerated to less-accelerated systems of 
depreciation appear to have had important effects in reducing inter-asset biases for 
unincorporated enterprises. Movements to reintroduce investment allowances and to 
move back to more-accelerated depreciation provisions have had the opposite effect. 
Inter-asset biases have also been reduced by reductions in inflation. Measures which 
reduce inter-asset biases for unincorporated enterprises generally also reduce these 
biases for the base case companies we have focussed on in this thesis. The full 
imputation reform itself has had an extremely powerful effect in reducing inter-asset 
biases for these companies and the effects of these other measures have been small in 
comparison. Reductions in company tax are clawed back at the shareholder level.
For companies paying unfranked dividends in all periods, the effects of the full 
imputation reform are more dramatic still. Inter-asset biases have been eliminated 
completely.
If one compares unincorporated enterprises and base case companies, it would appear 
that inter-firm biases have also generally fallen over time. However, it seems unclear 
whether full imputation involves greater or smaller intersectoral biases than would 
apply under a classical company tax system. In particular, tax preferences such as the 
10 per cent investment allowance available in 1992/93 and 1993/94 can cause
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intersectoral biases to increase. This is because the benefits of such measures are 
partially clawed back from companies as a result of full imputation and capital gains 
taxes. This suggests that the full imputation scheme is relatively inflexible. If the 
government wishes to provide tax incentives to encourage specific forms of 
investment, a major consequence may be to introduce intersectoral biases because 
unincorporated enterprises are able to capture the full benefits of these incentives but 
they are clawed back from companies by additional taxes on shareholders. Biases 
regarding whether investment is undertaken by companies or unincorporated 
enterprises would have been eliminated entirely if (as in New Zealand) the company 
tax rate and top personal marginal tax rate were aligned and if there had been no 
capital gains tax on shares. By levying a tax on gains in shares, the government has 
reintroduced a bias against corporate investment.
A final empirical concern with our analysis stems from the fact that when account is 
taken of detailed provisions of the tax code and rates of inflation, corporate costs of 
capital for equipment investment and buildings appear to have increased over time 
relative to unincorporated costs of capital since 1984/85. Over the same period, the 
corporate sectors share of net real capital stock has appeared to climb steadily. Our 
analysis fails to explain this trend.
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Appendix 4.1 The Cost of Capital with a Classical Company Tax 
System
In calculating the cost of capital assume once more that debt is a fixed proportion of 
capital stock as in equation (3.1) and that the firm chooses /, D and V N to maximise
its initial value. Substituting (2.9) into (4.4) and using (2.10), (3.1) and (4.2), the 
Lagrangian for the firm's optimisation problem becomes
L = t - r - 3 -----  \ - ^ D - V , N + X',[(l -  xt)ptF(Kt_t) -  -  x ^ + q ^ K ,
'"11(1 + *,) I 1-c,
5=1 V
+ + x , t  A + V ? - D , ]
where X) and X) are inequality constraints on dividends and new equity issues 
respectively.
The first-order conditions imply
K u  ((’ - V i ) P ^ F ' ( K , ) - { \  + iM ( \ - x M))bt q, ) +  +  0 " 8)  = 0(4.11)
+ x\{i,+(1-8) a;., -  K ) + X]D, + X]V,N
+... -  A?, = 0 (4.12)
1 1 1 !-c,
-1 + X\ + X4, = 0
(4.13)
(4.14)
3 3For a mature firm paying dividends in year t and subsequent years, Xt =Xt+] =...0. 
This means that
A), = ( l -m ,) /( l-c ,) ,  V/ (4.15)





« , = 1
V1-c, +« /
11=0 no+A)
i = / + i
(4.17)
Substituting into (4.11) yields
1 - ”U.
1~ ci+1
( l -V .) /0 ’( 0 1 -  mt
l “ c,
(1 -t,£,)-Q, (1 + 0 - ?,+i
1-
+*,((!■-V .)A r-♦„.)[■7 ^
V 1 _ C r*l
^ ( i - v , 0 - n , . ,  ( i-5 )1 - 0+1 J
(4.18)
If r, 7i, i, m, c, t, b, k and Z are constant through time and pt = p( 1 + 7u)' and
qt = q( l + 7t)',
P =
(l -  x(k  + Z))(§ -  n + 5(1 + 7i)) + b(i(l -  t) -  <())
(l + 7l ) ( l -T)
(4.19)
where Z is the present value of depreciation deductions,
oo Az = X-^- 
„=0 (1 + <|>)"
(4.20)
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CHAPTER 5: FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This thesis has attempted to modify some important international studies to analyse 
corporate financial policy and investment decisions under Australian tax settings. To 
focus on key issues in as simple as possible a setting, it has made a number of 
simplifying assumptions. It has abstracted from risk and uncertainty, considered only 
firms which are in a taxpaying position, abstracted from any transactions costs of 
issuing different securities, considered only firms which are owned by Australian 
shareholders and treated all shareholders as being taxed at a uniform rate, m.
Because of the simplicity of the model, there is considerable scope for further 
modification. The thesis is only a very partial move towards analysing corporate 
financial policy and investment decisions and should be thought of as a first step in a 
much wider research program.
It would be desirable to extend this analysis in a number of directions. This involves 
both a theoretical and an empirical side. Important theoretical extensions include the 
following:
• allowing for foreign shareholders and international equity flows. Allowing 
for outflows of foreign capital from Australia is straightforward. Dividends received 
by Australian companies from a wide list of'comparably-taxed' countries including 
Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States are 
exempt. This means that the cost of capital net of foreign taxes would be the same as 
for the case of expensing analysed in Chapter 3. As regards inflows of capital, it may 
also not be too difficult to modify the analysis of the thesis to allow for foreign 
portfolio investors who will normally be taxed on dividends from Australia but be 
able to claim credits for withholding taxes. It is more complex to modify the analysis 
to allow for the case of foreign direct investors where incentives to invest will often 
depend on complex interactions between Australian and foreign tax systems.
• allowing for companies in a tax-loss position. This would be a minor 
amendment which is easily incorporated within the general analytical frameword of 
this thesis.
• extending the model to allow for a q theoiy o f investment. Following the work 
of Summers (1981) and Abel (1979 and 1982), it has become common to consider 
how taxes can affect investment decisions in a model which allows for convex 
adjustment costs. There have been no Australian studies which consider the effects of 
taxation in this framework. Our model could be modified to allow for convex 
adjustment costs and hence allow these types of models to be considered in an
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Australian context. This would also appear to be a relatively straightforward 
modification of the analysis in this thesis.
• allowing for uncertainty. A number of authors have examined the effects of 
taxes on the return from risky assets. For example, Gordon (1985) argues that when 
uncertainty is taken into account, taxation of corporate income can leave incentives to 
invest little changed because of the risk-spreading effects of the tax. Bulow and 
Summers (1984) argue that this conclusion can be overturned if the prices of capital 
goods are uncertain and depreciation allowances are set ex ante. It would be of 
interest to extend the model to incorporate uncertainty.
• extending the model to allow for multiple classes o f shareholder. It would be 
of interest to consider multiple classes of shareholder perhaps by modifying the work 
of Brennan (1971) and Gordon and Bradford (1980).
• allowing for transactions costs in issuing new equity. Our model has 
suggested that it will normally be optimal for widely-held companies to have a policy 
of paying out the maximum level of franked dividends or franked bonus shares. One 
reason for firms not doing so is transactions costs. It would be of interest to attempt 
to modify the model to allow for transactions costs of issuing new equity.
Important empirical studies stemming from this study include the following:
• an examination of the question of why firms issue debt when new equity 
appears to be tax preferred. This study seems to be of particular interest because of 
the way in which the financial policy bias is in the opposite direction of the United 
States bias which has had much more attention.
• an examination of why firms pay unfranked dividends when there appear to be 
preferable alternatives including reducing debt or lending.
• an examination of why some firms appear to retain substantial levels of 
frankable earnings when paying franked dividends or issuing franked bonus shares 
appears to be preferred.
While the thesis has been a small step in analysing the effects of Australian tax 
provisions on corporate financial policy and investment decisions, this appears to be 
an important research area which has received much too little analysis in Australia. 
The thesis is a start at analysing these issues in an Australian context. Within its very 
simplified framework, the thesis has come to conclusions on corporate financial 
policy which differ from those of previous Australian studies. It has also developed 
expression for the cost of capital which take account of taxes on both companies and 
shareholders and allow the value of the firm to be set endogenously. It is hoped that 
further work will expand our understanding of issues raised in the thesis.
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